

National Institute for



Intelligence Studies

RISR No. 24/2020

# ROMANIAN INTELLIGENCE STUDIES REVIEW



“MIHAI VITEAZUL”

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ACADEMY



# **ROMANIAN INTELLIGENCE STUDIES REVIEW**

**No. 24/2020**

The *Romanian Intelligence Studies Review* is an open access academic journal with scientific prestige acknowledged by the National Council for the Validation of University Titles, Diplomas and Certificates (CNADTCU), indexed in the international databases CEEOL and EBSCO. The responsibility regarding the content of the published articles it is entirely up to the authors in accordance with the provisions of Law no. 206 of May 27, 2004. The opinions expressed in the published materials belong to the authors and do not represent the position of MVNIA.

**Bucharest  
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# **INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS**

## INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE LIAISON: BENEFITS AND DANGERS

Alin DREPTATE\*

### Abstract:

*Liaison between intelligence services is based on necessity and not on friendship, and it bears both benefits due to exchanges of information, coverage of intelligence gaps and shared operational costs, but it also has risks. The latter is given by the differences in the foreign policy of countries and their unequal perception of threats, observed in disproportionalities of resources allocated and power distribution to mitigate a perceived threat. Additionally to these, one of the most damaging aspects to intelligence cooperation agreement is the unauthorised disclosure, a consequence of insufficient national laws to regulate and protect intelligence cooperation; or due to vulnerabilities of an intelligence service caused by the presence of a penetration agent. Finding the balance between the benefits and dangers it is not an easy task which challenges the very need for liaison. This article argues that a pragmatic approach based on mutual interests and benefits will always outcome the risks associated with this activity.*

**Keywords:** *information, intelligence, liaison, espionage, cooperation.*

### Introduction

International intelligence cooperation between different and competitive organisations bear advantages and encounters difficulties, both driven by the perception of threats, national interests, foreign policy objectives, economic resources and intelligence needs. International intelligence liaison goes beyond national borders, and usually “depends on leaders and politicians” to facilitate it (Stafford & Rhodri, 2000, p. 2). In a traditional sense, liaison profits from the sharing of raw or processed information under the form of intelligence

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reports and assessments, or it can take a “wide range of forms and degrees” like operational access, influence or other long-term benefits (Westerfield, 1996, p. 523). A more complex interpretation highlights the advantages of cooperation under the form of training assistance, advice and logistics support, with or without participation in joint surveillance, joint source handling and covert activities or special operations (Lander, 2004). However, with all the benefits of international intelligence liaison, James Olson (2001) stressed the essence of intelligence services by underlining their nationally-orientated agendas: “there are friendly nations, but no friendly intelligence services” (Olson, 2001:83). This article will discuss the importance of international intelligence liaison by highlighting the benefits and the risks, and arguing that liaison takes place out of necessity, contrary to the simplistic “friendship, confidence and trust” perception of cooperation.

### **The benefits of intelligence liaison**

International intelligence liaison is necessary “in the face of a common threat” (Munton, 2009, p. 126). In most cases, the threat cannot be addressed unilaterally by a single nation due to the adversary’s technological advancement and military resources, or the “informal, mobile, variably organised and unpredictable” character of a non-state actor threat (Lander, 2004, p. 492). The Nazi threat led to cooperation between the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the Russian People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) in German-occupied territories, while the Soviet threat after WWII led to cooperation between the United States and West Germany to counteract Soviet operations and expansion of their influence. While these examples may seem obsolete, the 9/11 attacks reminisced the “fundamental tension between an increasingly networked world, which is ideal terrain for the new religious terrorism, and highly compartmentalized national intelligence-gathering”, emphasising the need for better liaison practices (Aldrich, 2004, p. 734). The 2004 bombings in Spain and the 2005 London suicide attacks brought additional awareness to the necessity of cooperation, making Spain to understand the need for a transnational approach to terrorism. Spain

sent attachés to “Libya and Morocco, to Mauritania in the increasingly important Sahel region, to Syria and Jordan in the Middle East” and signed agreements on countering terrorism with Mali and Algeria (Reinares, 2009, p. 381). The London bombings tragically exemplified an additional dimension of terrorism identified in internally and home-grown terrorists with influence from abroad, which made Britons more aware and susceptible to the need for international cooperation to counteract a common threat.

Intelligence liaison covers the gaps in intelligence coverage, access and expertise. Reaching out to other intelligence agencies allows external input to tackle the roots of the problem, and posture-shifting from reactive actions (countering or preventing attacks through tight security measures) to strategic / long-term effects. A strategic response is destroying the capability of an organisation, as exemplified by the cutting of the supply line of explosive materials, as occurred with Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in 1987 when the French authorities captured the MV Eksund arms ship. Additional examples during the Cold War support the same argument in favour of liaison for broad coverage and expertise. A lack of technical proficiency during the Cold War required the US to rely on the Germans to provide “assistance in breaking foreign diplomatic and spy codes, a science heavily dependent on advanced mathematical and computer skills in which Germans have traditionally excelled” (Johnson & Freyberg, 1997, p. 168). Also, offensive operations required intelligence liaison to facilitate access to information beyond the Iron Curtain, and foreign expertise in these countries’ administrative procedures for the infiltration of US spies. US-Israeli cooperation in the early 1950s favoured the US in obtaining through Jewish immigrants information about travel documents, food rations, military installations, factories and rail networks in communist countries. In return, Israel received modern training in technical intelligence and satellite imagery of areas of interest in neighbouring Arab countries (Kahana, 2001).

Intelligence cooperation also allows the extension of collection activities by overcoming geographical limits. America’s isolated position initially impeded the creation of its international spy networks, an aspect later on compensated by cooperation with the German

foreign intelligence service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND). During the Cold War, West German's geographical location allowed an "ideal base for US intelligence operations directed against the Soviet *bête noire*" (Johnson & Freyberg, 1997, p. 167). In the former British Crown Colonies, cooperation between the US and the United Kingdom proved invaluable, as the UK maintained airbases, naval installations and technical facilities which helped the US to physically access these areas and extend its political influence (Aldrich, 1998). The UK was also an appreciated liaison partner as it retained human expertise in Africa, the Middle East and parts of Asia, and, because of the PIRA, it had "unrivalled experience of dealing (in Northern Ireland) with a major and long-running terrorist threat" (Lander, 2004, p. 487). The US also overcame its geographical limitations through liaising with European neutral countries, which improved its capability of monitoring and scrutinising the Soviet territories in the post-WWII years.

A further benefit of intelligence cooperation is that intelligence cooperation reduces operational costs by joint manning of important facilities, missions / operations, and installations. Technical cooperation in signals intelligence is especially important, as it allows the combined use of already limited and expensive technical resources. Although it might prove problematic because of the asset's de-confliction and mission coordination schedule, an agreement in this regard almost certainly exists. This agreement allows for each entity to better distribute the technical and the human resources and monitor different areas of interest, later on exchanging the information or the assessments (e.g. 1946 US-UK signal intelligence agreement; Echelon system; BBC Monitoring cooperation with US Open Source Enterprise). While in the information field cooperation is achievable mostly without major consequences, at the tactical / operational level of kinetic missions with possible human casualties there is a high risk in synchronising forces. Cooperation presents difficulties given by the needs of a partner to act first or to obtain a certain outcome, in addition to the necessity of shared responsibility of success or failure, and the judicial consequences, if necessary, afterwards (e.g. 1985-1987 US-Israeli cooperation in the Iran Contra affair; UK-US handling of Oleg Penkovski in the 1960s). Great interoperability at tactical / operational

level is best highlighted by the liaison between the US and the UK which has the benefit of better logistical support due to US resources and the unique advantage given by the use of the same language, similar security classifications, procedures and joint communication channels.

Intelligence cooperation is also about projected common foreign policy (Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones and David Stafford, 2000) or, in the US-UK case, about “shared many preconceptions about international issues” (Lander, 2004, p. 487). Countries cooperate in the international arena as they have common advantages regarding the protection of economic interests, establishing a new market, exerting political influence or mounting a military presence in a region, while countering other international players. Examples of intelligence agencies cooperation are the UK-US collaboration to topple the government of Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953 because it affected British petroleum interests, while the US participated in the coup d’état over increased concern of Soviet influence, and a possible future military footprint in Iran. More generally, close intelligence liaison takes place also in forums like NATO or the UN where it facilitates the addressing of common threats and formulation of joint responses.

Crypto-diplomacy, or intelligence liaison substituting for non-existent diplomatic relations or supplementing them, is advantageous due to exchanging messages “through channels that can fairly easily be disavowed if unproductive” (Westerfield, 1996, p. 538). In cases when cooperation is exposed to public media, the government has plausible deniability of such liaison and subsequently it represents a lower risk of political responsibility. Additionally, intelligence officers can carry unsanctioned messages and establish cooperation mechanisms, while informally assessing the other party in regards to new proposals, which in case of failure can be refuted. Crypto-diplomacy had its highest point when this form of intelligence liaison facilitated the exchange of messages between the Soviet and US governments in 1962 that prevented nuclear conflict escalation. The use of crypto-diplomacy as a form a liaison has benefits, but one should consider the possible disadvantages of engaging in such secretive cooperation, especially when the inter-governmental “coordination of the channels is precarious” (Westerfield, 1996, p. 538).

Most successful cooperation between intelligence services is based on bilateral agreements compared with multilateral ones (e.g. Prüm Convention, Club of Berne, NATO Special Committee); or other forms of informal intelligence sharing. Bilateral cooperation 'is a daily occurrence for most intelligence services' and has the benefit of being more focused on the topics of interest (Hertzberger, 2007, p. 102). The information is exchanged directly between partners, on previously agreed terms, and with security risks usually lower than in other forms of cooperation. By comparison, multilateral agreements present several advantages as they have a multi-spectrum of "different areas of cooperation, different degrees of information sharing, different disciplines for partnering, and different specializations for exchanges", quantified in "systematic burden sharing, technology sharing, [and] shared access to specified intelligence assets" (Rudner, 2004, p. 194; *Ibid.*). However, the disadvantage of multilateral cooperation agreements is usually shared information, which is reduced to certain topics of interests and has a limited informative or operational value. Despite that, in some cases, this information is used as a trigger to develop future bilateral cooperation. The overall significance of these intelligence cooperation mechanisms is that they generate friendship at the individual level, confidence between partners with handling sensitive material, mutual respect, and understanding about partners' constraints and difficulties (Lander, 2004, p. 487).

### **The risks in intelligence liaison**

The risks in international intelligence liaison can overcome the benefits if they are not mitigated thorough understanding of the state-related variances between liaison partners: differences in foreign policy objectives and threat perception; disproportionalities in resources and power distribution; perception of adversarial intentions regarding cooperation; lack of mutual benefits; and penetration or exposure to a third party through unauthorised disclosure or information spillage. Other examples may include unintended purposes resulting from this cooperation, like the 1981 satellite imagery obtained from the CIA by Israel and used to target Iraq's Osirak reactor; and judicial objections to cooperation due to legislative restrictions or human rights violations of



a liaison partner. Although these can be present individually, in most cases they are jointly connected, creating a cumulus of factors threatening the international intelligence liaison.

To develop the first of these points, two countries' foreign policies cannot be fully congruent with each other. Referring to the UK's international relations policy, Lord Palmerston stated a basic principle in cooperation, affirming there are "no eternal allies" and "no perpetual enemies", suggesting the fluctuating character of international cooperation, allies, and changes in policy objectives, dependent on current realities (Johnson & Freyberg, 1997, p. 170). Historical perspective highlights this idea; in the 1950s, despite the long term and close cooperation between the UK and the US, the UK was reluctant to engage in provocative activities against the Soviets. Such an approach which could have been interpreted as a gap in their relations was, in fact, congruent with a different policy objective: to avoid challenging the USSR, which surprised the UK with the successful atomic bomb detonation in 1949 and the MIG-15 high altitude interceptor, whose capabilities were better than the Royal Air Force at that time. Additional differences in policies were apparent when "Britain failed to restrain America over Cuba, just as America had failed to restrain Britain from going into Suez" (Jeffreys-Jones & Stafford, 2000, p. 4). As a result, different foreign policies have negative effects in international cooperation, and the lack of 'combining finite resources' has consequences in firmly counteracting the adversary and its espionage or subversive actions (Johnson & Freyberg, 1997, p. 171).

Different policies resulted also in differences of threat perception, variable over time, which did not encourage in-depth liaison between traditional allies and triggered compartmentalised cooperation along with unilateral mitigation of threats. In a 2007 survey, several NATO countries had different perceptions of the Russia threat based on their proximity to Russia and regional conflicts involving it: "Poland, 36% cited Russia as their country's greatest future threat", while "nearly one-in-five Germans (18%) and Czechs (19%) also said Russia poses a threat" (Pew Research Center, 2007). After the WWII, the US perception of the Soviet military threat led not only to the use of Nazi intelligence officers hunted by the Israeli Institute for

Intelligence and Special Operations (Mossad) for war crimes but it limited the cooperation between US and Israel. The CIA emplaced extra protection measures to conceal their sources and avoid public embarrassment over use of individuals with such “moral lapses” (Lichtblau, 2014). While some researchers might consider these decisions unethical, they are more likely an expression of suitable mitigation of threats based on limited resources and partners with needed expertise, a consequence of deficiencies in intelligence liaison.

Intelligence cooperation has shortcomings over differences in liaising countries’ resources and political power. Most liaison activities involving powerful countries triggered one party dominating the relationship due to economic or military resources. An economically strong intelligence organisation is exemplified by the Central Intelligence Agency whose director “commands more resources than the UK Ministry of Defence, armed forces, aid budget, Foreign Office and intelligence agencies combined” (Lander, 2004, p. 486). One may argue that such differences need to be addressed either by establishing cooperation only between nations with equivalent resources or supporting the disfavoured nation to achieve a satisfactory level of resources needed in cooperation. The first case was roughly seen in the joint handling of Oleg Penkovski case when the US had better financial resources than the UK to stimulate and support his “more than 10,000 pages of material from over 100 exposed rolls of film”; the second case is exceptional but it happened recently with the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces which received expensive and interoperable equipment with US army (Scott, 1993, p. 138). However, a more realistic approach to a mutually beneficial liaison is a detailed cooperation agreement, stating clearly and specifically the duties of each liaison partner. SOE-NKVD relations demonstrated how cooperation can be negatively influenced by one party being limited in resources and favoured by a poorly made agreement. SOE had logistical difficulties supporting the “Pickaxe agents” and had conflicts with the Special Air Service (SAS) over their attempts to procure documents for the Soviet agents (Kitchen, 1997, p. 101). Despite these deficiencies, cooperation continued between the NKVD and the SOE in the UK’s hope of becoming a “cornerstone of post-war cooperation between Russia

and the outside world” (Kitchen, 1997, p. 102). Shortcomings in intelligence cooperation due to resources are normal between countries, but large differences not negotiated in the cooperation treaty will lead to misunderstanding and exchange of blame and will compromise future cooperation activities.

Lack of comparable benefits, with one party gaining exceedingly more than the other, also affects liaison. In some cases, intelligence organisations entered partnerships without having a clear agenda and the agreement signed between them had faults either in stating clearly the responsibilities of each party, the timeline or the objectives of the partnership. The cooperation between the SOE and the NKVD in 1941-1945 exemplifies the case of troubled cooperation, tinted with limited information for the SOE: “in 1944 the NKVD agreed to supply some information on the location and strength of Bulgarian partisans and about German units in the country” (Kitchen, 1997, p. 105). While, eventually, the NKVD benefited more from such cooperation, also the SOE gained experience and understanding of the Soviets, which later would become their adversaries. Therefore, the international liaison is not always a fair “quid pro quo” form of exchanging benefits and has a sinusoidal progression where one party might obtain less than the other, or such benefits have an oscillatory character over time.

A high risk when conducting intelligence liaison is the recruitment of the liaison officer either by the host country or by an adversarial state. Recruitment by the host state poses significant risks, as the cooperation between the two states is going to be affected in several ways, including political, economic and military. An example of a high profile liaison officer recruited by an adversarial nations includes Larry Wu-tai Chin, recruited in 1944 when he was working in China for the US Army Liaison Office, and had “near 40-year espionage career” in favour of China until his exposure in 1985 (Eftimiades, 1993, p. 38). A more recent case led in 2020 to the arrest of a Ukrainian Major General working in the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) for the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). Interestingly, his recruitment took place around 2014 when he acted in a liaison capacity, in the SBU-FSB interagency cooperation. Although in the context of a host friendly nation other ways than recruiting the partner’s liaison officer are

recommended, not every intelligence agency abides by this. Jonathan Pollard's recruitment in 1984 by the Israeli military intelligence unit LAKAM led to a tense political relationship between US and Israel, triggered limits in intelligence liaison between the two countries, and led to the official disbandment of LAKAM in 1986. In another case, the US-UK liaison officer Harold "Kim" Philby's recruitment by the KGB allowed the Soviets to have access to targeting operations against them including names of operatives and methods used. This penetration also disrupted "a joint SIS-CIA infiltration operation in Albania, thereby leading to the death of at least 300 individuals" (Lefebvre, 2003: 535). In consequence, "every liaison relationship is laced with suspicion" of being penetrated by a hostile intelligence service, or viewed with adversarial intentions regarding cooperation, which restrains intelligence services from full cooperation (Johnson & Freyberg, 1997, p. 171).

Perception of adversarial intentions regarding intelligence cooperation takes place between organisations which were confrontational over some time or because of historical ties. At the end of the Cold War, some Eastern European intelligence services were engaged in cooperation with Western services which they fought against for more than 40 years. Even though politically the states made the necessary steps toward cooperation, as "intelligence relationship is part of a wider political relationship and depends in good measure on that wider context", intelligence agencies developed limited cooperation (Lander, 2004, p. 486). The dangers coming from such cooperation is an increased risk for disinformation or manipulation of the other party, under the appearance of bona fides.

Intelligence liaison between two countries' intelligence services is more difficult when the cultures are different between the two, presenting the danger of misconception, prejudice and cultural clashes. Evelyne R. Hertzberger (2007) identified problems in intelligence cooperation when "building of trust is more difficult if a language barrier is in place" and the intelligence sharing declined when the officers were not "of the same or similar cultures" (Hertzberger, 2007, p. 105; *Ibid.*). In SOE-NKVD cooperation the Russians were considered "peasants", "primitive" and with a "dullness and stupidity of expression"

(Aldrich, 1998, p. 332; Ibid.; Ibid.). These perceptions about the Russians exposed the risk of intelligence liaison failure due to cultural misconceptions.

In internationally intelligence liaison a distinct danger nowadays is the legal aspect. Western countries engage in peacekeeping operations and support with intelligence the host country intelligence service, which can have questionable methods of collecting information. These are facilitated by legislative voids like in Afghanistan, where the intelligence services supported by the international community are known to use torture as a wide practice, official explanation being as “caused by individuals but not national policy” (Smith, 2017). Other circumstances include states which prefer to benefit from using partners to perform certain questionable intelligence-related activities to circumvent international and domestic laws to make their actions’ accountability equivocal. Such illegal activities are usually directed against individuals considered terrorists and these activities are known to have taken place when CIA used “black sites” between 2002 and 2008 in countries like Afghanistan or Thailand (Siems, 2017).

Other risks in liaison include Western countries having judicial objections to sharing intelligence products outside national borders because of internal legislation or the receiving country’s legal system which allows (in certain conditions) third parties access to intelligence obtained from a partner. These third-party entities are not part of the cooperation agreement and present the risk of compromising confidential sources involved. The 2006 report on the Canadian case of Nicholas Ribic charged with taking hostage four UN peacekeepers exemplifies the matter when a private citizen, upon being offered a fair trial was granted access to classified materials, some of them received from foreign intelligence services. Some countries overcame this risk by caveating the shared intelligence as to be used only for information purposes or triggering investigative leads without having indicting valence. In consequence, sharing intelligence which can be disclosed to unauthorised third parties due to countries’ legal systems will trigger less sharing, with consequences in mitigating efficiently a common threat.

## Conclusion

International intelligence liaison is a double-edged matter, and the important thing is how the risks and the benefits are approached. The risks will always be present in the form of disinformation, different foreign policy, cultural and legal implications, but since these are insurmountable, how the liaison partners are addressing them makes the difference between successful and failed cooperation. Deception in liaison can be both informative and risky, as a recruited liaison officer by an adversary third party is a danger to the intelligence service, but also, if known, a communication channel. The important elements in international intelligence liaison are communication between partners to enhance the benefits, and counterintelligence protection programs to transform the risks into opportunities. While a proper balance between the two is highly unlikely, the existence of more benefits over risks makes international intelligence liaison a solution for effectively addressing the uncertainties of the current and future threats.

## Acknowledgement:

"This article was part of an assignment of the author, at the University of Salford, United Kingdom".

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**INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY  
IN THE 21ST CENTURY**

## AL-QAEDA VS. ISIS: ORIGINILE, MOTIVAȚIILE ȘI FRACTURILE DIN CADRUL JIHADISMULUI GLOBAL

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### Abstract

*Terrorism is as old as human history. Over time, terrorism has acquired different forms and has developed a series of strategies to achieve its goals. Islamist terrorism started to develop from the 80s of the twentieth century. Al-Qaeda emerged during the time of the war in Afghanistan (1979-1989) and during the 90s its development took place. In the beginning, ISIS was al-Qaeda's branch in Irak. After the September 2001 attacks, the image of international terrorism started to be associated with the jihadist movements. Nowadays al-Qaeda and ISIS are two of the most iconic jihadist movements. Although they share common values and principles, since 2011 the tensions between them began to intensify, and in 2014 the two organizations broke up. The separation of the two organizations caused a breakdown in the global jihadist movement and, at the same time, an ongoing struggle for supremacy emerged. This article analyzes the causes that led to the separation of the two organizations. The analysis of the causes and motivations that influenced the fracture between al-Qaeda and ISIS was made with process tracing. Process tracing is one of the most used research methodologies in social sciences, and it focuses on analyzing the causes that led to the materialization of an event, and not just to their description. Our findings show that there were multiple causes which led to the fracture between al-Qaeda and ISIS. These include the lack of subordination of ISIS to al-Qaeda, the degree of violence used in the strategies of the two organizations, or the inability to identify which enemy should be eliminated first. Our analysis shows that divergent opinions, different strategies and personal ambitions can distract attention from reaching a common ideal. The split between the two organizations does not increase al-Qaeda and ISIS's chances of achieving their goals.*

**Keywords:** *ISIS, al-Qaeda, terrorism, jihadism, fracture, tensions.*

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## Introducere

Terorismul este un fenomen ale cărui origini le putem identifica încă din antichitate. Din toate timpurile indivizii sau grupurile care se simțeau excluse, marginalizate sau care considerau că nu le sunt respectate anumite drepturi recurgeau la anumite strategii teroriste prin care să-și atingă idealurile. Indiferent că ne referim la zeloții lumii antice sau la organizațiile contemporane, terorismul a însoțit umanitatea de-a lungul întregii sale existențe (Chaliand și Blin, 2007).

Unele studii dedicate subiectului se concentrează pe analiza factorilor psihologici sau motivaționali care funcționează ca un imbold pentru recursul la diferite forme de terorism (Post, 2007). Altele se axează pe combaterea acestui fenomen din punct de vedere politic și legislativ (Ramaj, Hor și Roach, 2005). Există și cercetări extinse care se axează pe studierea problematicii terorismului jihadist, de la procesele de radicalizare și ideologie până la modalitățile de operare ale acestor organizații (Mahlman-Orozco, 2019; Perry și Negrin, 2008; Esposito, 2002; Khan, 2006).

Atentatele teroriste din septembrie 2001 au coincis cu debutul unei noi ere a terorismului internațional. Terorismul islamist radical a devenit cel mai răspândit tip de terorism la nivel global. Deși organizațiile jihadiste împărtășesc idelauri comune, există o serie de tensiuni între acestea care au evoluat constant începând cu 2011. Evoluția tensiunilor dintre cele două organizații au produs o ruptură în cadrul mișcării jihadiste globale. În momentul de față al-Qaeda și ISIS sunt caracterizate mai degrabă de o atitudine competitivă, decât cooperativă. În pofida faptului că există studii cantonate pe această fractură (Watts, 2016; Filiu, 2014; Hamming, 2019), articolul își propune analiza cauzelor care au dus la ruptura dintre al-Qaeda și ISIS.

Articolul utilizează metodologia process tracing pentru a analiza dinamicile și strategiile folosite de al-Qaeda și ISIS în perioada 2011-2015. Datele utilizate provin în mare parte din literatura existentă, dar au fost introduse și anumite declarații ale unor personaje cheie din ierarhia organizațională a celor două organizații teroriste.

Relevanța acestui articol este marcată de faptul că majoritatea studiilor existente se concentrează pe analiza organizațiilor teroriste jihadiste doar din perspectiva ideologiilor, istoricului sau motivațiilor

acestora. Analiza cauzelor care au dus la materializarea unor fracturi în cadrul jihadismului global nu s-a bucurat de suficientă notorietate în mediile de specialitate naționale, de aceea acest articol are menirea de a completa un gol în cadrul literaturii de specialitate. În plus articolul poate fi relevant pentru persoanele pasionate de asemenea problematici.

Articolul este structurat în șase secțiuni cărora li se adaugă concluziile. Prima secțiune oferă o serie de definiții și clarificări conceptuale legate de terorism, făcând referire la tipurile acestuia. A doua prezintă în linii generale Islamul, realizând o paralelă între conceptul de legitimitate și manipulare în cazul jihadismului global. A treia secțiune este dedicată metodologiei și datelor utilizate. A patra secțiune analizează originea și evoluțiile al-Qaeda și ISIS cu accent pe traiectoriile lor opuse. Următoarea secțiune se concentrează pe Primăvara arabă, Siria și ascensiunea tensiunilor dintre al-Qaeda și ISIS. În cele din urmă, lucrarea analizează cauzele care au dus la fractura jihadismului global. Concluziile rezumă conținutul general al articolului și propun o serie de direcții ulterioare de cercetare.

### **Terorismul: definiții, tipologii și clarificări conceptuale**

Definirea conceptului de terorism a produs una dintre cele mai ample dezbateri vehiculate în mediile academico-științifice, în momentul de față existând aproximativ 200 de definiții ale acestui fenomen (Gomes și Mikhael, 2018). Incapacitatea de a se ajunge la un numitor comun în ceea ce privește definirea terorismului este marcată de multiplele perspective și lupe analitice prin intermediul cărora este privit și analizat acest fenomen. Pornind de la această afirmație, catalogarea unei acțiuni, organizații sau persoane ca fiind teroristă depinde de modul în care indivizii se raportează la acest fenomen. Felul „în care înțelegem terorismul este înrădăcinat în reacția noastră emoțională pe care o avem față de el” (Law, 2017, p. 17). De exemplu, Yasser Arafat, în cadrul unui discurs adresat Adunării Generale a ONU, a definit ceea ce era perceput de occidentali ca fiind terorism, drept o luptă revoluționară de eliberare națională, purtată de anumiți combatanți curajoși împotriva colonialiștilor și a invadatorilor, acțiuni care nu pot fi numite teroriste (*Jewish Virtual Library*).

Cu toate acestea, fiecare încercare științifică de conceptualizare și definire a terorismului este strâns legată de trei factori principali. Primul vizează metoda operațională, care în majoritatea situațiilor este definită drept utilizarea sistematică a violenței. Al doilea factor este ținta, și anume populația civilă sau diferite obiective strategice, iar al treilea factor este scopul, definit drept „generarea unui sentiment de frică și stres psihologic în rândul populației, respectiv discreditarea capacității statale de a se opune acestor acțiuni” (Kushner, 2003, p. XXIII).

Terorismul poate să fie definit drept o formă de „violență premeditată, motivată politic, comisă contra unor ținte necombatante de către grupuri naționale marginale sau de către agenți clandestini ai unui stat al căror scop este în general să influențeze un anumit public” (Chaliand și Blin, 2018, p. 27). Unele studii definesc terorismul din perspectiva a trei tipologii diferite, și anume, terorism demonstrativ, distructiv sau suicidal. Terorismul demonstrativ „caută publicitate pentru o anumită cauză, terorismul distructiv recurge la atentate și amenințări cu moartea pentru a obține sprijin pentru cauza pe care o promovează, iar terorismul suicidal este definit de moartea atentatorului, implicarea unui anumit public și declanșarea ostilităților” (Gomes și Mikhael, 2018, pp. 7-8). Altă definiție a terorismului evidențiază că acest fenomen reprezintă „utilizarea violenței pentru o cauză politică sau socială. Indivizii sau organizațiile care folosesc violența pentru a-și atinge obiectivele sunt definite drept teroriste în momentul în care aceste acțiuni își propun atacuri asupra civililor care nu sunt implicați direct în modelarea politicilor guvernamentale” (Outman et. al, 2003, p. 1).

Există cinci strategii principale la care recurg organizațiile teroriste pentru atingerea diferitelor obiective. Prima strategie este cea de atenuare, prin care teroriștii urmăresc convingerea inamicului că sunt suficient de puternici pentru a impune anumite costuri dacă se menține o anumită orientare politică. A doua strategie este cea de intimidare, prin care organizația încearcă să convingă populația că este capabilă să pedepsească neascultarea, guvernele nefiind capabile să le oprească. Provocarea este cea de-a treia strategie, aceasta axându-se pe influențarea inamicului de a răspunde violent la acțiunile teroriste cu scopul de a obține sprijinul populației. Strategia de tipul *spoiler attacks*

este reprezentată de efortul de a convinge publicul că teroriștii moderați sunt slabi și nu merită sprijin. Strategia de supralicitare este evidențiată de utilizarea violenței cu scopul de a convinge publicul că teroriștii au șanse mai mari să obțină victoria decât grupurile rivale și, astfel, merită sprijinul lor (Gomes și Mikhael, 2018, pp. 7-8).

### ***Tipologia organizațiilor teroriste***

Secolul al-XX-lea a produs suficiente metamorfoze ale terorismului, care a ajuns să fie analizat și ierarhizat în funcție de obiectivele și motivațiile statelor, organizațiilor sau indivizilor care au recurs la anumite tactici specifice acestui fenomen. Astfel, putem vorbi despre terorismul de stat, terorismul susținut de stat sau diferite organizații care recurg la terorism cu scopul de a atinge anumite obiective (Bjørge, 2005, p. 182).

Terorismul de stat vizează utilizarea terorii și a violenței împotriva propriei populații cu scopul de a se instaura controlul absolut al statului asupra acesteia. Terorismul de stat este caracteristic regimurilor totalitare, iar în ceea ce privește situația statului rus, acesta a fost dezvoltat de către Lenin, fiind dus la extremă de către Stalin (Chaliand și Blin, 2018).

Terorismul susținut de stat este definit din perspectiva inițiativelor diferitelor state de a susține și a se folosi de anumite organizații teroriste cu scopul de a-și atinge propriile obiective. Acest sprijin „se realizează deoarece grupul terorist poate servi intereselor strategice ale anumitor state, poate câștiga simpatia diferiților lideri sau poate juca un rol important în ceea ce privește consolidarea pozițiilor interne ale diferiților conducători” (Byman, 2005, p. 21). Un exemplu reprezentativ pentru terorismul susținut de stat este marcat de sprijinul pe care îl oferă statul Iran organizației Hezbollah, această inițiativă fiind susținută atât de afinitățile ideologice și religioase dintre cele două entități, cât și de obiectivele care, din anumite puncte de vedere, sunt similare (Haaretz).

Acțiunile organizațiilor teroriste au motivații politice, ideologice, culturale, sociale sau religioase. În ceea ce privește tipologiile și ierarhizarea acestora, putem aminti terorismul național-separatist, care militează pentru obținerea independenței față de statele în interiorul

căroră se află. Două dintre cele mai reprezentative asemenea mișcări au fost Armata Republicană Irlandeză (IRA) sau Mișcarea Separatistă Bască (ETA) care, prin acțiunile lor, au provocat o serie de crize și tensiuni interne de amploare (Kushner, 2003). De asemenea, putem aminti „grupările teroriste cu vocație revoluționară”, precum Baader-Meinhof, Brigăzile Roșii Italiene, Los Tupamaros și Sandero Luminoso (Chaliand și Blin, 2018, p. 211).

O altă tipologie a organizațiilor teroriste este evidențiată de terorismul a cărui obiective sunt legate de motivații religioase. Această tipologie de terorism, după cum afirmă unele studii, face parte din categoria noului terorism sau a celui tip de terorism care predomină în zilele noastre (Gomes și Mikhael, 2018). Din această categorie fac parte organizații precum Hamas, Hezbollah, al-Qaeda sau ISIS (Law, 2017, p. 449).

### **Islamismul, legitimitatea terorismului jihadist și fazele acestuia**

Secțiunea anterioară a evidențiat o serie de clarificări conceptuale cu privire la terorism, punându-se accent pe diferite definiții, strategii și tipologii ale acestui fenomen. Această secțiune reliefează fazele terorismului jihadist, oferindu-se un punct de vedere cu privire la legile Islamului, cu scopul de a se evidenția dacă terorismul jihadist este, într-adevăr, justificat prin textele fundamentale islamice sau acestea sunt doar interpretate într-o manieră manipulativă de către anumiți ideologi și lideri teroriști.

### **Islamismul**

Nașterea Islamismului are origini în prima parte a secolului al-VII-lea, fiind realizată în cadrul unei societăți beduine din Arabia Saudită. Nașterea acestui curent, filozofie sau religie, a avut un impact atât de mare încât „a creat de la zero o întreagă ordine socială”. Semnificația arabă a termenului islam este evidențiată de sintagma „stare de supunere”, iar musulmanul este persoana care trebuie să se supună lui Allah, unicul Dumnezeu. Tradiția islamică a influențat o serie de restructurări sociale și organizaționale care au fost oglindite în

principiul conform căruia ideea de cofraternitate a fost poziționată deasupra „legăturilor tradiționale ale diferitelor clanuri și triburi, care acum erau uniți în credința lor față de Allah, cuvântul acestuia fiind transmis de profetul Mahomed, mesagerul său” (Hiro, 2002, p. 30).

Moartea Profetului Mahomed, din 632, a produs două evenimente majore. Primul este marcat de prima criză secesionistă a Islamului, influențată de numirea lui Abu Bakr în funcția de calif. Decizia a fost contestată de unii musulmani care susțineau că Ali, ginerele Profetului, trebuia să primească această funcție. Susținătorii lui Ali au format Shi'atu' Ali, care a coincis cu apariția șiiților, sunnismul nemaifiind unica ramură a Islamului (Chaliand și Blin, 2018, pp. 59-62). Al doilea eveniment este evidențiat de reorganizarea Islamului în jurul „respectării de către umma (comunitatea credincioșilor) a tradiției (sunna), care se împarte în două serii de texte sacre: Revelația (Al-Quran) și Mărturiile (hadith)” (Chaliand și Blin, 2018, p. 244), cele două elemente fiind fundamentale pentru conturarea legii sharia. Islamul se definește „și prin referința la o entitate, cea a comunității credincioșilor, care abolește frontierele statelor în favoarea unui spațiu geopolitic aparținând poporului lui Dumnezeu” (Chaliand și Blin, 2018, p. 245).

### **Jihadul: legitimitate vs. interpretare manipulativă**

Islamul se bazează pe existența unei dogme centrale, și anume, tawhid, care pe de o parte atestă existența unui singur Dumnezeu, „impunându-se, astfel, un monoteism strict musulmanilor, iar pe de altă parte îl întruchipează pe Allah drept singura sursă a autorității”. Fiecare musulman trebuie să-și trăiască viața după conceptele shariei, care reprezintă voința lui Allah pentru umanitate. Din punct de vedere politic, idealul musulmanilor este întruchipat de crearea unui „imperiu Islamic în care o singură persoană să dețină puterea politică și cea spirituală” (Law, 2017, p. 448).

Odată cu trecerea secolelor, au început să se cristalizeze diferite școli și ideologii de inspirație sunnită care promovau diferite curente și stiluri de interpretare a învățăturilor islamice. Începând cu secolul al-XVIII-lea lumea musulmană s-a perceput pe sine ca fiind în declin în raport cu țările europene (Gomes și Mikhael, 2018), iar prăbușirea Imperiului Otoman de după sfârșitul Primului Război Mondial a



evidențiat disoluția Califatului „în care conducerea politică și spirituală era teoretic unică” (Law, 2017, p. 448).

În acest context tensionant, unii ideologi au început să îmbrățișeze diferite stiluri de interpretare a învățăturilor islamice pentru a se găsi o serie de soluții cu privire la redobândirea gloriei Califatului. Jihadul a început să fie privit drept unica soluție pentru realizarea acestui ideal. Cu toate acestea, este foarte important să evidențiem că jihadul este împărțit în jihadul mare (lupta interioară pe care trebuie să o dea fiecare musulman pentru a trăi în conformitate cu sharia), respectiv jihadul mic, care reprezintă o datorie morală a fiecărui musulman ce trebuie să poarte un război împotriva inamicilor occidentali și a musulmanilor apostatați, pentru a putea trăi într-un Califat care este întemeiat pe legea fundamentală (Law, 2017, p. 448).

Organizațiile teroriste, care au îmbrățișat ideea jihadului mic pentru atingerea diferitelor idealuri, au fost influențate de principiile propuse de diferiți gânditori musulmani. Pentru a demonstra această afirmație vom face referire la trei ideologi: Ahmad ibn Taymyya, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab și Sayyid Qutb.

Sayyid Qutb, membru al Frăției Musulmane, promovează ideea creării unui stat Islamic prin voia lui Allah, împarte societatea musulmană în credincioși și necredincioși și militează pentru înfrângerea Occidentului care este inamicul istoric al Islamului (Gomes; Mikhael, 2018). Acesta a deschis calea unei „viziuni paroxistice: jihadul va deveni o obligație fundamentală a Islamului, asemenea celor cinci stâlpi, el trebuie să fie ofensiv și se aplică chiar și luptei împotriva musulmanilor pe care reaua lor purtare îi asimilează cu niște apostatați (pentru care nu există altă osândă decât moartea)” (Chaliand și Blin, 2018, p. 267).

Continuarea viziunii lui Qutb i se datorează, printre alții, lui Abd al-Salam Faraj, care deși nu avea nicio autoritate legitimă pentru a continua lucrarea lui Qutb, se va bucura de suficientă notorietate în ceea ce privește promovarea jihadismului (Chaliand și Blin, 2018, p. 267).

Astfel, organizațiile teroriste care își justifică acțiunile prin apelul la diferite motivații de ordin religios (al-Qaeda, ISIS), își justifică ideologiile de funcționare prin dorința de a crea un stat Islamic, care să funcționeze pe baza „adevăratei doctrine istorice musulmane fundamentaliste salafiste” (adevărata cale) (Law, 2017, p. 448).

În primii ani petrecuți la Mecca, Profetul Mahomed, s-a axat aproape în mod exclusiv pe rugăciune și meditație, modul în care se raporta la „ceilalți” bazându-se pe principiul cooperării non-violente. Însă, după ce se produce fuga la Medina din cauza opoziției și a persecuției în anul 622, Mahomed devine liderul spiritual, politic și militar al unui Stat Islamic. Acesta credea că Allah i-a dat puterea și permisiunea de a lupta împotriva celor ce-i persecutau pe musulmani, iar odată cu acumularea de putere, Mahomed a devenit din ce în ce mai ostil față de adversari (Sookhdeo, 2009, p. 18).

Cu toate acestea, mulți musulmani condamnă folosirea războiului / terorismului în numele Islamului. Deși există anumite pasaje în textele fundamentale care „pot fi interpretate drept permissive în ceea ce privește utilizarea violenței în acest fel (violență îndreptată împotriva politeiștilor, evreilor, creștinilor și musulmanilor apostazi), Islamismul nu este o religie a violenței și urii față de ceilalți” (Sookhdeo, 2009, p. 18), aceste interpretări fiind date de anumiți ideologi, care consideră, că abaterea de la valorile tradiționale islamice au dus la degradarea societății musulmane, iar „Războiul Sfânt” reprezintă unica modalitate de soluționare a problemei.

Astfel, terorismul jihadist este motivat mai degrabă de o interpretare contextuală a anumitor pasaje din textele fundamentale, care este livrată unui public mai mult sau mai puțin receptiv, într-o manieră aproape manipulativă, decât ca o acțiune legitimă din toate punctele de vedere, care este în concordanță cu adevăratele valori promovate de Al-Quran.

### **Evoluția jihadismului**

Jihadismul a evoluat „dramatic după atentatele din septembrie 2001”, Comunitatea Internațională mobilizându-se din ce în ce mai puternic pentru a face față amenințărilor teroriste. Dinamicile promovate de ISIS au influențat, după anul 2014, remodelarea jihadismului global, iar al-Qaeda s-a angajat într-o luptă de redobândire a titlului de lider jihadist (aceste dinamici și evoluții vor fi analizate în secțiunile următoare) (US Institute of Peace, 2017, p. 5). Cu toate acestea, este foarte important să se evidențieze fazele evolutive ale

jihadismului. Scopul acestei sub-secțiuni este de a se demonstra că emergența acestui fenomen nu a debutat exclusiv cu septembrie 2001.

Au existat șase faze evolutive principale ale jihadismului global. Prima etapă este marcată de emergența anumitor ideologi precum Sayyid Qutb care promovau ideea de excomunicare a semenilor musulmani considerați „infideli”. Această etapă debutează odată cu sfârșitul anilor '70. A doua fază, cea din anii '80-'90, este evidențiată de combinarea rigorii teologice salafiste cu activismul politic al Frăției Musulmanilor. A treia fază este reprezentată de debutul Războiului din Afganistan (1979-1989) sau a Războiului din Golf (1990-1991), aceste evenimente stârnind ascensiunea sentimentelor anti-americane, iar statele arabe care au permis intervenția acestora au fost percepute ca fiind trădătoare ale Islamului. A patra etapă este definită de o serie de atacuri spectaculoase, care culminează cu cele din septembrie 2001, și care conturează o nouă eră a jihadismului global, respectiv demararea războiului împotriva teroriei, instrumentat de SUA și aliații acesteia. A cincea etapă este punctată de invazia SUA din Iraq, iar ultima etapă survine după anul 2014, moment în care, se produce ascensiunea ISIS și creșterea numărului de persoane recrutate, mai ales din rândul străinilor (US Institute of Peace, 2017).

### **Metodologie și date**

Pornind de la raționamentul conform căruia subiectul articolului face parte din științele sociale, analiza datelor se realizează prin intermediul *process tracing*. Această metodologie este definită de identificarea mecanismelor cauzale care analizează relațiile dintre cauză și efect (Beach, 2012), evitând abordările strict descriptive.

Inițial, termenul de *process tracing* a fost asociat cu psihologia cognitivă de la sfârșitul anilor '60, începutul anilor '70, din SUA. Acesta definea o serie de tehnici de examinare a pașilor intermediari din cadrul proceselor mentale cognitive, pentru a se înțelege mai bine euristica prin care oamenii iau decizii. În 1979, Alexander L. George își însușește termenul pentru a descrie utilizarea dovezilor din studiile de caz pentru a explica procesele istorice, din acest moment metodologia *process tracing* fiind prezentă în cadrul științelor sociale (Bennet; Checkel, 2015). Astfel, *process tracing* poate fi definită drept un

instrument fundamental al analizei calitative (Collier, 2011) ce se concentrează pe urmărirea anumitor mecanisme cauzale și care în urma unei analize empirice detaliate reliefează modul în care se desfășoară un proces cauzal (Beach, 2017).

Datele utilizate în cadrul analizei se împart în două categorii: (1) date primare (declarații ale liderilor al-Qaeda și ISIS) și (2) secundare (existente în literatură). Ascensiunea tensiunilor dintre cele două organizații a început fie resimțită odată cu 2011, prin urmare datele au fost colectate cu scopul de a fi relevante pentru acea perioadă. Datele colectate, mai ales cele secundare, sunt analizate într-o manieră comparativă, evidențiindu-se abordările diferite ale celor două organizații față de realizarea aceluiași obiectiv, această atitudine justificând fractura produsă în cadrul jihadismului global.

Analiza folosește date primare și secundare care au fost colectate în intervalul 2011-2015, fiind incluse și analizate numai acele date care au legătură directă cu tensiunile și fracturile dintre al-Qaeda și ISIS. Datele au fost colectate din următoarele surse online: ASPI, Brookings, Haaretz, Hudson Institute, Independent, ICCT, ICG, Jewish Virtual Library, Lawfare, Middle East Institute, PNAS, ThoughCo, United States Institute of Peace, Wilson Center.

### **Al-Qaeda, ISIS și valurile de extindere**

Cele două organizații analizate, al-Qaeda și ISIS, fac parte din mișcarea salafi-jihadistă (Almohammad, 2019). Încă din ultimul deceniu al secolului trecut organizațiile teroriste jihadiste au produs o serie de crize, tensiuni și distrugerii, atât în Orientul Mijlociu, cât și în lume (Ben-Asherc și D'Orsogna, 2019).

Apariția al-Qaeda are loc într-un context tensionat în care exista „o relație turbulentă între Occident și lumea musulmană” (Gomes; Mikhael, 2018, p. 12). Ossama bin Laden începe să pună bazele al-Qaeda încă din perioada războiului din Afganistan (1979-1989) (Chuang; Ben-Asherc și D'Orsogna, 2019). Adevărata arhitectură a acestei organizații se realizează în anii '90, când bin Laden și Ayman Al-Zawahiri au dezvoltat această organizație, sub protecția talibanilor și a Pakistanului, unde au mutat conducerea până în 2009 (Riedel, 2019). Inițial viziunea lui bin Laden față de crearea al-Qaeda era motivată de

trei obiective principale: „(1) grup terorist de sine stătător, (2) organizator, recrutor și furnizor logistic pentru alți musulmani militanți care să fie stimulați să lupte în afara Afganistanului, (3) unificarea și coordonarea mișcării jihadiste globale, prin furnizarea unui scop și a unei direcții” (Gomes și Mikhael, 2018, p. 12). Idealul al-Qaeda era acela de a reuni sute de grupări jihadiste al cărui scop să fie acela de a funcționa în baza unui proiect jihadist global.

Prin celebrele fatwa pe care le emite, bin Laden își exprimă dezacordul față de Arabia Saudită și prezența SUA în peninsula Arabică, manifestându-și sprijinul pentru diferite conflicte (Cecenia, Bosnia, Palestina). În viziunea acestuia, conflictele menționate reprezentau primii pași în ceea ce privește înfrângerea SUA. Liderul al-Qaeda critică Arabia Saudită pentru modul în care irosește bogăția petroliferă și pentru că ignoră cazul Palestinei (Gomes și Mikhael, 2018, p. 12).

Din a doua jumătate a anilor '90, al-Qaeda organizează și revendică o serie de atentate mai mult sau mai puțin răsunătoare (1998 – Ambasaderele SUA din Africa), culminate cu atentatele din 11 septembrie 2001, al căror impact a culminat cu demararea războiului global împotriva terorismului. Organizația al-Qaeda spera că toate grupurile jihadiste care luptau împotriva guvernelor locale să se unească sub egida organizației și să lupte împotriva SUA, care erau percepute drept sursa tuturor problemelor Orientului Mijlociu (Byman și Williams, 2015).

Originea actualei organizații ISIS se conturează inițial pe la sfârșitul anilor '90, în Iordania, în momentul în care Abu Musa al-Zarqawi pune bazele Jamaat-al-Tawhid-wal-Jihad (JTJ) (Chuanga; Ben-Asherc; D'Orsogna, 2019). Cu toate acestea, ISIS este o organizație terorist-jihadistă care se desprinde din al-Qaeda. În contextul invaziei americane din Iraq, bin Laden îi oferă bani lui al-Zarqawi pentru a pune bazele unei organizații teroriste și chiar dacă, inițial, al-Zarqawi a dorit să rămână independent, în 2004 jură loialitate organizației al-Qaeda și schimbă numele JTJ în AQI (filiala al-Qaeda Iraq) (Byman și Williams, 2015). Organizația lui al-Zarqawi a fost poziționată într-o oarecare obscuritate până în 2007, iar adevărata ascendență a acesteia debutează în 2011, motivată de instabilitățile crescute din Iraq și Siria (Wilson Center, 2019).

Începând cu 2006, AQI, sub instrucția al-Qaeda, a pus bazele unui organism oficial de guvernare, prin fuzionarea cu alte grupuri de insurgenți, formând Consiliul Shura Mujahedin, care urma să ocupe diferite teritorii din nordul Irakului, plasate la granița cu Siria. Odată cu intensificarea războiului civil din Siria, ISI (AQI) își schimbă numele în ISIS și se extinde în Siria fără a se consulta cu al-Qaeda. Aceste dinamici marchează debutul tensiunilor dintre al-Qaeda și ISIS, cea dintâi începând să se reorienteze spre diferite colaborări cu Somalia sau Nigeria, iar cea din urmă continuându-și expansiunea în Yemen, Afganistan sau Pakistan (Chuanga; Ben-Asherc și D'Orsogna, 2019).

Extinderea al-Qaeda și ulterior a ISIS s-a produs de-a lungul a patru valuri succesive: Primul val este marcat de începutul anilor '90, când foști luptători din Afganistan se întorc în Algeria, Caucaz, Egipt, Libia, Sudan, formează diferite celule mici și luptă împotriva regimurilor considerate non-islamice. Alții se alătură diferitelor războaie civile (Algeria, Cecenia), producându-se radicalizarea lor. Al doilea val este lansat de al-Qaeda după cea de-a doua jumătate a anilor '90, conturându-se teoria luptei împotriva „inamicului îndepărtat” și eliminarea influențelor occidentale din Orient. Acest val s-a extins până în momentul atentatelor din septembrie 2001. Al treilea val este reliefat de momentul în care SUA invadează Irak, inițiativă care a funcționat ca un imbold pentru revigorarea jihadismului, al patrulea val fiind evidențiat de debutul Primăverii arabe și ocuparea a cât mai multe teritorii (International Crisis Group, 2016).

Viziunea ISIS este într-oarecare măsură similară cu viziunea al-Qaeda, diferențele fiind evidențiate de strategiile aplicate pentru atingerea scopului. ISIS a remodelat peisajul jihadist printr-o „strategie și mai sângeroasă decât al-Qaeda, aceasta luptând, de asemenea, împotriva rivalilor ideologici și a Occidentului” (International Crisis Group, 2016).

### ***Decăderea al-Qaeda și ascensiunea ISIS***

Începând cu 2014 al-Qaeda pierde titlul de lider al jihadismului global, acesta fiind revendicat de către ISIS (Clarke, 2018). Ascensiunea ISIS nu este privită cu admirație de către al-Zawahiri, care dorește să mențină poziția al-Qaeda în fruntea jihadismului global (Byman;

Williams, 2015). Există numeroase teorii, studii sau cercetări care analizează cauzele care au dus la decăderea al-Qaeda. Unele dintre ele susțin că odată ce liderul carismatic (bin Laden) în jurul căruia s-a cristalizat organizația teroristă a fost asasinat, s-a produs și „decapitarea” al-Qaeda. Înlocuirea unui conducător eficient (bin Laden), sub conducerea căruia au fost instrumentate cele mai răsunătoare atentate teroriste din întreaga existență a organizației, cu unul mai puțin eficient și, totodată, mai puțin carismatic (al-Zawahiri), care nu a mai putut gestiona tensiunile și divergențele dintre cele două grupări, a produs o inevitabilă eclipsare a al-Qaeda (Bacon; Arsenault, 2017).

De asemenea, ascensiunea ISIS și decăderea al-Qaeda poate să fie explicată și din perspectiva modului prin care cele două organizații teroriste dezvoltă o serie de modalități de propagandă online. Organizația al-Qaeda realizează acest lucru pe baza anumitor platforme sau forumuri de discuții vechi, pe când ISIS promovează o serie de videoclipuri, articole și mesaje pe cele mai utilizate platforme online (Facebook, Instagram, Youtube). Astfel, decăderea al-Qaeda ar putea să fie explicată și din perspectiva unei promovări deficitare în mediile online, din acest punct de vedere ISIS menținându-se în fruntea topului organizațiilor teroriste care a instrumentat cele mai multe radicalizări, în special din lumea Occidentală (Byman; Williams, 2015).

O a treia cauză care ar putea justifica prăbușirea al-Qaeda este marcată de strategiile pe care le utilizează. ISIS se bazează pe cucerirea și acapararea diferitelor teritorii, strategiile acestuia fiind profund influențate de factorul militar. Pe de altă parte, al-Qaeda a pus un accent crescut pe diferite investiții necesare înțelegerii nevoilor logistice ale organizației, nerecurgând la modalitățile operaționale ale ISIS pentru a-și atinge obiectivele (Gomes; Mikhael, 2018).

În pofida faptului că al-Qaeda „nu a dispărut, organizația dezvoltându-se în zona Magrebului, Somaliei, Siriei, Yemenului, modelele de radicalizare variind în funcție de țară” (International Crisis Group, 2016), în ultimii ani ISIS s-a dovedit a fi mai eficientă din toate punctele de vedere (Almohammad, 2019), iar ascensiunea acestuia reprezintă o dovadă a „cât de vulnerabile sunt statele și sistemele politice ale Orientului Mijlociu” (Riedel, 2019). Astfel, divergențele și tensiunile dintre cele două organizații teroriste (pe care le vom analiza

în secțiunile următoare), nu sunt evidențiate numai de diferitele strategii sau mijloace care să conducă la atingerea anumitor obiective, ci mai degrabă, al-Qaeda și ISIS luptă pentru obținerea titlului de lider al jihadismului global.

### **Primăvara arabă și ascensiunea tensiunilor dintre al-Qaeda și ISIS**

Secțiunea precedentă a oferit un punct de vedere cu privire la originile și valurile de extindere ale al-Qaeda și ISIS, sistematizând o serie de motive care au dus la decăderea al-Qaeda și pierderea titlului de lider global al terorismului jihadist, în favoarea ISIS. Această secțiune analizează contextul care a favorizat apariția divergențelor dintre cele două organizații și distanțarea ce a rezultat, accentul fiind pus pe evenimentele din timpul Primăverii arabe și extinderea ISIS în Siria.

#### **Primăvara arabă**

După cum afirmă unele cercetări, evenimentele asociate Primăverii arabe au influențat materializarea unora dintre cele mai semnificative dinamici din Orientul Mijlociu, de la sfârșitul celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial încoace. Pentru prima dată în istoria recentă a regiunii populațiile au făcut o serie de schimbări la scară largă și au luptat împotriva guvernelor autoritare (Jones, 2012). Dinamicile survenite odată cu anul 2011 au fost privite cu o oarecare simpatie de lumea Occidentală, inclusiv de SUA. Această atitudine fiind motivată de faptul că revoltele populațiilor arabe, îndreptate împotriva guvernelor corupte ar putea deschide calea spre democratizare (Anderson, 2011). Cu toate acestea, pentru o democratizare eficientă protestele și revoltele nu sunt suficiente. Societățile arabe ar trebui să faciliteze o serie de reforme educaționale și economice, iar aceste inițiative de modernizare trebuie susținute de instituțiile statale (Campante; Chor, 2012). Cu toate acestea, realitățile survenite după 2011 au conturat alte realități.

Imaginea Primăverii arabe poate fi asociată cu o serie de proteste anti-guvernamentale, rășcoale sau rebeliuni armate care s-au răspândit în Orientul Mijlociu la începutul lui 2011. Aceste mișcări au



fost motivate de o serie de resentimente față de dictaturile arabe învechite, populațiile care au recurs la asemenea manifestații fiind motivate de brutalitatea aparatului de securitate, șomajul, creșterea prețurilor și corupția guvernelor (Manfreda, 2019). Deși evenimentele din 2011 au dus la prăbușirea regimurilor autoritare din Tunisia, Libia sau Yemen, marcându-se, astfel, speranța pentru realizarea unor reforme democratice, economice sau sociale, victoria Frăției Musulmane în Egipt sau a grupurilor salafiste, în urma alegerilor democratice din Tunisia, Libia sau Yemen aveau să contureze alte realități. Astfel, dinamica prezentată anterior, dublată de rolul tot mai mare al insurgenților islamici din Siria, au dus la consolidarea unui islamism politic accentuat în regiune (Styszynsky, 2014).

De asemenea, conturarea noilor realități politice au impulsionat extinderea al-Qaeda. Organizația dezvoltă noi filiale și recrutează mii de luptători care să fie fideli cauzei lor, protestele pro-democratice fiind reprimare (Lister, 2019).

După 2011 crizele din Yemen, Egipt, Libia sau Tunisia au creionat o nouă eră a politicii arabe care, în mod paradoxal, a demis oportunitățile de consolidare a democrației și a pluralismului politic. Principalii beneficiari de pe urma acestei realități sunt mișcările extremiste, al-Qaeda și ISIS amenințând țări care până atunci nu au fost afectate de acestea. Astfel, câștigurile și ascensiunea mișcărilor jihadiste se datorează, din anumite puncte de vedere emergenței diferitelor conflicte (Afganistan, Siria, Iraq, Algeria) (International Crisis Group, 2016).

### **Siria și ascensiunea tensiunilor al-Qaeda-ISIS**

În 2011 izbucnește conflictul sirian stimulat de emergența protestelor din timpul Primăverii arabe (Byman și Williams, 2015). Demonstrațiile pașnice și demararea negocierilor politice au escaladat într-o formă superioară de violență care a permis extinderea organizațiilor jihadiste (Styszynski, 2014). În acea perioadă, al-Qaeda și filialele acesteia erau predominante în Siria, aceasta îndemându-l pe al-Baghdadi (care a condus ISIS din 2010) să ia parte la conflict. Liderul ISIS, al-Baghdadi, trimite soldați în Siria și demarează acțiuni de recrutare pentru a se extinde. Pe fondul retragerii SUA și a emergenței

politicilor anti-sunnite în Irak, ISIS dobândește tot mai mult sprijin din partea populației, începând să se extindă masiv în Siria (Byman; Williams, 2015). Această extindere, dublată de acapararea anumitor regiuni importante din Iraq, l-au determinat pe al-Baghdadi să proclame transformarea ISI în ISIS și ruperea de al-Qaeda (Byman și Williams, 2015).

Tensiunile intra-jihadiste „devin publice pentru prima dată în 2013” (Zammit, 2014), acestea fiind în strânsă legătură cu extinderea ISIS în Siria. Având în vedere că la începutul conflictului al-Qaeda era organizația teroristă principală în Siria, aceasta exercitându-și influența prin Jabhat al-Nusra, o filială a organizației, tensiunile intra-jihadiste au fost motivate de intența ISIS de a influența Jabhat al-Nusra să se declare ca fiind creată de Statul Islamic, acum reunindu-se sub un nou nume (ISIS) (Beacon și Arsenault, 2017). Al-Julani, liderul Al-Nusra, nu a fost de acord cu inițiativa ISIS, acesta afirmându-și loialitatea față de al-Qaeda și independența față de ISIS. Declararea loialității al-Nusra față de al-Zawahiri, dublată de tensiunile dintre cele două organizații, legate de revendicările teritoriale, au influențat intrarea în scenă a al-Qaeda. Aceasta a declarat că al-Nusra este singurul reprezentant legitim al-Qaeda în Siria și că ISIS ar trebui să-și restrângă activitatea în Iraq. ISIS începe să respingă din ce în ce mai puternic autoritatea al-Qaeda, iar al-Baghdadi refuză să jure loialitate lui al-Zawahiri, motivat de faptul că „ISIS nu este o simplă organizație, ci un Stat Islamic și de aceea are mai multă autoritate” (Zammit, 2014). În 2014 al-Zawahiri a respins public ISIS, iar Abu Mohammad al-Adnani, purtătorul de cuvânt al ISIS, a declarat că „al-Qaeda a încetat să mai fie baza jihadului (...) ISIS este urmașa al-Qaeda a lui bin Laden, doar că sub banner-ul ISIS” (Beacon; Arsenault, 2017). De asemenea, al-Adnani critică Al-Qaeda, acuzându-o că a trădat insurgenții care se jertfesc pe câmpurile de luptă și că s-a îndepărtat de calea jihadului, cooperând cu „infidelii” și seculariștii. Acesta încurajează întoarcerea la jihadul original, făcând referire la operațiunile spectaculoase din trecutul al-Qaeda (Styszynski, 2014). Al-Zawahiri nu a rămas pasiv acestor declarații și a susținut că „ISIS fabrică minciuni convenabile (...) folosind greșit entuziasmul tinerilor” (Dearden, 2017), acesta discreditând Statul Islamic și dorința de cooperare ulterioară. Astfel, ceea ce a început de la o dispută pentru

autoritate în Siria a escaladat spre o luptă pentru conducerea întregii mișcări jihadiste globale (Zammit, 2014).

### **Jidadul global: fractura dintre al-Qaeda și ISIS**

După cum rezultă din secțiunea anterioară, tensiunile dintre cele două organizații teroriste au influențat organizarea unei noi ordini jihadiste globale. Ruptura dintre al-Qaeda și ISIS nu a fost motivată în mod exclusiv de lipsa de supunere a lui al-Baghdadi față de al-Zawahiri, ci și din pricina viziunilor diferite față de modul în care ar trebui atinse diferite obiective. Diferențele de strategie, tactică și ierarhizarea dușmanilor în funcție de preferințele proprii reprezintă punctele de analiză ale acestei secțiuni.

### **Obiective comune și viziuni diferite**

Al-Qaeda și ISIS împărtășesc atât un ideal comun, cât și o ideologie similară. Ambele organizații urmăresc înființarea unui Califat care să funcționeze după principiile legii sharia, după care au funcționat primele societăți islamice, ambele împărtășind ideea de realizare a acestui ideal prin violență (Styszynski, 2014).

Având în vedere că atât al-Qaeda, cât și ISIS sunt influențate de învățăturile wahhabiste care resping orice inovație religioasă, culturală și, totodată, care susțin că numai anumiți musulmani sunt „credincioși”, există o diferență ideologică între cele două. Această diferență este marcată de faptul că ISIS împărtășește ideea lui Mahdi, „o figură profetică care va conduce toți musulmanii într-o luptă împotriva infidelilor (...) ideea de purificare a Islamului fiind marcată de modul în care cei aleși vor determina cine trebuie expatriat din comunitate, respectiv cine sunt dușmanii care amenință Islamul” (Gomes; Mikhael, 2018, p. 18). Astfel, această diferențiere ideologică poate să fie folosită drept o justificare pentru violența extremă la care recurge ISIS, inclusiv împotriva musulmanilor considerați „infideli”. ISIS își justifică acțiunile de acaparare a teritoriilor din Irak și Siria din perspectiva unei coaliții arabe sunnite care se ridică împotriva guvernelor apostate și hărțuitoare, dar cu toate acestea, majoritatea arabilor, inclusiv sunniți,

nu susțin ideea Califatului, opunându-se politicilor brutale promovate de ISIS (Ford, 2014).

Scopurile al-Qaeda ar putea să fie rezumate la răsturnarea regimurilor corupte, instalarea unora adevărate (guverne islamice) și eliminarea influenței SUA din Orientul Mijlociu, care, din perspectiva lor, reprezintă principala cauză a problemelor regionale. Toate aceste idealuri sunt instrumentate într-o asemenea manieră încât să se atingă obiectivul de constituire a Califatului (Byman și Williams, 2015). Cu toate acestea, al-Qaeda nu promovează uciderea rivalilor musulmani, inițiativă pe care o consideră drept o risipă de resurse și o creștere a neîncrederii și a lipsei de susținere din partea populației (Byman, 2015). În plus, al-Qaeda critică acțiunile violente ale ISIS, afirmând că cea din urmă se îndepărtează de la adevăratul inamic, și anume SUA (Byman și Williams, 2015).

ISIS, în schimb, nu respectă strategia „inamicului-îndepărtat”, promovată de al-Qaeda, aceasta orientându-se spre strategia „inamicului-apropiat”. Din perspectiva ISIS, adevăratele ținte sunt regimurile apostate (Assad-Siria, Abadi-Iraq, etc.), ci nu SUA. al-Baghdadi promova purificarea Comunității Islamice prin atacarea minorităților religioase și a grupărilor jihadiste rivale. ISIS se axează foarte mult pe cucerirea și controlul unui anumit teritoriu, cu scopul de a-și consolida poziția. Organizația al-Qaeda nu a demonstrat niciodată prea mult interes în ceea ce privește deținerea unui teritoriu, această strategie fiind aplicată cel mult cu scopul de a deține un loc de refugiu (Byman și Williams, 2015).

Organizația al-Qaeda folosește teroarea cu scopul de a influența o anumită audiență, care ulterior să adopte un comportament favorabil obiectivelor proprii (Gomes și Mikhael, 2018). Tactica preferată de către această organizație rezidă în atacurile internaționale de anvergură. De asemenea, al-Qaeda se abține de la asasinarea anumitor persoane răpite dacă le pot folosi în scopuri propagandistice (ex. jurnaliști).

ISIS cucerește prin forță, iar teroarea este instaurată prin imaginea războiului revoluționar, utilizat cu scopul de a submina moral forțele de securitate. Pe teritoriile controlate, ISIS aplică o serie de mijloace brutale prin care să-și consolideze autoritatea (violuri, execuții, decapitări publice) (Byman și Williams, 2015).

Organizația al-Qaeda este ceva mai moderată și încearcă să-i convingă pe musulmanii locali să le adopte opiniile, în loc să-i oblige prin recursul la violență (Byman și Williams, 2015).

Se poate observa o diferență majoră între cele două organizații și în ceea ce privește modul în care trebuie instaurat Califatul. ISIS se bazează pe principiul extinderii maxime, iar al-Qaeda recurge la o abordare graduală. ISIS promovează ideea conform căreia clădirea statului este realizabilă și nu trebuie întârziată, pe când strategia graduală a al-Qaeda susține că instituirea statului trebuie să îndeplinească mai multe condiții, de la educarea, pregătirea populației cu privire la acceptarea acestui ideal și obținerea a cât mai mult sprijin până la constituirea diferitelor alianțe cu mișcările locale (Almohammad, 2019).

Pornind de la cele expuse mai sus, se poate afirma că separarea dintre al-Qaeda și ISIS, respectiv fractura jihadismului global provocată de această dinamică, este motivată de trei diferențe strategice principale: (1) cele două organizații nu erau de acord cărui inamic să-i acorde prioritate, (2) nu au fost de acord cu privire la cantitatea corespunzătoare de violență (al-Qaeda fiind îngrijorată de violența ISIS împotriva musulmanilor), (3) nu au fost de acord cu privire la condițiile adecvate de constituire și declarare a unui stat (ISIS fiind pregătită să facă o astfel de declarație deși nu deținea elementele de bază ale unui stat) (Bacon și Arsenault, p.14).

Astfel, tensiunile dintre al-Qaeda și ISIS, care au dus la separarea acestora, au provocat o fractură în cadrul jihadismului global. Cele două organizații continuă să reprezinte două dintre cele mai mari amenințări la adresa securității globale, iar ISIS, respectiv modul în care această organizație a evoluat după 2014 reprezintă o amenințare mai mare pentru Orientul Mijlociu decât a fost al-Qaeda în întreaga ei existență (Byman și Williams, 2015). Scindarea celor două s-a produs datorită perspectivelor diferite de atingere a anumitor obiective, motivate de modul în care se raportau la tripla ierarhie inamică (inamic îndepărtat, inamic apropiat, respectiv inamic interior) (Almohammad, 2019).

## Concluzii

Acest articol și-a propus să analizeze cauzele care au dus la ruptura dintre al-Qaeda și ISIS. Analiza a fost centrată pe intervalul 2011-2015, deoarece în acest interval s-au materializat o serie de conflicte între cele două organizații, care au influențat fractura mișcării jihadiste globale. Principalele rezultate ale acestui studiu bazat pe *process tracing* sunt evidențiate de faptul că au existat multiple cauze care au dus la materializarea acestui rezultat.

În pofida idealurilor și obiectivelor comune, una dintre principalele cauze care a dus la separarea celor două organizații este marcată de incapacitatea acestora de a ajunge la un numitor comun în ceea ce privește definirea inamicului prioritar. ISIS își concentra atenția asupra musulmanilor considerați „infideli” și asupra regimurilor apostate, pe când al-Qaeda privea SUA ca principală sursă a problemelor din Orientul Mijlociu.

Cea de-a doua cauză care a intensificat tensiunile dintre cele două organizații este reliefată de strategiile adoptate. ISIS promovează ocuparea și controlarea într-o manieră brutală a diferitelor teritorii, în timp ce al-Qaeda susține că populațiile musulmane trebuie educate într-o asemenea manieră încât să accepte idealul de constituire a Califatului.

De asemenea, există o diferență de viziune și față de inițiativa de a pronunța sau nu instaurarea Califatului. ISIS crede că guvernarea anumitor teritorii într-o manieră brutală poate garanta ordinea și constituirea acestuia, pe când al-Qaeda consideră utopică declararea Califatului fără existența elementelor de bază ale unui stat (instituții, acceptare populară, sistem legislativ etc.). În plus, lipsa de subordonare a ISIS față de direcțiile trasate de al-Qaeda și ocuparea diferitelor teritorii din Siria au intensificat tensiunile dintre cele două organizații.

Prin urmare, se poate observa că inclusiv un ideal atât de măreț precum constituirea unui Califat în cadrul căruia fiecare musulman să-și poată trăi viața după legea sharia poate să fie eclipsat de o serie de mici diferențe ideologice, modalități diferite de gestionare a anumitor situații, dublate de o serie de ambiții personale. Scindarea celor două organizații nu favorizează șansele de atingere a idealurilor pentru care militează.

Limitele articolului sunt marcate de faptul că nu analizează modul în care liderii politici din statele care se confruntă cu procese intense de radicalizare gestionează combaterea terorismului și nici direcțiile și strategiile promovate la nivelul Comunității Internaționale, față de combaterea și eradicarea jihadismului global.

De asemenea, limitările articolului nu sunt evidențiate numai de anumite subiecte care nu au fost analizate în cadrul acestuia, ci și de tipul de date utilizate. Având în vedere că nu există multe studii în mediile de specialitate naționale care să analizeze cauzele care au dus la ruptura dintre al-Qaeda și ISIS, datele culese și analizate sunt în mare parte în limba engleză. În plus, acest articol oferă numai o perspectivă generală cu privire la fractura din cadrul jihadismului global deoarece nu putem avea acces întotdeauna la un volum de informații veridice care vizează asemenea subiecte. Majoritatea informațiilor provin din declarații ale anumitor personalități cheie din ierarhia organizațională a celor două grupări sau se încadrează în tipologia diferitelor rapoarte și analize realizate pe baza evenimentelor observabile, fără să se aibă acces la discuțiile purtate între liderii al-Qaeda sau ISIS. Având în vedere că nu există un volum foarte mare de declarații venite din partea liderilor jihadiști, articolul s-a axat mai mult pe analiza datelor secundare, deja existente în cadrul literaturii. Prin urmare, tipul de date utilizat, perspectiva de ansamblu fără posibilitatea de a privi în detaliu și accesul la materiale, în mare parte în limba engleză, reprezintă alte limite ale articolului.

Relevanța articolului pentru studierea terorismului internațional și, implicit, pentru analiza mișcării jihadiste globale, este marcată de faptul că reprezintă unul dintre primele studii românești care se concentrează pe analiza tensiunilor care au produs fractura dintre al-Qaeda și ISIS. Articolul poate fi relevant pentru cei pasionați de asemenea problematici, iar studiile viitoare ar putea analiza modul în care organizațiile teroriste își obțin finanțările, sau cum a fost afectată ISIS de asasinarea lui al-Baghdadi. Modul în care au evoluat dinamica celor două organizații în perioada 2017-2019, când ISIS a pierdut multe teritorii, ar putea constitui un alt subiect de analiză pentru studiile viitoare.

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## USING SOCIAL MEDIA IN HUMAN RESOURCES RECRUITMENT FOR THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF PUBLIC ORDER, DEFENSE AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Oana - Cătălina NĂSTASE\*

### Abstract

*The present study analyses the advantages and disadvantages of using data which is obtained from social media to recruit for the military profession. People disseminate a lot of personal data on social media, which is why social media has become an important tool for recruitment.*

*The more information people transfer from their private lives on social media, the more their lives become a public space that can be used by anyone. All changes in society through the development of technology have also led to people's erroneous approaches to what the right to privacy means in the use of social media. Thus, social media users provide personal data, without realizing that this data can be accessed by any other user.*

*In order to determine the advantages and disadvantages of the use of data provided by social media users in recruitment, an analysis of the literature was carried out.*

*The conclusions highlight the importance of social media in the 21<sup>st</sup> century and the need to realize that the data provided on social media becomes public and accessible to any other user.*

**Keywords:** *social media, recruitment, data, advantages and disadvantages.*

### Introduction

One of the directions of action for ensuring national security established in the National Strategy for National Defense (2015) involves the continuation of the process of transformation, modernization and endowment of the Romanian Army. This process also includes human resources, being mentioned in the Strategy (2015)

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the fact that the priority will be to ensure the human resources necessary to maintain and develop the operational capacity of the competent institutions within the public order dimension. The human resources for these institutions must be of the highest quality. For this to happen, the recruitment process must be at the highest level and be constantly connected to all the changes in society.

The use of social media has become inevitable and indispensable in the 21<sup>st</sup> century in all areas, including the recruitment process. Clark and Roberts (2015) argue that current recruitment tools allow recruiters to attract candidates to websites and also allow them to explore their social life through social media, thus pointing out the best candidates.

Social networks are currently used in both personal and professional life. The human resource management is one of the areas that has benefited greatly from this, especially in terms of recruitment. However, the use of data obtained from social networks requires special care so as not to violate human rights to privacy.

Considering the importance of the National System of Public Order, Defense and National Security (NSPODNS) institutions in the functioning of the state and the fact that social networks are used in almost any field, the purpose of this study is to identify, by analyzing previous research, the need for recruitment through social networks in the military institutions and to establish the advantages and disadvantages of using this method of recruitment.

### **Recruiting by using social media**

Social networks have become part of people's lives. They are used in both personal and professional lives and so many areas of activity took advantage of them in order to have a higher efficiency.

Human resources management is an area in which the use of social networks has become very common. In the recruitment process, one of the activities in this field, social networks have become the main recruitment tool. However, Munro (2018) is one of those who say that social networks are used in many other processes in human resources management, not just in the recruitment process. Social networks are used in the human resources management process both in terms of the

identification of the candidate and in terms of his testing period, and subsequently, in terms of his period of accommodation with the organization.

The increasing use of social networks in the recruitment process has led to studies meant to demonstrate whether it is necessary or not. Girard, Fallery and Rodhain (2013) conducted a study whose main purpose was to demonstrate the need to use social networks in the recruitment process. The idea of the study is that social networks do not replace other methods of recruitment, but are a dynamic method which facilitates relationships. However, according to this study, the indispensability of social networks in the recruitment process is still a controversial topic.

This recruitment tool is especially effective for young people. Although everyone is connected to the online environment, the Z generation<sup>1</sup> is the one that responds best to this type of recruitment. Wenger et.al (2019) considers that it is important the activity on social networks in order to attract young people because they are the ones who use this method of communication and social interaction on a large scale. Technology makes things easier and helps to make time more efficient. In the century of speed, gaining time is one of the greatest benefits that an activity can offer.

It is important for recruiters to know the social networks most used by young people. Some social networks are special for recruitment. Those who post on that platform are either looking for a job or looking for candidates, which is why they will present their qualities. The challenge comes when the recruiter looks for candidates on social networks that are not intended for recruitment because on these platforms, people do not try to show what is best from a professional point of view. Cülcüloğlu (2013) states that managers sometimes look for a candidate's Facebook profile to understand his/her lifestyle, although the Facebook platform is not dedicated for recruitment.

Smith and Kidder (2010) believe that it is understandable that employers want to know as much data as possible about candidates to a position in their organization and the Facebook provides a lot of

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<sup>1</sup> Those born after 1997.

information, some of which is confirmed by the candidate during the recruitment process and some information reveals what the candidate wants to hide.

Although recruitment through social media is at the beginning, this method of recruitment is now widely used. According to Krishna and Mohan (2016), 94% of recruiters use social networks during their activities, or plan to use them. 89% said they recruited through LinkedIn, and 26% said they recruited through Facebook. Arrawatia and Verma (2019) they claim that Facebook is the largest social network with over 400 million users. Although, initially, the purpose of this social network was to connect people for personal purposes, over time, it began to be used in many professional fields.

Their number is growing and this is normal because social networks give the recruiter the opportunity to easily identify the person he needs. The problem arises when there is no clear strategy to allow all recruiters to use this recruitment tool in the same way.

According to Jóhannsson (2016), it is necessary to establish certain strategies for using social networks during the recruitment process for two main reasons: the first reason is to reduce the inaccuracies produced by previously used e-recruitment tools and the second reason is to adapt to the communication of social network users. Both recruiters and candidates need to understand the online environment in order to use it to their advantage.

The information that can be obtained with the help of social networks is diverse, which is why it is difficult to create a grid to compare the profiles on social networks of several applications. Bissola and Imperatori (2013) consider that so far research on social networks has focused on the possibilities they offer and the potential risks involved in using them, paying little attention to identifying a valid method to implement the use of social networks in the process of evaluating candidates.

In their study, Krishna and Mohan (2016) reported that employees who used social networks for employment believe that the quality of candidates has improved by 49%. This is possible because through social networks recruiters can more easily identify certain qualities they are looking for in future employees. They can also

identify the negative aspects of a potential candidate. Taking into account this aspect, it is necessary to develop a recruitment strategy that includes social networks as a recruitment tool.

### **GDPR implications in the use of data obtained from social networks**

The more people transfer information from their private lives to social networks, the more their lives becomes a public space that can be used by anyone. All the changes that have taken place in society through the development of technology have also led to erroneous approaches of people to what it means to have the right to privacy in the use of social networks.

Thus, users of social networks provide personal data, without being aware that this data can be accessed by any other user. But it is this personal data that is fundamental for the survival of social networks. Each element of personal information posted on a social network determines the development of that network and all that personal data is a source for anyone that can be interested and accesses the profile of the person who posted the data. If used positively, according to von Krogh (2012), social networks create an unique opportunity for organizations to get to know both its customers and employees.

The use of social networks in the recruitment process raises questions about the legality and ethics of the information obtained about candidates. When analyzing a person's profile based on data identified on social networks, it is necessary to pay special attention to the management of personal data.

Kluemper (2013) identified a number of issues that may arise during the recruitment process. Personal data identified by recruiters following the investigation of social networks can influence the decision regarding a potential candidate. For example, if the recruiter identifies inappropriate pictures, content that suggests drug abuse or alcohol abuse, insults to the former employer, or discriminatory comments, the recruiter may make the decision to stop the recruitment process. The recruiter is looking for aspects that are not disclosed and that could influence, positively or negatively, the candidate's employment

decision. According to Kluemper (2013), these checks may encounter legal or ethical obstacles because candidates may accuse this method as a method of violating the right to privacy. However, Gustafson (2012) considers that employers have the right to use data posted on these social networks because it is a legitimate means of obtaining data about a person.

Kristl, Mararist, and Bing (2011) explained that there are several questions that need to be answered regarding the use of social networks in the recruitment process. The most important are the questions related to the validity of this method, the perception of candidates regarding the verification of their own social networks by employers and the legality of the verification of social networks during the recruitment process.

The agreed option for checking social networks could be to obtain the consent of the candidates to have their social networks profiles checked before initiating the steps in this regard, but this could involve filtering the data by the candidates.

Through social networks, additional information about the candidate can be obtained, and especially information that one would not provide in an interview. But this is risky because the candidate may consider this a violation of the right to privacy. If from a legal point of view, this practice does not involve any risks, from an ethical point of view the recruiter may encounter certain problems and may even remove the application. Clark and Roberts (2015) compared the activity of searching for information about a candidate on social networks with the activity of physically tracking a person in public spaces. This is not illegal, but it is certainly inconvenient for a person to be followed wherever they go. So, following social networks can be considered inappropriate and extreme for some candidates.

### **Advantages and disadvantages of using social media in recruitment for the military institutions**

The last decade has led to new changes and an increasing development of technology. As society discovers and adopts new methods of communication and organization, such as social media, public institutions, including the police and intelligence services, have



the responsibility to react and adapt. According to Omand (2012), social networks represent the latest technological innovation in recent times and the authorities have the obligation to adapt to them.

Schreurs (2004) argued that the armed forces are encountering increasing difficulties in attracting, recruiting and retaining new employees. This determined the need to change the recruitment strategy. Currently, there are problems in attracting candidates for the military system because the private sector is a strong opponent. Military institutions could make some improvements to their social media pages in order to be able to recruit qualified people. First of all, special attention should be paid to the comments on the posts that a military institution distributes on social pages, and then those who visit these pages should be identified, depending on the purpose of their comments. (Rempfer, 2019) If these comments are positive, there is a chance that some of these people will be a potential candidate.

When a person repeatedly comments on a page's posts, they are presumed to be interested in the domain of that page. Following a study conducted by RAND, those who comment on the social pages of military institutions fall into three categories: those in the general public, those who are part of the army or in reserve and those who have a family member who was part of a military institution or is currently active. (Wenger et al., 2019) With this in mind, people who are active on these social pages can be approached, and if necessary, can be added to the portfolio of candidates.

The increasing presence of military institutions on social networks also determines the correct informing of the population, and, thus, people, having the necessary information related to a certain system, can decide whether they fit, from their perspective, to that system.

Research on recruitment through social networks for the military profession does not exist, but there are some statements of people who have a decision-making role in military institutions regarding the use of social networks to attract recruits. For example, Major General Frank Muth, commander of the U.S. Army Recruitment Unit, believes that it is necessary for the military institution to recruit through platforms such as Hulu or Netflix, because young people no

longer watch commercials on television as previous generations did. He launched a campaign to attract young people to the army through advertisements on the networks on which they are active. (Sheftick, 2018) If before the explosion of social networks the army was promoted through television, now it is time for the promotion to be achieved through the means used by those targeted to be part of the military structures.

The Swedish military is also keen to use social media to recruit staff. They used Facebook for years to recruit. (Sundberg) Through this profile they managed to promote their image and attract many young people.

Regarding Romania, the recruitment process in NSPODNS is affected by “the deterioration of the demographic situation, by the changes produced in the motivational profile of young people and by the competition imposed by the civil sector”. (Rozalia, 2017) In developing the recruitment strategy for NSPODNS it is important to take into account the issues identified by the beneficiaries because they know what they need.

In 2017, Gabriel Leș, Minister of Defence in that time, stated that “attracting and recruiting a valuable human resource is a strategic area with a strong impact on both the ability to respond to new challenges in the security environment and training population and territory for defense”(Rozalia, 2017). This statement suggested that structures with a role in national security need the best quality human resources, and for this to happen, the recruitment process must involve all the steps to determine the compatibility between candidates and employee status to NSPODNS. For the time being, the verification of the candidates' activity on social profiles is not a stage in the recruitment process. In the civilian sector, the use of social networks for recruitment is one of the main methods used and there are even courses for this.<sup>2</sup> The competition that military structures have with the civilian sector, in attracting quality human resources, requires military structures to update the recruitment procedures and connect to the online environment.

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<sup>2</sup> Social Media Recruitment Course: Facebook, LinkedIn, HR Academy - Performance through People.

Alexandrescu (2018) has the opinion that the selection and recruitment system within NSPODNS is compatible with that of similar structures in NATO member countries, based on the elimination of all forms of discrimination and ensuring equal opportunities for all candidates. Checking the profiles of candidates on social networks can create discrimination because certain data obtained (such as age, sex, race, sexual orientation, and certain physical disabilities) can affect the objectivity of the recruitment process. Although it involves some risks, this initial verification of social networks can significantly reduce the time of employment of an employee by filtering them even before the first meeting.

Although we have not identified strictly related research on the introduction of social media as a tool for recruiting human resources in the military institutions, there is research that identifies possible advantages and disadvantages of using this tool in the recruitment process.

Drahošová and Balco (2017) listed the advantages and disadvantages of using data obtained from social networks. Advantages include great information exchange and an easy way for communication. In terms of disadvantages, internet addiction was considered the most important. The following disadvantages were also identified: lack of security, information overload and loss of social connection. Analyzing these advantages and disadvantages, it can be seen that they are in contradiction. If people communicate through social networks, they lose contact with other people, and if on the one hand they are satisfied that they are informed, on the other hand they are dissatisfied that they are overloaded with information. According to Tal (2018), the biggest advantages of using social networks in the recruitment process are speed, efficiency and the ability to score and attract specifically. She also identified the very low cost of searching for a candidate on social networks as an advantage. If traditional methods involve certain costs, such as paying for ads in audio-visual media, an account on social networks does not involve any costs. Holm (2008) considers that online recruitment has great advantages over traditional recruitment, starting from lower costs, shorter candidate identification

time, and the possibility to identify a candidate from any geographical area and keeping the information on an indefinite period of time.

Serkan (2017) believes that the use of social networks during the recruitment process saves recruiters' time, gives them the opportunity to verify the information provided by candidates and facilitates the process of searching for potential candidates. In addition to these advantages, the use of social networks in recruitment activities presents another great benefit, namely, this method does not involve any costs.

Cülcüloğlu (2013) argues that recruitment through the use of social networks is much less expensive than traditional methods. He also argues that traditional methods for recruitment have a lower success rate than recruitment through the use of social networks.

Although it has many advantages, online recruitment also has disadvantages that must be taken into account in order for success to be guaranteed. As Barber (2006) also said, one of the biggest disadvantages is the lack of face-to-face communication. Although online communication is faster, people need to interact in order to be sure that what they are saying is true. There may be different people behind the screen than what appears on the screen.

In 2001, Pin and his colleagues conducted a study in which they asked human resources workers if interaction with potential candidates was important, and 50% of those who responded to the study agreed. The recruitment process can be done online up to a certain point: scoring the candidate, checking the profile, submitting the offer, but in order to make a decision about the end of the recruitment process it is necessary to establish a face-to-face discussion with him. Pin and colleagues (2001) argue that excluding this discussion may lead to the removal of qualified candidates from the portfolio.

It is also important that all candidates go through the same recruitment process so as not to be discriminated against. And, of course, the recruitment process must be adapted to the job that needs to be filled. The same tools cannot be used for each domain. Masa'd (2015) believes that online recruitment cannot be done for positions that require average skills.

The online environment was considered from the beginning more favorable than the old methods of carrying out activities. It certainly facilitated many of these activities, but with the advent of this, and especially with the advent of social networks, the individual began to lose sight of what privacy means. The growing desire to share aspects of personal life on social media encompassed the whole society. Clark and Roberts (2015) describe the online environment as the place where people meet, make plans, and share the news they have with each other. Usually, people post family pictures, holiday pictures, and pictures of daily activities on their personal pages and also communicate with their loved ones through this page. Although the posts are online, people believe that they decide who has the right to see those posts or not. Therefore, they may find it inappropriate to have an employer or recruiter on their page looking for private information.

The information obtained from social networks can determine the recruiter to judge the candidate. However, some information may be old and irrelevant, and the recruiter must take this into account so as not to misjudge the candidate. Clark and Roberts (2015) claim that recruiters use the information found on the pages of candidates' social networks because it is very easy and very cheap, but their prejudices can lead them to misunderstanding certain information and draw certain conclusions incorrectly.

In order for recruiters to make the right decisions about the information identified on social networks, it is important to give up their own prejudices when browsing a candidate's page. Brown and Vaughn (2011) argue that discrimination can occur because recruiters do not pass on to decision makers the information that underpinned their decision to hire or not a particular person. They should objectively analyze the information and pass it on to those who have the right to decide. This way, the prejudices they may have could be eliminated, and all candidates would have equal chances.

The more attractive it is, the more risky it is to score candidates on social networks. Popescu and Georgescu (2013) presented certain dangers that may arise when searching for information about a candidate on the Facebook page. One of the most common problems would be that the profile identified on the Facebook platform is not real.

There may also be certain risks such as the existence of viruses that can lead to the discovery of personal information about the person accessing the page or receiving inappropriate messages, either in private or on the Facebook wall. The Internet allows all these things, which is why the recruiter who wants to know information about the candidates must have the necessary equipment because it is not known what dangers exist.

Social networks can be both an opportunity and a threat in the recruitment process, either in the civilian or in the military sector. It is important for the recruiter to have well-established goals and strategies that will use to know what to check and to know when to stop, if it is necessary.

### **Conclusions**

Recruitment through social networks is not a solid field in terms of research. However, all existing research shows that this method of recruitment is necessary and presents more advantages than disadvantages. The development of technology has provided great help to this field of activity. Low periods of time and low costs are the main advantages that recruitment through social networks has over traditional recruitment methods. Previous research shows that organizations that have adopted this method of recruitment have had a larger portfolio of candidates in a shorter time and a higher success rate in choosing the right candidate.

Practice has shown, however, that there are disadvantages in using social networks to identify certain candidates and find out things about them. The biggest disadvantage of this method of recruitment is the lack of research in the field because there is no clear strategy to apply to all recruiters. Thus, certain candidates may be discriminated against or recruiters may invade their private space. Also, another disadvantage is the lack of human interaction that is essential for recruiters to be sure that what appears in front of the screen is in line with the reality.

The military organizations, although it has stricter rules than other organizations, are adapting to new trends in recruitment. For the time being, recruitment through social networks is not part of the

procedure for recruiting for military institutions, but it is necessary to introduce it, according to the statements of those who work in these institutions.

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# **HISTORY AND MEMORY IN INTELLIGENCE**

## NOTE ALE SERVICIULUI SPECIAL DE INFORMAȚII CU REFERIRE LA SCHIMBĂRILE DIN BASARABIA DUPĂ OCUPAREA DE URSS ÎN 1940

Radu STEFĂNIȚĂ\*

### Abstract

*Bessarabia became forcibly communist. Territorial, administrative and economic organization sought to de-nationalize, to eliminate the Romanian's identity and to quickly and arbitrary integration into the Soviet State.*

*The Special Service of Information knew the tools and the methods used by the USSR in all occupied territories and in 1941 informed the decision making agencies like the Presidency of the Council of Ministries. The notes provided information to Romanian State about the impact of those measures on population and the general state of social unsatisfactory concerning the Soviets misbehave.*

*In fact, the information provided by the Romanian Intelligence Service was anticipating a growing in coercion which was confirmed after the liberation of Bessarabia in the second half of 1941 and the discovery of the criminal apparatus that functioned during the year of Bolshevik occupation.*

**Keywords:** *Serviciului Special de Informații, notă, Basarabia, R.A.S.S. Moldovenească, comunizare, nemulțumire.*

### Introducere

Articolul include o scurtă trecere în revistă a modificărilor realizate de U.R.S.S. în Basarabia după ocuparea din 1940 și, mai ales, a impactului generat în societatea basarabeană. Aceste măsuri au vizat, pe de o parte comunizarea accelerată a regiunii și, pe de altă parte, obturarea oricăror legături directe, civilizaționale și culturale cu România.

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Plecând de la sursele bibliografice ale perioadei, am utilizat și surse arhivistice pentru a demonstra că statul român a cunoscut în parte aceste măsuri, prin informațiile și sintezele furnizată de către Serviciul Special de Informații, transmise Președinției Consiliului de Miniștri. În articol am utilizat literatură a problemei general recunoscută și validată, dar și documente de arhivă, cu aspecte nepublicate până în prezent.

### **Organizarea Basarabiei după ocupare**

După un ultimatum de trei zile și ocuparea violentă și abuzivă de către Moscova, din punct de vedere administrativ, Basarabia a fost inclusă în cursul lunii iulie 1940 în cadrul Republicii Autonome Sovietice Socialiste (R.A.S.S.) Moldovenești (creată din 1924, cu capitala la Balta), existând, ulterior, o dezbatere amplă la nivelul forurilor de decizie ale Partidului Comunist referitoare de viitorul administrativ al teritoriilor ocupate (Șișcanu, 2007, p. 240). O soluție a fost prezentată pentru prima dată la doar o săptămână de la ocupare în ziarul „Pravda” (organul cel mai influent și mai informat al presei sovietice), care a avansat posibilitatea ca toate teritoriile „eliberate” să formeze o republică separată (Bruhis, 1992, p. 273)<sup>1</sup>. Disputa care privea fixarea granițelor de interior ale viitoarei R.S.S. Moldovenească a continuat, în cursul lunii iulie 1940, promovându-se un proiect central, care viza unirea teritoriului cu cel al fostei structuri autonome din cadrul R.S.S. Ucrainene, altul ucrainean, care urmărea fracționarea provinciei și reunirea restului rămas cu 6 din cele 14 raioane ale R.A.S.S. Moldovenești (Petrencu, 1999, p. 37) și unul de compromis, care includea în noua republică 8 din cele 9 județe ale Basarabiei și 12 din cele 14 raioane de la est de Nistru (Șișcanu, 2007, p. 247, un document din 15 iulie 1940, emis la Moscova).

Formal, între autoritățile de la Chișinău și cele de la Kiev s-au purtat în cursul lunii iulie 1940 negocieri referitoare la delimitările etnice ale viitoarelor unități administrative, dar care aveau să se

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<sup>1</sup> Proiectul a apărut în numărul din 11 iulie 1940, noua structură teritorială urmând să aibă 50.500 kilometri<sup>2</sup> și peste 3,7 milioane de locuitori, fiind superioară unor state ca Belgia, Olanda sau Elveția.

dovedească inutile în planul deciziei, ce avea să se ia, ca toate marile hotărâri, la centru (Scurtu, 2010, p. 359). În august 1940, a fost adoptat proiectul ucrainean, care răpea din considerente etnice Basarabiei 3 din cele 9 județe<sup>2</sup> (Petrencu, 1999, p. 38), dând o compensație teritorială minoră, în același timp cu adoptarea legii cu privire la formarea R.S.S. Moldovenească (Șișcanu, 2007, p. 249)<sup>3</sup>, care căpăta statut de republică unională separată (cu însemne specifice), în timp ce fosta R.A.S.S. Moldovenească se dizolva în cadrul statului ucrainean (Tabac, 1996, p. 15). Stema noului stat era reprezentată de o seceră și un ciocan luminate de razele soarelui, încadrată cu reprezentări agricole, cu o stea în 5 colțuri.

Decizia de împărțire administrativă a Basarabiei nu a fost cunoscută decât după adoptare de către liderii de partid din Basarabia și de cei din R.A.S.S. Moldovenească care coordonau teoretic provincia ocupată (Bruhis, 1992, p. 276), hotarul definitiv între cele două state unionale fiind stabilit după negocieri bilaterale abia în noiembrie 1940, când au fost stabilite și delimitările administrative interne ale noului stat (Gribincea, 1995, p. 29 – 30)<sup>4</sup>. Schimbările teritoriale aveau la bază rațiuni demografice, zonele eterogene locuite de slavi (din nord și sud) fiind alipite la un stat ucrainean considerat sigur de către autoritățile sovietice (King, 2002, p. 95). Tranșarea problemei Basarabiei în favoarea Kievului a avut la bază rolul și locul activiștilor ucraineni în cadrul Partidului Comunist și a reprezentat o compensație pentru politica prosovietică dusă de aceștia și a constituit o sursă de resentimente între cele două republici „surori” care aveau o graniță extinsă (Scurtu, 2010, p. 358 – 359). Noul stat reunea – ca patrie a „moldovenilor” – doar ceva mai mult de jumătate din teritoriile ocupate în iunie 1940, în locul suprafeței pierdute dându-i-se noii republici unionale în schimb un mic teritoriu transnistrean locuit în majoritate relativă tot de români și o populație cu aproape 40% mai mică decât

<sup>2</sup> Populația celor trei județe era alcătuită din români (28,4%), ucraineni (25,4%), bulgari (15,3%) ruși (13,3%) găgăuzi (9,1%), germani (6,2%).

<sup>3</sup> *Legea URSS cu privire la formarea R.S.S. Moldovenești unionale* adoptată pe 2 august 1940, dădea noii republici 6 raioane din fosta R.A.S.S. Moldovenească: Camenca, Râbnîța, Dubăsari, Grigoriopol, Tiraspol și Slobozia.

<sup>4</sup> La 1 decembrie, în noul stat, în 1940 existau 6 județe, 58 de raioane, 14 orașe, 11 orașele și 1100 sate.

regiunea anexată inițial (Constantin, 1995, p. 105)<sup>5</sup>. În fapt, prin apariția noii republici unionale, U.R.S.S. a obținut două mari avantaje: pe de o parte, în plan geostrategic, revenirea la gurile Dunării și, de aici, controlul navigației pe principalul fluviu european (Ciorănescu, 2001, p. 133) și, pe de altă parte, obținerea unui surplus agricol consistent (deși, teritorial, în comparație cu Uniunea Sovietică, era infim), necesar propriei populații, aflată în mai multe rânduri în perioade de foamete (Gribincea, 1995, p.18.).

Împărțirea Basarabiei a avut la bază o serie de justificări, cea mai importantă fiind cea politică. Astfel, era dezrădăcinat odată pentru totdeauna termenul de „Basarabia”, care făcea trimitere indirectă la apartenența românească, fiind deschis, în același timp, printr-o alipire a teritoriilor „moldovenesti” din estul Nistrului, dosarul unei posibile revendicări etnice a Moldovei. În plus, strategic, prin intermediul R.S.S. Ucrainene, era controlat Cernăuțiul și gurile Dunării, eternă atracție a rușilor în ultimele două secole (Stavilă, 2000, p. 42). Primirea în contrapartidă a unor teritorii puternic rusificate nu a fost o compensație, ci o rană nouă produsă pentru a lovi în specificul diferit de cel slav al regiunii dintre Prut și Nistru, în unitatea teritorială și etno-politică tradițională (Turcanu, 2011, p. 366).

Ulterior recunoașterii la nivel unional, similar organizării din U.R.S.S., R.S.S. Moldovenească a fost împărțită mai multe oblastii, care conțineau câteva județe, la rândul lor formate din raioane, republica având în frunte un președinte și un comitet central, iar oblastile având un președinte și un comitet executiv. În paralel s-au dezvoltat și structurile specifice de partid (care lua cu adevărat decizia, indiferent de natura sa), fiind organizați octombriștii (5 – 12 ani), pionerii (12 – 15 ani) și comsomoliștii (peste 16 ani) (Antonescu, 1942, p. 68 – 69).

Încă din primele zile de după „eliberare”, după model sovietic, administrația românească (atâta cât mai exista după refugiarea majorității funcționarilor în iunie – iulie 1940) a fost înlocuită cu

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<sup>5</sup> R.S.S. Moldovenească, cu o suprafață de 32.200 kilometri<sup>2</sup>, era compusă din 28.800 kilometri<sup>2</sup> – din cei peste 50.500 kilometri<sup>2</sup> ocupați în Basarabia (45.630 kilometri<sup>2</sup>), Bucovina de Nord și Herța – și 3.200 kilometri<sup>2</sup> din cadrul fostei R.A.S.S. Moldovenești. Populația noului stat era de 2,3 milioane de locuitori (din care 0,35 milioane transnistreni), în timp ce peste 1,5 milioane dintre proaspeții ocupați erau incluși în R.S.S. Ucraineană.

sovietele executive sătești (selisoviet), de orășel și de oraș, care au impus noua administrație la nivelul fiecărei localități din noua republică (Petrencu, 1999, p. 40). În condițiile în care alegerile de la nivel local, programate inițial pentru primăvara anului 1941, au fost amânate pentru toamnă, conducerea zonei a fost realizată aproape 11 luni de cei desemnați după ocuparea celor două provincii românești de către sovietici (Stavilă, 2000, p. 43).

Fapt demn de menționat, la nivelul conducerii centrale a Partidului Comunist, încă din 1940, s-a decis ca în structurile formațiunii să nu intre reprezentanți ai comuniștilor organizați în perioada interbelică în Basarabia (aceste celule au fost lichidate imediat după ocupare), structurile de comandă și decizie (inclusiv cele ale poliției politice) fiind repartizate covârșitor minoritarilor ruși, ucraineni și evrei (Constantin, 1995, p. 35 – 37). În aceeași direcție, la alegerile înscenate din 12 ianuarie 1941, au fost desemnați în cele trei fragmente ale Basarabiei și Bucovinei de Nord (R.S.S. Moldovenească și cele două regiuni Cernăuți și Ismail) un număr de 40 de deputați pentru parlamentul unional de Moscova; ca expresie a sublimei democrații sovietice, candidații care aveau rude în România fuseseră excluși în urma verificărilor realizate de către serviciile de informații. Majoritatea deputaților erau veniți de peste Nistru și nu reprezentau decât formal administrația și interesele populației din regiunile respective (Stavilă, 2000, p. 43). Este ilustrativ faptul că președintele Sovietului suprem al R.S.S. Moldovenești a fost ales Feodor Brovko, un român din Transnistria, iar guvernul, alcătuit preponderent din ruși, era condus de T. Constantninov, român din regiunea Poltava (Ucraina).

### **Schimbări economice și administrative**

Odată cu venirea autorităților sovietice, întreg aparatul financiar a suferit transformări, funcționarii existenți fiind înlocuiți cu alogeni, care, după ce au dezamăgit prin comportament și competență, au fost parțial înlocuiți cu vechii angajați (Fruntașu, 2002, p. 135). Schimbarea violentă de regim a generat mari probleme economice și administrative Basarabiei, legate inclusiv de funcționarea Comisiei de la Odessa (propusă de sovietici încă din 27 iunie 1940, înainte de ocuparea provinciei și alcătuită din reprezentanți ai U.R.S.S. și ai României) și care

a tergiversat, prin funcționarea celor 17 direcții, rezolvarea chestiunilor în litigiu legate de predarea și primirea bunurilor și a teritoriului (Dobrinescu, Constantin, 1995, p. 192). Delegația României, reprezentată la cel mai înalt nivel de generalul Aldea și de generalul Constantin, a solicitat, printre altele, evacuarea instituțiilor românești, a populației civile care dorește acest lucru (Șișcanu, 2007, p. 140), stabilind un nomenclator cu peste 15.000 de nume (în cea mai mare parte funcționari și militari, cu familiile lor), precum și retrocedarea arhivelor și a bunurilor mobile și imobile deținute de diferitele ministere de la București în provincie (Dobrinescu, Constantin, 1995, p. 1923-194). Din cele peste 15.000 de nume publicate au fost eliberate și trimise în România doar 2.000.

În perioada iulie – octombrie 1940 a fost trimis în Basarabia și predat autorităților sovietice parcul C.F.R., precum și instalațiile portuare și o parte din flota maritimă și dunăreană din porturile provinciei, pierderile (în bunuri imobile) ministerelor (cele mai afectate fiind ministerul de Finanțe, Institutul Național de Cooperație, ministerul de Externe) ridicându-se la peste 2,6 miliarde lei, cea mai mare parte a acestora fiind transferate peste Nistru și afectând, prin lipsă, funcționarea vieții economico-sociale în provincie (Șișcanu, 2007, p.141 – 180) (au fost predate 157 de locomotive, 256 vagoane de pasageri, 4421 de vagoane de marfă). A fost afectată producția internă a provinciei (cu o pierdere estimată de 4,1 miliarde lei), pierderile totale ale României generate de dispariția provinciei dintre granițele firești fiind estimate de fostul ministru de Finanțe Virgil Madgearu la peste 26 miliarde lei, în timp ce estimările de la București fixau valoarea avuției publice din provincie la suma de 443 miliarde lei, din suma menționată 125 miliarde lei aparțineau instituțiilor și 161 miliarde domeniului agricol (Dobrinescu, Constantin, 1995, p. 209-210). Prin cedarea Basarabiei și a nordului Bucovinei a fost dezorganizată funcționarea unui sistem economic firesc care includea cele două regiuni, forța de apărare a țării scăzând la rândul ei considerabil ea prin pierderile demografice consistente și prin ocuparea de către sovietici a unor puncte strategice (linia Nistrului, o parte din gurile Dunării) (Dobrinescu, 1991, p. 168).



Schimbări administrative au fost determinate și de schimbarea regimului proprietății, fiind naționalizate, încă din luna august 1940, băncile, comunicațiile și întreprinderile, în timp ce celelalte mijloace de producție au fost naționalizate în luna octombrie a aceluiași an (Șișcanu, 1997, p. 40). Includerea R.S.S. Moldovenească în sistemul socialist a presupus și naționalizarea terenurilor agricole, cu un truc folosit de autoritățile comuniste în vara anului 1940, când, pentru a strânge recolta în timp util, au lăsat țăranilor toate pământurile (inclusiv celor aparținând fugarilor) ulterior începând, pe scară largă, organizarea, după model sovietic, a colhozurilor (cu realizarea inițială a stațiilor de mașini și tractoare – S.M.T.-uri – puncte de reper ale statului în procesul de control a agriculturii) (Șișcanu, 2007, pp. 252 – 253.). Deși primele colhozuri au fost organizate în noiembrie 1940, exista reticență din partea țăranilor români de deveni membri în respectivele cooperații tovărășești, în februarie 1941 fiind organizate abia 111 colhozuri, ce dețineau doar 68.500 de hectare de teren arabil.

Distribuirea pământului a fost doar o stratagemă care a vizat, în afara strângerii recoltei, stabilirea unor impozite nominale care au depășit cu mult posibilitățile gospodăriilor țărănești și care au fost încasate sub controlul noilor autorități locale (Șișcanu, 1994, p. 32). Într-un stat eminamente agricol, prin intermediul S.M.T.-urilor, statul a concentrat în mâinile sale principalele mijloace de producție și a obligat gospodăriile țărănești (aparținând într-o proporție covârșitoare românilor) să încheie contracte net dezavantajoase prin care controla orice tip de decizie administrativă cu rol în economie (Șișcanu E., 1997, p. 43), generând astfel reticența agricultorilor, care au acceptat în număr foarte mic includerea în formula „tovărășească” de tip nou (doar 3,4 % din gospodării (17.059) și 4,2 % din teren au fost incluse în organizarea agricolă de tip sovietic) (Gribincea, 1995, p. 105).

### **Note ale Serviciului Special de Informații**

Într-un document al Serviciului Special de Informații înaintat în 19 iunie 1941 Președinției Consiliului de Miniștri, se preciza că fenomenul colectivizării fusese introdus prin coerciție, toate colhozurile și S.M.T.-urile primind numele unor fruntași comuniști necunoscuți în regiune (*D.N.A.I.C*, Fond Președinția Consiliului de Miniștri, dosar

378/1940, filele 14 -18). Serviciul Special de Informații realiza documentul „Situația economică a Basarabiei și Bucovinei de Nord” în care se preciza că tot prin coerciție fuseseră realizate 120 de centre viticole,<sup>17</sup> sovhozuri viticole, 7 sovhozuri de creștere a animalelor (dintre care 3 mari). Industria existentă la momentul ocupației a fost redată circuitului firesc sub controlul direct al noilor autorități (fiind naționalizate toate bunurile de producție), reprezentând o anexă a bazei agrare specifice regiunii și având puține componente neagricole; concluzia clară era că industria agricolă urma să satisfacă necesitățile provinciei, dar și a U.R.S.S.(*D.N.A.I.C*, Fond Președinția Consiliului de Miniștri, dosar 378/1940, filele 14-21)<sup>6</sup>.

În ianuarie 1941, pe fondul instaurării autorității totalitare în provincie, au avut loc primele alegeri în cadrul forurilor de partid și care, după cum s-a întâmplat de-a lungul timpului în întreg U.R.S.S., au dat câștig de cauză candidaților de pe listele verificate de autoritățile de la Moscova(Scurtu, 2003, p. 361) – candidații propuși au fost aleși în proporție de 99,5 % – ulterior, formându-se centrul de comandă (Comitetul Central) alcătuit în proporție covârșitoare din minoritari. Astfel, doar 4,9 % din reprezentanții Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist din Moldova erau români, abia un deceniu mai târziu ajungând la 19% (Scurtu, 2003, p. 401).

Preocuparea centrului pentru controlul noii republici era certificată și de prezența în cadrul Sovietului Suprem a corifeilor comuniști: Iosif Vissarionovici *Stalin*, Nikita Sergheevici Hrușciiov, Viaceslav Mihailovici Molotov, Kliment Efremovici Voroșilov și Semyon Konstantinovich Timoșenko (Watts, 2011, p. 131). O notă a Serviciului Special de Informații, din luna februarie 1941, preciza (având ca sursă legația U.R.S.S.) că, în provincie se pregătește o amplă reformă administrativă, pentru un control cât mai sever la sate, având drept scop înregimentarea țăranilor în „comună” și a tuturor tinerilor în

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<sup>6</sup> Serviciul Special de Informații realiza documentul „Situația economică a Basarabiei și Bucovinei de Nord”, în care se preciza că existau fabrici de zahăr la Jucica, Lujeni, Bărbesti, Crașciatic, Zeleneu, Drăcineț, Bălți și de ulei la Bălți și Tighina, în timp ce la Bălți fusese construită o fabrică de mașini agricole. La momentul eliberării românești existau 537 de întreprinderi industriale cu 12.000 de angajați. În afara industriei agricole existau, preluate din perioada interbelică, exploatare de cărbune, var și piatră.

organizațiile comsomoliste, instituțiile comuniste fiind introduse în toate sferele vieții din regiune prin folosirea violenței (*D.N.A.I.C.*, Fond Președinția Consiliului de Miniștri, dosar 378/1941, filele 55 – 56). O notă a Serviciului Special de Informații din luna februarie 1941 preciza că populația, indiferent de naționalitate, era din ce în ce mai revoltată de aceste măsuri. Au existat zone în care s-a experimentat modelul bolșevic, Soroca fiind exemplu în acest sens. Astfel, aici au fost infiltrate structuri comuniste în conducerea administrației, economiei, învățământului și vieții sociale. Concomitent cu această nouă organizare a fost urmărită eliminarea tuturor reprezentanților care ar fi putut influența populația împotriva sovieticilor, principalele măsuri luate de noile autorități fiind presiunea economică, schimbările administrative, modificarea învățământului, distrugerea bunurilor materiale.

Principala măsură economică s-a regăsit în colectivizarea unităților economice individuale prin 2 căi: exproprierea și confiscarea bunurilor industriale și agricole, a gospodăriilor mici și mijlocii și impunerile fiscale enorme asupra unităților producătoare agricole și industriale. Aceste măsuri au fost dublate de arestarea și condamnarea la muncă silnică a celor susceptibili de a deveni „dușmani ai poporului”, de dislocarea claselor sociale, prin stimularea urii între bogați și săraci (fapt realizat prin propagandă și prin promovarea exclusivă în funcțiile de conducere în diferite ramuri de activitate a unor indivizi pauperi și, în general, neinstruiți) și de izolarea completă a provinciei atât de România cât și de U.R.S.S. (pentru a înlătura orice influență venită din Țară, cât și pentru a întârzia deziluzia populației basarabene după ce, prin contact, ar fi luat cunoștință despre adevărata față a comunismului), în ceea ce privește învățământul, programa impusă a vizat distrugerea totală a sentimentului național, religios și familial și cultivarea urii față de orice era opus comunismului (Moraru și Petrencu, 2008, p. 35 – 36).

Pe acest fond, o lună mai târziu, a avut loc primul congres (soviet suprem) al Partidului Comunist din Moldova, care a adoptat la 10 februarie 1941 prima constituție a R.S.S. Moldovenești (având ca model actul fundamental unional din 1936) și care, deși stipula teoretic separația puterilor în stat, funcționarea liberă a autorităților și

drepturile cetățenilor republicii, a tolerat existența arbitrariului, abuzului și încălcării legilor elementare (Gribincea, 1995, p. 31 – 32).

În afara oricăror limite de democrație aparentă chiar și într-un sistem totalitar, structurile puterii din R.S.S. Moldovenească au fost create în R.S.S. Ucraineană (Stavilă, 2000, p. 41). Notele Serviciului Special de Informații din perioadă observau:

- folosirea propagandistică a noilor sărbători pentru a promova comunismul. O notă a Serviciului Special de Informații din 20 mai 1941 prezenta sărbătorirea cu mare fast a zilei de 1 mai în marile orașe ale Basarabiei: la Orhei (în fabrici, școli, colhozuri), la Bălți (inclusiv uzina electrică), la Soroca (școala rusă), Chișinău (cale alegorice, trupe ale Armatei Roșii) (*D.N.A.I.C.*, Fond Președinția Consiliului de Miniștri, dosar 378/1941, filele 46 – 47);

- creșterea gradului de nemulțumire a populației față de realitățile din provincie, inclusiv a colonizărilor. O notă a Serviciului Special de Informații, din 20 mai 1941, prezenta sărbătorirea cu mare fast a zilei de 1 mai în marile orașe ale Basarabiei: la Orhei (în fabrici, școli, colhozuri), la Bălți (inclusiv uzina electrică), la Soroca (școala rusă), Chișinău (cale alegorice, trupe ale Armatei Roșii) (*D.N.A.I.C.*, Fond Președinția Consiliului de Miniștri, dosar 378/1941, filele 34);

- atacurile dure ale noilor guvernanți la adresa fostei ordini constituționale românești și promovarea educației antireligioase și comuniste. O sinteză a Serviciului Special de Informații din luna martie 1941 prezenta luările de poziție ale deputaților Por și Brasko (președintele Prezidiului Sovietului Suprem al Republicii Federate Moldova), care au criticat fosta administrație monarhică ce se opunea „ridicării economice și sociale a poporului moldovenesc”. Primul Congres al Comsomolului urma să aibă loc la 15 martie 1941, în provincie ducându-se o amplă politică antireligioasă, membrii organizației Bezbojnik (cei fără Dumnezeu) vizitând orașele și satele Basarabiei pentru a realiza conferințe ateiste (*D.N.A.I.C.*, Fond Președinția Consiliului de Miniștri, dosar 378/1941, filele 36 – 37);

- trimiterea (cu forța) la studii. Într-un „Rezumat al informațiilor de ordin politic, social, economic”, din 21 februarie 1941, al Serviciului Special de Informații se preciza că, 350 de tineri basarabeni au fost trimiși să urmeze cursurile școlii de Comsomoliști de la Kiev, în timp ce

șomerii tineri erau trimiși în Siberia și în zona industrială din Urali. În caz de refuzau plecarea erau chemați în fața tribunalelor pentru crimă de sabotaj.(*D.N.A.I.C.*, Fond Președinția Consiliului de Miniștri, dosar 378/1941, filele 44 – 47);

- trimiterea (cu forța) la muncă a celor înstăriți în U.R.S.S și reprimarea sângeroasă a încercărilor de trecere frauduloasă a frontierei în România, datorate condițiilor de viață precare. O notă a Serviciului Special de Informații din luna februarie 1941 preciza că bărbații mai înstăriți din cele două provincii au fost trimiși în interiorul U.R.S.S, iar numărul de încercări nereușite de trecere a frontierei (datorate situației economice și bolilor) a crescut, fiind reprimare sângeros de către autorități.(*D.N.A.I.C.*, Fond Președinția Consiliului de Miniștri, dosar 378/1941, fila 49).

### Concluzii

Basarabia a fost comunizată în regim forțat. Organizarea teritorială, administrativă și economică au vizat deznaționalizarea, eliminarea caracteristicilor românești și integrarea rapidă și arbitrară în statul sovietic. Mijloacele și metodele utilizate de către U.R.S.S în toate teritoriile ocupate au fost cunoscute și au făcut, la nivelul anului 1941, obiectul informărilor Serviciului Special de Informații către decidenți, recte Președinția Consiliului de Miniștri. Aceste note au adus cunoaștere statului român referitor la impactul acestor măsuri asupra populației și a nemulțumirilor generate în societate de abuzurile sovietice.

În fapt, datele transmise de către serviciul de informații românesc către decidentul legal anticipau o creștere a metodelor coercitive, care aveau să culmineze cu identificarea de către statul român, după eliberarea din a doua parte a anului 1941, a aparatului criminal, ce a funcționat în anul de ocupație bolșevică.

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# **SECURITY PARADIGMS IN THE 21ST CENTURY**

## THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS OF CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE IN THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT

Sergey MINASYAN\*

### Abstract

*Deterrence is both a theoretical branch of the theory of international relations and security studies, and a practical strategy used by states (and sometimes non-state actors) to manage conflicts and crises. Given the special role it plays in regional and international security issues, military, and politics, deterrence has long been an object of interest to scholars as well as the military, politicians, and diplomats.*

*To analyse deterrence in regional conflicts, one must begin with a brief typology of the elements and mechanism of deterrence in general, and only then see how they can be applied to regional conflicts. Deterrence can rely on conventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In regional conflicts without direct involvement of nuclear superpowers, the most applicable scenario is that of deterrence with conventional weapons, i.e. conventional deterrence.*

*However, the use of conventional deterrence in regional conflicts has not been covered by political science in great detail. Therefore, from academic and practical perspectives, it is important to clarify the conceptual aspects for a more precise theoretical understanding and subsequent discussions applicable to some regional conflicts, including the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.*

**Keywords:** *conventional deterrence, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, South Caucasus, regional security, conflict resolution.*

### Introduction

Deterrence remains an effective form of achieving fundamental strategic military and political goals by both states and non-state actors.

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The effectiveness of deterrence is demonstrated by many examples in world history. As noted by one of the military historians, “deterrence is old, like fear” (Overy, 1994, p. 73). Nevertheless, a comprehensive conceptualization of deterrence in political science and military-strategic research – most importantly, in political practice – was absorbed only after the Second World War, when the active bipolar confrontation of the nuclear superpowers began to gain momentum.

There are many definitions of deterrence, from our professional point of view we prefer to define deterrence as *preventing an actor from committing undesirable military or political action by threatening to cause it considerable, preferably unacceptable, damage*. Deterrence can include any combination of military, political, economic, diplomatic, informational, psychological, or other measures that aim to dissuade a potential aggressor from achieving their goals by means of military force.

During the Cold War, the theory and practice of deterrence by both superpowers mostly relied on nuclear weapons. However, in the '70s and '80s, and especially after the end of the Cold War, conventional deterrence began to become increasingly important. It could be said that a renaissance of conventional deterrence took place. At the current stage this so-called “second conventional age” is marked by the development of modern conventional weapons: long-range, precise ballistic and cruise missiles that use advanced intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance systems. In case of great military powers, these modern technologies include not only classic strike platforms – ballistic and cruise missiles, artillery systems, other precision-guided munitions (PGMs) – but also weapons based on new physical principles.

The military competition between small countries involved in a regional conflict after the renaissance of the conventional deterrence is mainly based on the growing destruction capacity of the existing strike platforms with improved surveillance systems and on greater sensitivity and vulnerability of modern states to the possible damage and destruction of their basic military capabilities and civilian infrastructure. With regard to many regional conflicts, conventional deterrence plays a special role. That is why in the Nagorno-Karabakh

conflict, assuming external actors do not become directly involved, conventional deterrence is the only possible strategy.

Naturally, every ethno political or international conflict is different and has some unique parameters. Still, many conflicts share the same logic, so that a set of theoretical concepts and patterns can be used to understand these conflicts' cause-and-effect relationships, algorithms, and mechanisms, and to assess the efficiency of military and political measures used to address them. This article does not study the all complex nature of political, historical and other realities of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that can be found in many sources (Avakian, 2013) and is dedicated solely to the theoretical frameworks of conventional deterrence in the situation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with special focus on the elements and mechanism of implementing deterrence.

### **The elements of deterrence**

**Nuclear and conventional deterrence:** There is a conceptual difference between nuclear deterrence and conventional deterrence. The logic of nuclear deterrence is that the adversary will refrain from a certain kind of action/inaction in order to avoid 'mutual suicide'. In conventional deterrence, no matter what military potential is possessed by the party engaging in it, the actor that unleashes hostilities always has the hope of achieving political goals by military means even in the event of a retaliatory strike. The application threshold is thus lower for conventional deterrence, and consequently, conventional deterrence has higher *credibility* than nuclear deterrence. The reason is that making the decision to use conventional weapons is fundamentally easier than in the case of nuclear weapons. The credibility of intentions to use nuclear weapons in response to the adversary's action or inaction relies on a perceived suicidal readiness. The existing "nuclear taboo" – moral and political limitations on the use of nuclear weapons, especially against countries that do not possess them – has been enhanced by the fact that nuclear weapons have not been used for a long time. Still, despite the greater credibility of conventional

deterrence, it remains less effective than nuclear deterrence, because of the difference in magnitude of the potential damage.

Not only does conventional deterrence have a more complicated conceptual and existential basis, it is also more complex in its implementation. For example, it is extremely difficult for the potential adversary to estimate the scale of potential losses from retaliatory actions in the event of a violation of the status quo (Harknett, 1994, pp. 88-89). Unlike a nuclear war where the result is clear cut, the estimate of the potential cost resulting from retaliation in a conventional war is a hypothetical or mathematical exercise. Assessing the credibility of conventional deterrence is also difficult. For these reasons, conventional deterrence is less powerful than nuclear deterrence (Stone, 2012, p. 109). However, as political realities always demonstrate, 'the fact that nuclear threats are incontestable does not guarantee that they will be viewed as credible, while the contestable nature of conventional threats does not preclude their credibility' (Wirts, 2018, p. 58).

**Narrow and extended deterrence:** Depending on the actors involved, deterrence can be categorized as *narrow* or *extended*. *Narrow deterrence* only involves the deterring country. *Extended deterrence* also involves another country or group of countries. Additionally, *narrow deterrence* only concerns the security and interests of the deterring actor while in the event of *extended deterrence*, other players commit to the deterrence, including by providing military and/or political guarantees.

Since the middle of the Cold War (60s), the concept of extended deterrence was one of the foundations of the military and political plans of NATO. The deterrence relied primarily on the US nuclear potential. Similar nuclear safeguards were extended to the Asia-Pacific Region (APR), namely, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Taiwan (country where US nuclear safeguards remain informal). Within NATO, the arrangement was collective defence (Article 5 of the 1949 Treaty) whereas in the APR, the US made a bilateral agreement with each ally.

Based on this typology, we encounter a mixed type of deterrence in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. On the one hand, evidently, Armenia

implements extended deterrence. In its key documents in the sphere of security and defence (National Security Strategy, Military Doctrine, etc.) the Republic of Armenia has stipulated its commitments towards the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic acting as the guarantor of its security and representative of its interests in the international arena. The military and political guarantees provided by Armenia thus deter Azerbaijan from resuming hostilities against Nagorno-Karabakh. On the other hand, Armenia carries out deterrence against Azerbaijan with regard to its own security, since the military and political leadership of Azerbaijan has repeatedly stated its readiness to launch military strikes at the territory of Armenia. In this case, Armenia evidently engages in minimal or narrow deterrence.

Finally, in the regional security framework Armenia is also a beneficiary of extended deterrence given the military security guarantees provided by its external security partners.

**General and situational deterrence:** In terms of its timeframe, deterrence can be categorized as *general* (strategic) or *situational* (immediate). In *general deterrence*, a country plans and implements a set of military and political measures to prevent threats to its security. Since it is ongoing and part of the country's long-term strategic planning, it is sometimes called *strategic deterrence*.<sup>1</sup>

One example of general deterrence is the long-term implementation by Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh (at least, after the ceasefire in May 1994) of a policy to dissuade Azerbaijan from resuming full-scale hostilities in the zone of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The need for general deterrence affects many aspects of Armenia's military and foreign policy, including its military and political cooperation strategies, its involvement in international organizations and cooperation with the external security partners (including

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<sup>1</sup> It is important not to confuse the meaning of *strategic deterrence* described here with the way this term is used by some nuclear states. E.g. in Russia it denotes deterrence relying on the strategic nuclear potential of land- and sea-based missile systems and strategic bomber aircraft. The term is also used in Russia to avoid confusion with nuclear deterrence using non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons.

participation in international peacekeeping), arms procurement, deployment of its armed forces and location of its military facilities, and the goals of its military reforms and development.

In contrast to general deterrence, the need for *situational deterrence* arises right before or during a crisis. As Patrick Morgan, the creator of this typology, pointed out, the situational deterrence mechanisms take effect when the adversary is already contemplating or preparing an attack, or when decisive action is necessary to dispel the adversary's doubts about the determination and capabilities of the deterring actor (Morgan, 2003). Situational deterrence is also needed when the effectiveness of general deterrence on the regional level is reduced, for example, by external factors affecting the military and political situation or the military balance in the conflict zone.

There are various means of situational deterrence at times of crisis: effective communication (this can involve military parades, military exercises in the immediate vicinity of the conflict zone, military and political visits by leaders of friendly and allied states, etc.); demonstrative acquisitions of new types of weapons and military equipment; initiating military and political support from and consultations with allied states and international organizations; full or partial military mobilization; declaring a state of emergency, and so on. In certain circumstances, situational deterrence may involve direct military actions of limited or proportional scale.

### **Deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial**

Based on the type of retaliation threats, Glenn Snyder's classification, developed in the late '50s and early '60s, distinguishes two types of deterrence: *deterrence by punishment* and *deterrence by denial* (Snyder, 1993, pp. 360-361). The first type – *deterrence by punishment* – was especially relevant for the nuclear bipolar confrontation between superpowers during the Cold War. It involved threats to inflict unacceptable damage (to the adversary's territory, population, industry, infrastructure, etc.) with missile and bomb strikes in the event that the adversary initiates military action, regardless of its outcome. In this logic, the adversary is expected to abandon the idea of

launching (or sometimes also continuing) military action after calculating possible damages from the retaliatory strike.

Deterrence by punishment remains pivotal in the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence. It is also the conceptual basis of the *counter value strategy* that targets major civilian and industrial facilities as well as the military and political leadership of the adversary. In recent decades, deterrence by punishment has increasingly become applicable to conventional deterrence. With the growing accuracy and destructive power of conventional weapons, the technological development of many states has reached such proportions that the destruction of specific elements of infrastructure, economic facilities, and communications can lead to catastrophic consequences.

It is not only superpowers or regional powers but also small countries involved in regional conflicts with their neighbours that acquire high-performance large-calibre Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), tactical and operational-tactical missile systems, and other types of conventional missiles and artillery. This trend was evident by the mid- '70s, especially during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988 and other local conflicts in so called "Third World" countries. These types of long-range weapons have also become common in the arsenals of small states because of their relatively low cost, high efficiency and ease of operation, requiring neither a complicated infrastructure nor large numbers of trained personnel (Cohen, 1986, pp. 150-155).

Similarly to American and Soviet nuclear deterrence during the Cold War or "Third World" non-nuclear regional conflicts, conventional deterrence in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict involves industrial and political as well as military targets, for example, the facilities for producing and transportation of energy. It should be noted that potential retaliatory strikes target economic and communication infrastructure, but not the civilian population.

In the event that deterrence by punishment is ineffective, *deterrence by denial* is used to convince the adversary that they have no chance to achieve their military and political goals, and thereby dissuade them from initiating hostilities. When conventional weapons are used, deterrence by denial has a major advantage over deterrence

by punishment. When deterrence by punishment fails, the forces and assets needed for deterrence by denial (for example, large-calibre MLRS, tactical missile systems and other types of long-range weapon systems) can later be used to engage in a “traditional” conventional armed conflict. Conventional deterrence by denial thus integrates with a traditional military defence strategy, because the weapons and armed forces of the defending party can become “the instruments of defence if deterrence failed” (Snyder, 1993, p. 355). In this regard, conventional deterrence has an advantage over nuclear deterrence, which lacks the flexibility of combining deterrence by punishment with deterrence by denial, or with defensive action, in the event that deterrence fails.

Accordingly, the concept of deterrence by denial is more applicable to conventional deterrence, which includes more elements of the classical military strategy. It can even be argued that deterrence by denial is fundamental for conventional deterrence. However, in nuclear deterrence, deterrence by denial was the basis for the *counterforce strikes* strategy, although by the end of the Cold War, both the United States and the USSR already concluded that, because of their enormous destructive power, nuclear weapons became a political deterrent rather than a weapon.

In the post-bipolar period, deterrence by denial entered a new stage, especially in regional conflicts, and in many cases became the prevailing approach, since, in contrast to nuclear deterrence, conventional deterrence does not concentrate on the use of missiles and bombs to undermine the economic, demographic, and the political survival of the adversary. In view of the smaller striking force of conventional weapons, conventional deterrence tends to focus on reducing the adversary’s military and technical capacity. The goal of the deterring actor is to demonstrate ability to inflict unacceptable damage to the offensive capability of a potential adversary, destroying all hope for quick victory, causing the adversary to lose political motivation for an offensive, and thereby successfully deterring it from unleashing a new war.

We should also note a circumstance that is particularly relevant for the current military-technical balance in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: the deterring sides possess a sufficient quantity of PGMs,

including Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGM) and Surface to Air Missiles (SAM), to rule out the option of quick victory; as noted by John Mearsheimer in his classical study, “as a result of developments in precision-guided technologies, it is clearly much more difficult to implement a blitzkrieg” (Mearsheimer, 1983, p. 28). Instruments of deterrence by denial in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict include also multi-layered fortifications along the line of contact, which lower the chances for the success of a rapid offensive.

### **The mechanism for implementing deterrence**

**Deterrence capability:** Capability is the most obvious and essential element of effective deterrence. At the same time, as Bernard Brodie noted, ‘the maximum possible deterrence may require a war-winning capability, but much less force can nevertheless possess considerable deterrent value’ (Brodie, 1959, p. viii). This observation was confirmed in the course of many acute regional and global crises and escalations.

The effective implementation of any type of deterrence clearly requires a certain military-technical capability. In the case of conventional deterrence, this capability must primarily include two interrelated components:

1. Availability of large-calibre MLRS, long-range and medium-range tactical missile systems, other types of long-range weapons (for example, multifunctional aircrafts, equipped with long-range air-to-ground missiles) for striking at sensitive targets deep in the territory of the potential adversary (deterrence by punishment);

2. An effective defensive capability to prevent the potential adversary from achieving an immediate complete victory (deterrence by denial). In this case, it is primarily about general-purpose forces that can be used to prevent the adversary from promptly achieving their strategic and operational goals in the course of classical military operations.



**Credibility of deterrence:** The most important characteristic of any type of deterrence, whether nuclear deterrence or deterrence with conventional types of weapons is also the question of its *credibility*, or, in other words, the potential adversary's awareness of the potential retaliation' scope and the potential costs of unleashing aggression. Deterrence only works when a country's military and political leadership is aware that in the event that it initiates a military campaign, the potential adversary has the political will, determination, and capacity to cause it irreparable losses and/or prevent it from achieving its operational goals. In other words, as former US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, put it, 'weakness is an invitation', i.e. if a player believes that their adversary lacks power and determination for retaliation, deterrence will fail.<sup>2</sup>

The credibility of Armenian deterrence in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is affected, amongst other things, by the *asymmetry of motivations*, often playing a more important role than the *asymmetry of capabilities*. As prominent expert on asymmetric conflicts, Ivan Arreguin-Toft, points out: "power asymmetry explains interest asymmetry" (Arreguin-Toft, 2001, pp. 95-96). In the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, an important factor of credibility of Armenian deterrence is thus the *asymmetry of motivations*, since Armenians have more motivation than Azerbaijani. Victory or defeat in a likely new war for Armenia, and even more so for Nagorno-Karabakh, is a matter of the very survival of their statehood (Deriglazova and Minasyan, 2011).

Another factor that enhances the credibility of Armenian deterrence is the existence of a successful historical precedent of willingness to resort extreme means to stand in the existing political situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In line with the *theory of reputation-building*, such a precedent enhances the actors' political reputation in the eyes of potential adversaries and allies (Sechser, 2010, p. 646).

In the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, this phenomenon was clearly demonstrated by the ability of Armenia to bear the costs of the conflict in the conditions of 1991-1994 war, subsequent decades of persisting status quo and communication blockade as well as after April 2016

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<sup>2</sup> Author's interview with Donald Rumsfeld in Washington D.C., April 2013.

Azerbaijani initiated military escalation along the frontline in Nagorno-Karabakh. As deterrence theory experts point out, while the ability to inflict damage on the adversary is an important factor in a conflict, it is not decisive, and “the ability to absorb suffering also confers bargaining advantage and can offset an adversary’s superior economic or military capability” (Lebow, 2007, p. 246).

**Sustainability of deterrence:** An essential element of deterrence is the sustainability of its implementation. Deterrence can succeed if the deterring actor can ensure the sustainability of its deterrence capability, i.e. the forces and means needed to inflict heavy damage on the potential aggressor in any conditions, regardless the scope of the aggression. The sustainability of deterrence is of particular importance if the potential aggressor is likely to resort a surprise attack. Therefore, a country’s deterrence potential must include forces and means for ensuring the sustainability of its deterrence.

In contemporary local conflicts, the sustainability of conventional deterrence increasingly depends on protection against attacks by Special Forces, whereas warning and protection against air strikes should cover combat UAVs as well as combat aviation and long-range missiles and artillery.

In terms of sustainability of conventional deterrence, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict displays a significant peculiarity. In the current political and geographical conditions, the deterrence capability of Armenia has greater survivability, especially in the event of a first strike by Azerbaijan. In peacetime, the most powerful and sufficient Armenian forces, in particular, long-range missile-artillery systems and means of ensuring their sustainability (command posts, communication centres, and air defence systems) are not deployed in Nagorno-Karabakh but in Armenia. Accordingly, Armenia’s cooperation with its external security partners will work as serious political constraints for a decision by Azerbaijan to make a first *disarming* strike against territory of the Republic of Armenia.

**Communication as a component of deterrence:** The credibility and resulting success of deterrence largely depend on effective communication, i.e. the ability to inform and convince the potential adversary of the true extent of the deterring party's determination and military capability. As noted by Bernard Brody, displays of military power, especially of new types of weapons or military equipment, allow countries to achieve two goals: 1) to inform the adversary of their intentions and determination, and 2) to convince the adversary of their military capability (Brodie, 1953, p. 281).

In the course of deterrence, communication between parties in conflict involves formal and informal exchange of specific information about each other. This implies informing the other party of one's approaches and positions and, simultaneously, assessing the capabilities and intentions of the other party with regard to the conflict that requires deterrence. Each party needs to understand and predict the other party's:

- National interests and tasks;
- Obligations with regard to the conflict issue;
- Military, political, economic, and other resources that it can use to achieve its national interests and tasks and its obligations with regard to the conflict issue (Harknett, 1994, pp. 93-94).

During implementation of deterrence, communication can happen in a variety of forms, from large-scale military exercises, displays of new military equipment and military parades, to parliament sessions and public discussions in which a party can express its political approaches to the conflict. Communication, especially in the form of a display of military capabilities and intentions, is one of the most sensitive elements of deterrence. An effective and credible display of capability and determination by the deterring actor undermines the argumentation of one of the most important resources of the potential aggressor: their often exaggerated belief in their ability to change the status quo. Respectively, the potential adversary's reaction to effective communication can sometimes be emotional and inadequate.

At the same time, it should be noted that ingenious communication can be purposefully misleading, serving as an efficient albeit provocative tool of deterrence and military and political relations

in a broader sense. In particular, displaying quantitative and qualitative improvement of military-technical capability so as to exert political and psychological pressure on potential adversaries and earn the respect of one's allies is a widely practiced policy, particularly useful in times of crisis. As noted by the former US Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara, "(...) in a crisis, it matters what the other side believes – not what is objectively true" (McNamara, 1986, pp. 51-52). However, while misleading communication can sometimes have a positive effect, deterring the aggressive intentions of a potential adversary can also lead to unjustified expectations and exaggerated self-confidence, for which the deterring actor will eventually pay a high price.

This said, in conventional deterrence, when a party communicates its intentions to a potential adversary, it is often advisable to maintain some degree of *uncertainty*. Compared to nuclear deterrence, conventional deterrence has more dependence on constant demonstration of military-technical capability. This complicates the situation of the deterring actor. On the one hand, displays of new armaments and military equipment increase the credibility of deterrence in the perception of the likely aggressor. On the other hand, the displays convey information on the military capabilities of the deterring actor and enable the potential adversary to better prepare for military operations should they decide to unleash them (Freedman, 2004, p. 39).

That is why, for example, the Armenian parties in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict constantly strive to preserve some uncertainty during demonstrations of military capability and newly acquired weapons and military equipment, in order to complicate the potential adversary's strategic planning in the conditions of the ongoing regional arms race. In strategic planning and military and political calculations, it is efficient to proceed from the worst and most challenging option when assessing the capability and intentions of the adversary. In this sense, the strategic uncertainty resulting from incomplete information on the capability and intentions of the adversary is a critically important and integral part of deterrence, as world politics has shown many times (Kilgour and Zagare, 1991, pp. 306-312).

## Conclusions

Currently, deterrence theory is one of the most developed scientific concepts in modern international political science, in scientific and analytical studies in the field of security and in military-strategic analysis. Deterrence continues to improve and develop, and numerous scientists and political experts continue to search for new concepts and approaches that contribute to modernizing and adapting the theory and practice of deterrence to new political realities.

In the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, to achieve the maximum practical effect, conventional deterrence can be realized in close connection and synthesis with various types of political and diplomatic deterrence. This stems from both the conceptual features of political and diplomatic deterrence and certain parameters of this conflict. The preservation of a fragile truce in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone is also largely conditioned by the format of international involvement and the position of influential external actors (for example, the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairmanship), which allows for the use of these factors as part of the implementation of political and diplomatic deterrence. Apparently, deterrence will remain a key form of military and political behaviour of the Armenia for a very long time.

Deterrence, as a theory and a practical policy, has advantages as well as shortcomings and vulnerabilities. The policy of deterrence cannot be static and must develop constantly in order to remain relevant, containing the potential adversary, making it fears potential losses and abandons its intentions. In particular, the effectiveness of deterrence in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can be affected by changes of a variety of parameters, including the military-technical balance, the military and political factors, the rationality vs. emotionality of decision-makers, the geopolitical context, domestic politics, and societal attitudes and so on.

Deterrence as a strategy and a policy implementation also has conceptual limitations. In particular, a problem with assessing the effectiveness of deterrence is that the only sign of its success is often that “nothing happened” (Freedman, 2009, pp. 47-48). It is difficult to find out whether the deterred party gave up its intentions as a result of realizing the potential costs, or whether other factors played a role.

One of the most significant problems for conventional deterrence is the credibility and adequate perception of the threat of retaliation. A related problem is the rationality of decision-making by the actor being deterred. In particular, according to the *prospect theory* that describes decision-making in risky situation, the parties in conflict can be prepared to take risks and incur losses in order to prevent losses in more valuable and important spheres. It is also important that in the course of decision-making in a conflict involving deterrence, the deterred side takes into account the potential risks of inaction as well as those of action (Gerson, 2009, p. 41).

Finally, the most important conceptual flaw in any type of deterrence is that it cannot solve the problem of conflict resolution. All effective deterrence can do is help the parties win time by freezing the conflict. While far from a final solution, this is also a significant achievement that should not be underestimated. In the long term, deterrence can reduce tensions sufficiently to create the basis for a mutual compromise as the conflict loses its topicality in the public attitudes of the conflicting societies. As emphasized in a classic study on this topic, deterrence gives opposing parties' time to reconcile their conflicting interests, thereby reducing the tension and potential of an open conflict in their relationship (George and Smoke, 1974, p. 5).

Accordingly, in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, deterrence cannot lead to conflict settlement but can prevent the resumption of large-scale military operations. Conventional deterrence can thus create conditions for rethinking of the conflict situation and elaboration of compromise-based approaches by the political elites and societies of the parties in conflict.

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**INTELLIGENCE, SECURITY  
AND INTERDISCIPLINARITY**

## **TERRORIST PUBLICATIONS. RUMIYAH MAGAZINE: SHORT MONOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS**

**Raluca Codruța LUȚAI\***

### **Abstract**

*Rumiyah is a classic example of the effects of that globalization has and of the relationship that appears between mass media and terrorism. Terrorist groups have always been concerned about the degree of loyalty of its members, on the one hand, and attracting new supporters, on the other. In this direction they have developed successful editorial projects. One of these editorial projects is Rumiyah magazine. Using the content analysis method, this article is a monographic analysis of the twelve issues of Rumiyah magazine. The main purpose of this approach is to understand the narrative discourse of the terrorist group and the way its identity is constructed.*

**Keywords:** *Islamic State, Rumiyah, mass media, terrorism, monograph.*

In an extremely interconnected and digitalized world in which anyone can create content, the laws of journalism change. Helpful and harmful at the same time, internet and social media offer everyone a platform to express themselves. Having seen the usefulness of mass media since the '80's, terrorist groups have used mass media and, after that, the internet, as a vector in promoting their ideals and objectives. The relationship being established between terrorist groups and mass media is described by the vast majority of researchers as a symbiotic relationship. Terrorism cannot exist without mass media, while mass media enjoy the benefits resulting from the terrorists' activity, the two reciprocally influencing each other.

Terrorist groups use mass media in order to legitimate the actions they promote, in order to draw attention and to gain

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recognition. Their strategy goes beyond and stops, also, over the issues related to legitimizing their cause, gathering respect, sympathy and new adepts.

Aware of the role of publishing in promoting their aims and in forming a harmonious community, the contemporary world's great terrorist groups have developed true publishing houses, which are used as engines for promoting their own ideas. As such, terrorist publishing is a reality and, during the last years, it has become a constant for building terrorist groups. Al Qaeda, Hamas, or the Islamic State, the newer terrorist group, have developed, within their ranks, media departments dealing with publishing and spreading publications, resembling famous western publishing successes. While Westerners are used to reading *Foreign Policy* or *Cosmopolitan*, *Inspire Magazine*, *Azan Magazine* or *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah* magazines are required reading for the individual in contact with terrorist groups.

This work aims at analysing one of these terrorist publications, namely the Islamic State's latest editorial project, the *Rumiyah Magazine*. The approach is a monographic one at the end of which an overall image of the magazine is given. From the ideological perspective, the image was built using the document analysis tool. The magazine's twelve issues have been analysed from the point of view of the following elements: the name of the publication, the type, the timeliness, the format and the content. The reasoning behind our attempt is related to the need to understand in detail how the terrorist group's narrative speech is built.

### **The Islamic State and Mass-Media production**

Having Al Qaeda in Iraq and the Iraqi Islamic State as predecessors, the Islamic State, or ISIS, represent the new wave and "a new step in Jihadism" (Al-Istrabadi, Ganguly, 2018), being, in this moment, the greatest threat to regional security and, in some cases, even to international security. Taking advantage of the social, economic and institutional chaos, ISIS was successful in developing in the shadows and in drawing the attention of the entire international stage. The terrorist group's real echo starts when it becomes capable of recording astonishing progresses in conquering the Iraqi and Syrian

territory, a success which reached its peak with conquering the town of Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq. In June 2014 the leaders of the terrorist group issue a statement which has been unique in the history of any Jihadi movement: the declaration of the Caliphate is the moment which declares ISIS as a terrorist group standing apart.

The *Dabiq* magazine is published during this geopolitical context. With a modern look, the terrorist magazine is, often, compared with Western publications like *People* or *Cosmopolitan*. The publication's digital début took place one month after conquering the city of Mossul, on July 5th 2014, and announced the terrorist group's most important moment: proclaiming the Caliphate, on a day filled with symbolism, the first day of Ramadan. The symbolism of the day in which the announcement has been made by network's declared leader is very important and loaded with meanings. During this solemn moment, the leaders of ISIS have chosen to proclaim the creation of the Islamic Caliphate and of the Islamic State. "Raise your head high for today, by Allah's grace; you have a state and Khilafan, which will return you dignity, might, rights and leadership" (*Dabiq*, 2014). The ISIS publishing team has continuously kept on publishing and, in 2018; the *Dabiq* magazine reached fourteen editions.

The Islamic State's propaganda machine is formed by teams located from West Africa all the way to Afghanistan, dealing with spreading the Caliphate's brand (winter 2015). The marketing policy and strategy are well set and aim at quantity but, also, at the quality of the materials they supply. The materials promote the narrations in a continuous dynamic. More than that, the propaganda effort is centred both on the international public (motivation for which the publications have been translated in more languages) as well as on the local public, who must agree with the ideas of the organizers. For the local public, an Arab-speaking one, the local marketing trend is not just a digital one. In the territory conquered by it, the Islamic State has created more nuqat *i'lamiyya*, true centres specialized in popularizing the group's ideology. These media centres publish and distribute CD's and DVD's to the locals, especially children and teens, the group which is mostly targeted by the organization. In certain moments, these centres have become mobile in order to be able to cover as much territory as possible and in

order to spread the network's ideology as efficiently as possible (Zellin, 2018).

For the Islamic State, the *Dabiq* magazine is not the organization's first attempt at publishing. Before this publication appeared, the Islamic State was dealing with printing and popularizing *Islamic State News* and *Islamic State Report*, two publications which kept the readers up to date in relation to the progress registered in the war to proclaim the Caliphate – the organization's ultimate ideal. The *Dabiq* magazine is born from the combination between the two publications (*Islamic State News* and *Islamic State Report*) and the addition of a powerful religious accent (Gambhir, 2015). Through the Al HayatCenter, the *Dabiq* magazine aims at offering updates from the battlefields in relation to those who fight against the unbelievers, offering administrative reports in relation to the evolution of the Caliphate proclaimed and, last but not least, the magazine is a place for expressing the religious ideology, which is the base of the newly formed state.

### **The *Rumiyah* magazine**

The first number of *Rumiyah* magazine, ISIS' second publishing project, appears online in an interesting geopolitical context. The period before the year 2016 has been, for the terrorist group, a moment of territorial expansion and extraordinary gaining. In the meanwhile, the international coalitions have been successful in conquering back many of these territories, and the group has found itself defeated many times. One of the cross-roads moments took place in October 2016, when the city of *Dabiq*, a city with an important symbolism for the terrorist group, has been freed. Not only was the name of the city also the name of the successful editorial project, but this town was to be the place where the crusaders and Allah's courageous troops would have met for a last battle which would have ended, in their view, with the triumph of Islam. For ISIS, losing the control over the town of *Dabiq* has meant delaying the Islamic Armageddon they were imagining, the end of the *Dabiq* editorial project, which lost its legitimacy and the début of a new terrorist publication, *Rumiyah* magazine.

Therefore, *Rumiyah* is the replacement and the continuation of *Dabiq* magazine. This is published within the same agency (Al Hayat Centre) and is available online since the end of 2016. It can be read in more languages: English, French, German, Russian or even Indonesian (Ghosh, Pooja, 2017).

***The name of the publication*** is loaded with significations. It refers to the city of Rome, the place where the Jihadi fighters will rest after having conquered the world. Rome is a place with a separate meaning, desired throughout history by Muslim empires, a place of reference for Christianity (especially for the Catholic one) and a symbol for Western civilization. This time, Rome is seen as the place where the last confrontation between the Islamic fighters and their enemies will take place.

***The publication's motto*** explains the meaning of the title. „O *muwahhidin*, rejoice, for by Allah, we will not rest from our jihad except beneath the olive trees of *Rumiyah (Rome)*”. Abu Hamzah al Muhajir, known as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’ successor, is the author of the motto on the frontpage of each issue of the publication. The quote is identified on all the covers of the publication.

**Type of magazine:** *Rumiyah* is a magazine that deals with religious propaganda. It uses symbols, an allegoric language rich in religious images and citations and it aims at “manipulating the collective aptitudes” (Anton, 2007). According to Guy Durandin (Reiffel, 2008), propaganda aims at exercising an influence on personalities in order to generate certain behaviours. Through it “thought is short-circuited, the adherence to orthodoxy is provoked and orthodox religious practice is favoured” (Reiffel, 2006). The same thing happens also in the case of *Dabiq* magazine. In its pages, it uses religious citations, invitations aimed at causing a specific behaviour. This type of behaviour has more hypostases. A first hypostasis is the one represented by the concept of *hijrah*, which requires all the believers to return back to the Islamic State. This is in addition to the idea of violence which must be shown against all those who do not share the Islamic State’s values. The narrative speech is based on the values of violent Islam, on demonizing the enemy and on repeating certain important issues (governing the caliphate, war and, of course, religion

as supra-issue). The information is used with political and military purposes.

In his work *Disinformation, source of war (2000)*, Vladimir Volkoff offers a matrix that must be followed when analysing propaganda publications. At *Dabiq* magazine' level, this matrix structures as follows:

<b>PROPAGANDA IN RUMIYAH MAGAZINE</b>	
<b>Group of individuals which must be influenced</b>	Nowhere clearly specified. The magazine is dedicated to all those who believe in the values and actions promoted by the Islamic State. As such, two categories can be distinguished: (A) members of the Muslim community and (b) others who can be attracted and converted to Islam.
<b>Establishing the objectives</b>	They are connected to attracting new supporters of the group, <i>Rumiyah</i> works as a liaison channel between the new "state" formed and its citizen.
<b>Organization created to accomplish them</b>	The Al Hayat Media Centre is responsible with publishing and spreading the magazine.
<b>Campaign Plan</b>	Unknown
<b>Command Centre</b>	Unknown but it could be located within the area Of the territories conquered by the Islamic State (Syria and Northern Iraq).

Tabel 1: Propaganda in *Rumiyah* (Source: author's idea)

The eleven issues of *Rumiyah* magazine analysed are gathered in a **corpus** of 508 pages. The number of pages for issue grows exponentially once with the passing of time. In the case of *Rumiyah* magazine, the difference between the first and the last issue is not as considerable as in the case of *Dabiq* magazine. The first issue of the

publication goes on for 38 pages while the last issue has 46 pages. The longest issue of the magazine is number 11, published in June 2017 “*Rumiyah* – the rulling on Ghaninmah Fay and Ihtitab” and goes on for 60 pages.

From the point of view of **timeliness**, the *Rumiyah* magazine is published monthly. The publishing début takes place in September 2016, five months after the last issue of *Dabiq* magazine. Beginning with September of 2016 and until the month of June 2017, *Rumiyah* magazine appears constantly with the mention that, in December (2016) two issues is published.

**The format** is A4, glossy, destined to attract the reader’s attention. The choice for this format is evident. Through a modern design enriched with illustrations, the publishers of the magazine are aware of the fact that the texts and the messages they are transmitting will be easier to be understood by the reader, and more attractive.

**Page layout:** The speech is rarely interrupted by illustrations. The analysis of the magazines highlights a symmetric and proportional trend. The alignment of the text is done on two columns.

**The illustration** present within the pages of the magazine is a modern one, made in a professional and abundant manner from the point of view of the images representing the soldiers of the Islamic State, the atrocities they produce and the group’s military arsenal. The images are brutal, violent, even catastrophic and uncensored. The characters are exclusively males, and represent religious leaders, soldiers, western leaders and children. A novelty element brought by *Rumiyah* magazine is given by the infographics showing in graphically attractive manner essential aspects related to the group’s military successes or other issues.

From the point of view of graphics, the cover of *Rumiyah* magazine appears, from our point of view, as being very bland. These changes after issue number eight, the cover getting closer to the identity concept used by its predecessor. The covers of *Rumiyah* magazine showed, on the left side, the issue’s content while, starting with issue number eight, the content’s index no longer appeared on the first page.



The publication's structure is an organized and, relatively, constant one. Besides the editorial called "Foreword" or "Feature", the eleven issues of *Rumiyah* magazine show five categories of sections which are found within the magazines. These five sections are: *Articles*, *Exclusive*, *Sisters*, *Interview* și *News*. Picture number 2 shows the frequency with which they appear within the eleven issues. The *Articles* section and the *News* section can be found in each issue of the magazine. From the point of view of continuity, the *News* section is the most continuous and most organized. In each of the magazine's issues, it shows the Islamic State's military operations,

The *Articles* section does, also, have a few sub-sections who appear throughout more issues. Among those: paths to victory, establishing the Islamic State or among the believers are men. The last sub-section has been kept from the *Dabiq* magazine. In a logic that follows the section from *Dabiq*, Form Pages of History, the Paths to victory section shows important elements who contributed to building the Islamic State. The Establishing the Islamic State section shows the steps that need to be taken in order to create a state according to the true meaning of the word, while the Among the believers are men section continues with the same idea as in *Dabiq*, the one related to glorifying the important members of the group.

Together with these sub-sections, the *Articles* section includes articles like: "Brutality and severity towards the Kuffar" (Nr.2), "The pledge to fight to the death" (Nr.4), "The flames of justice" (Nr.5) or "A Mujahids memories from the battle of Mosul" (Nr.12).

The *Exclusive* section is present in all the eleven issues, except in issues number five and twelve. It includes an interesting sub-section, one like "DIY - Do it yourself" type. Just Terror Tactics reminds of Open Source Jihad, which was present in *Inspire* magazine. The section was designed with the purpose of offering inspiration and knowledge to all those who intend to fight in the name of Allah. The publishers consider that, in order to organize successful attacks, you don't need to be a military, an expert or a martial arts master. With the proper training – offered by this sub-section, and with the proper means, anyone can organize successful operations that end up with wounding more unbelievers and with terrorizing a whole nation (*Rumiyah*, 2018).

Throughout more issues, the readers are instructed how to carry out attacks with knife (what are the advantages and the best tactics), how to choose the best cars in order to carry out car attacks or how to plan and to carry out kidnappings and hostage takings. The “valuable” lessons the leaders can learn represent indicators that might be used by spy agencies in the fight against this group.

The *Sisters* section is dedicated to the woman who is seen as an important partner in the fight against the unbelievers while in the Interview section, in the four issues in which it is present, the Interview section shows interviews with important members of the network.

Another element that deserves to be specified is the “Selected 10 videos from the Wilayat of the Islamic State” page. The section takes the shape of a page and it can be found within the issues 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 9 and 11. It shows ten video recommendations.

The timeliness of the sections in <i>Rumiyah</i>		
	SECTION	PUBLISHED
1.	Articles <i>Paths to victory (Nr.2, Nr.3, Nr.5, Nr.6)</i> <i>Establishing the Islamic State (Nr.8, Nr.9, Nr.10)</i> <i>Among the believers are men (Nr.10, Nr.11)</i> <i>Important advice for the Mujahdin (Nr. 11, Nr.12)</i>	Nr.1, Nr.2, Nr.3, Nr.4, Nr.5, Nr.6, Nr.8, Nr.9, Nr.10, Nr.11, Nr.12.
2.	Exclusive <i>Just terror tactics (Nr.2, Nr.3, Nr.5, Nr.9)</i> <i>Important memorandums (Nr.2, Nr.10)</i>	Nr.2, Nr.3, Nr.4, Nr.6, Nr.8, Nr.9, Nr.10, Nr.11.
3.	Sisters	Nr.5, Nr.6, Nr.10, Nr.11.
4.	Interview	Nr.5, Nr.6, Nr.9, Nr.10.
5.	News <i>Military and covert operations</i>	Nr.1, Nr.2, Nr.3, Nr.4, Nr.5, Nr.6, Nr.8, Nr.9, Nr.10, Nr.11, Nr.12

Tabel 2: Timeliness of the sections in *Rumiyah* (Source: author's idea)

The following are the types used within the articles: (A) types of opinion (editorials, commentaries and interviews) and types of information (useful news and reports). The type of report can be found best within the News section, while the interviews and commentaries can be found both in the Articles as well as in the Exclusive sections.

**The style** in which the articles are written is a religious, persuasive one. The call for Allah and for his Messenger is especially frequent, and the lesson the reader receives about Islam are especially useful if he wants to become a model member of the Islamic State. The mean for the victory of the Islamic State and of Allah's teachings is faith, and the lack of it does nothing but to allow the unbelieving enemy to win: "With the absence of this religion and the implementation of something other than Allah'sshari'ah, kufr becomes dominant and oppression prevails, and to cure this, the people pursue various paths" (Rumiyah, 2018). The religious message promoted by the magazine focuses, in a strategic and extremely intelligent manner, on the feelings of the readers, who can be easily influenced toward disapprove of other religions, even violently. The references from the Quran, or from other books considered by Islamic theology as being holy, confer value and legitimacy to the content.

The articles signed by **authors** are a few. Throughout the 11 issues of the magazine, we have identified fourteen signed articles. The authors of the articles are important members of the group. Among these we mention: the organization's speaker (who signs articles in issues number four and nine), Abu Musab az-Zarqawi ("And likewise the messenger are afflicted, then the final outcome is theirs" in issues number eight and nine), group leader, or Abu Dujnah al-Bengali (Tamim Chowdhury) former leader of Military and covert operations in Bengal. Beside these, issues number two, three and five include articles signed by Abū Hamzah al-Muhājir ("Paths to victory"), author of some sections of *Dabiq*, which shows the publication's editorial continuity.

The publisher who publishes the magazine is the Al Hayat Media Centre, known in the world of terrorist publishing for its support of terrorist groups.

A careful analysis of the issues of the magazine forms an overall picture related to the terror group's evolution and can contribute to

understanding the latter while understanding how the issue of fear is built contributes to understanding the agenda promoted by the organization. The above-mentioned elements form the group's identity and help not only in attracting new adepts but, also, in understanding the organization and the philosophy it promotes.

## Conclusions

The *Rumiyah* Magazine promoted so powerfully by the Islamic state terrorist group in Iraq and Syria represents a clear demonstration of the importance given by the group to this kind of publishing projects. Unlike other forms of online presence which can be volatile, temporary or channelled toward certain aspects, this kind of magazine has an integrating, stable, nature and is successful in transmitting a large volume of information's aimed at keeping the reader up to date in relation to the evolution of the organization but, also, emotions through which they successfully attract new adepts.

The analysis of *Rumiyah* magazine represents an incursion in how the group's narrative speech is built. We have observed the symbolism of the title they have chosen, the religious and persuasive style and the logics of the sections representing the skeleton of a religious propaganda publication. The editorial project carried out by the Islamic State represents a mean of indoctrination and of attracting new adepts but, especially, an incursion in the terrorist group's philosophy. The Islamic State's brand is built through the attacks carried out by the group and is solidified through what has been promoted by it.

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## A SAFE AND STABLE BUSINESS ENVIRONEMENT THROUGH COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE

Adina MIHĂESCU\*

### Abstract

*We note, therefore, that one of the notable problems we are currently facing is of an economic nature, of major importance, with real possibilities to destabilize local, national or international security. If a state has enough leverage to cushion the bad impact of sudden changes / threats, a private company can not do the same. At the same time, a weak management leads to the bankruptcy and disappearance of a firm on the market, which can not happen with a state (in the sense that it can go bankrupt but does not disappear, and the economic crisis turns into a political one), as Barry Buzan et al. State (2010, pp. 154-160).*

*From another perspective, however, one of the principles of economic security is that we go into any analysis on the assumption that economic agents work more competitively on an uncertain market. It goes without saying that in the economic environment we can not speak of perfect safety and balance. So uncertainty increases competitiveness, stimulates creative spirit, analytical and predictive capabilities.*

*The aim of this contribution is to investigate the capacity of the business environment to absorb shocks and to set sustainable goals translated into its agenda setting. After the economic crisis of 2008-2014, the vast majority of business have assessed their mechanism of equilibrium bringing forward a new strategy to deal with complex macro-systemic problems.*

**Keywords:** *business environment, competitive intelligence, business competition, economic forecasts, information.*

### Introduction

With the dissolution of U.R.S.S. and the Communist Bloc, the outlook of the international economy is rapidly changing. If until 1989

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we were dealing with two large blocks: the capitalist and the communist one, fundamentally different and with no major economic exchanges except with each other, the beginning of the '90s comes with major changes. Liberalization of markets (including capital markets), emergence and development of new markets, reorganization of customs tariffs, all these have led to the need of giving greater importance to economic security. The interdependence of states now depends on their ability to co-operate, to exchange and to influence each other from an eminently economic perspective. They understand that their security now also depends on the domestic economic environment, the trade relations it carries out, but also the international situation or state of affairs. It is important to note here that one of the incipient arguments of European integration was the joining of the heavy industries of coal, steel, nuclear, and the replacement of independence with the interdependence of states in this regard.

The *Global Risks Report 2018*, an annual study published by the World Economic Forum, globally examines studies and identifies the risks that humanity faces in the coming year. The latest report, dated January 2018 (which emerged from the Davos-Switzerland meeting, having as the central theme of debates: *Creating a Shared Future in a Fractured World*), identifies a heightened risk in the following areas:

- a) Persistence of social and economic inequalities.
- b) Political tensions at national and international level.
- c) Environmental hazards.
- d) Cyber-vulnerabilities

We note, therefore, that one of the notable problems we are currently facing is of an economic nature, of major importance, with real possibilities to destabilize local, national or international security. If a state has enough leverage to cushion the bad impact of sudden changes / threats, a private company can not do the same. At the same time, a weak management leads to the bankruptcy and disappearance of a firm on the market, which can not happen with a state (in the sense that it can go bankrupt but does not disappear, and the economic crisis turns into a political one), as Barry Buzan et al. State (2010, pp. 154-160).

From another perspective, however, one of the principles of economic security is that we go into any analysis on the assumption that economic agents work more competitively on an uncertain market. It goes without saying that in the economic environment we can not speak of perfect safety and balance. So uncertainty increases competitiveness, stimulates creative spirit, analytical and predictive capabilities.

### **The European Vision**

For the period 2021-2027, the European Commission foresaw a doubling of the budget for the social sector, entrepreneurship and sustainable infrastructure. Based on the recommendations of a high-level expert group, the Commission has also established a roadmap to promote the role of funding in delivering a sustainable economy that achieves its environmental and social goals. The *Sustainable Financing Action Plan (2019)* and subsequent legislative proposals will help investors make informed investment decisions on the basis of clear criteria defining what a sustainable investment is. This plan should facilitate the intensification and expansion of wider investments in sustainable projects both in the EU and globally, as well as stimulate investors to withdraw from non-sustainable investments.

A significant percentage of all enterprises present within the European Union is represented by SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises) and micro-enterprises. In this respect, the *Small Business Act*, communicated by the European Commission, aims to promote entrepreneurship, ease access to finance and the single European market.

This act, although not binding, has received the support of the European Parliament and provides a guideline and direction for the European business environment.

Europe's economic growth and jobs depend on its ability to support the growth of enterprises. Entrepreneurship creates new companies, opens up new markets, and nurtures new skills. The most important sources of employment in the EU are Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs). The Commission's objective is to encourage



people to become entrepreneurs and also make it easier for them to set up and grow their businesses (*The Small Business Act*).

This program requires a set of principles, very important for business development:

- “Create an environment where entrepreneurs and family businesses can thrive and where entrepreneurship is rewarded;
- Ensure that honest entrepreneurs who have gone bankrupt can quickly benefit from second chance;
- Adapting public intervention to the needs of SMEs: facilitating SME participation in public procurement and better access to state aid for SMEs;
- Facilitating SMEs' access to finance and developing a legal and commercial environment that promotes the punctuality of payments on commercial transactions;
- Allows SMEs to transform environmental challenges into opportunities;
- Encourage and support SMEs to benefit from market growth”.

(*The Small Business Act*)

At the same time, in terms of facilitating access to finance, there is the *COSME* program (“Europe's program for small and medium-sized enterprises”). This one occurred due to the fact that access to finance remains one of the fundamental problems. “It helps businesses to access markets in the EU and beyond. It funds the Enterprise Europe Network that helps SMEs find business and technology partners, and understand EU legislation; the *Your Europe Business portal* that provides practical information on doing business within Europe. It also finances a number of IPR (Intellectual property rights) SME Helpdesks”. (*COSME* program)

*COSME* aims to help with mentoring and guidance programs for young entrepreneurs, especially those in Young, Woman, and Senior, who need more help and support in starting a new business. Launched in 2014 with a budget of € 2.3 million, this program aims to attract as many people as possible to the business environment, develop competitiveness and entrepreneurship.

Approximately 23 million SMEs have generated more than € 3.5 billion in 2015 as value added while also providing jobs for 90 million people, due to the emphasis on entrepreneurship, innovation and

sustainable economic development. There is, therefore, a growing interest in the European Union in terms of business environment and its development. An improvement in public information and access to information is needed in terms of business environment, the role and involvement of the European Union, its processes and its mechanisms.

There is a need for constant adaptation of small and medium-sized firms to enter new markets, but also to maintain and grow steadily. In addition to funding, European Union programs also offer know-how that is so useful in starting a business. Emphasis is placed on innovation and entrepreneurship, sustainable development and encouragement of the initiative.

Business creativity is rewarded by profit, which is ultimately the goal of everyone starting a business. But beyond profit, one must bear in mind the role of these firms in reducing unemployment by hiring staff, training and qualification.

It is desirable to make a transition from the Administrator level to the Entrepreneur level (an upgrade). If the former only deals with accounting, financial and reporting data, the latter must first of all have vision, critical thinking and developed analytical spirit; to make informed decisions, with a large number of data available.

### **Developing the business environment in Romania**

In order for the business environment to grow and develop, it is necessary that as many companies as possible adapt to the new technologies (this does not simply mean adopting them, but understanding their impact – whether positive or negative); work based on strategies, on plans related to budgets and performance criteria.

At national level, we can find the *Association of Business Intelligence Specialists* (ASIA) – a non-profit entity in Romania set up to develop the Business & Competitive Intelligence field, thus contributing to increasing the competitiveness of companies in our country.

At the international level, the *Strategic and Competitive Intelligence Professionals* (SCIP) is a global nonprofit membership of industry experts, academia and government who come together to build and share strategic intelligence, research decision-support tools, processes and analytical capabilities. “Established in 1986, today SCIP

has chapters around the world, with individual members in nations around the globe. In addition, SCIP has alliance partnerships with independent affiliate organizations in many countries. Specifically, SCIP provides education and networking opportunities for business professionals working in the rapidly growing field of competitive intelligence (the legal and ethical collection and analysis of information regarding the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions of business competitors). Many SCIP members have backgrounds in marketing, strategy, market research, strategic analysis, science and technology, data science, economics". (See more on <http://www.cichina.org/18site/10site/Organizer.htm> or <https://www.scip.org>)

Thus, working methods in the CI are very complex and comprise many areas of activity, bringing together experts from several areas of expertise, from finance to statistics, marketing, or leadership. The necessity of staging and planning work is essential. We are not just talking about a simple data collection (this is essentially the easiest thing to achieve), the transformation of these data, the way we can understand them for our own benefit; it brings added value and long-term advantage.

If CI is used only as a source of information, the company manages to keep up-to-date with what's happening around it. But the ultimate goal is not this, but helping the company to build long-term forecasts and plans, becoming a leader, a trailblazer, not a mere follower. Ideal is to achieve a long-term competitive advantage, stability and continuous development. As Adriean Pirlog (2013) states: "*Security should play a tangible role in the development policies of any business and should be taken into account when establishing budgets for risk and security strategies. The field of security requires a complex approach that goes beyond the dichotomical way that considers the relationship between defenders vs. real or virtual attackers.*"

It is very common for companies to use the method of setting up the main competitor (s) and continuing the fight with them. It is obvious that in a world of globalization, easy access to information, permanent change, this method is obsolete. Vigilance and strategic planning help to quickly identify vulnerabilities and ideally turn them

into opportunities; the key to success is a response time as low as possible.

According to the National Trade Register Office, the number of radiated companies (which cease activity) is on the increase. (See more on <http://www.onrc.ro/index.php/ro>) From the chart below, we notice that the number of firms that cease to work is rising. If in 2014 there are 52,387 radiated companies, the number increases to 53,603 in the following year, while in 2016 the growth is even higher (about 24%), accounting for 66,687 enterprises. However, according to the same source, only the first half of 2018 (January-July) registered 82,060 new firms.




Table no. 1: Statistics on the number of legal persons, radiated between 2014 and 2016, at the county level (Source: the author' idea)

Considering the decrease in the number of active market operators, the tightening of credit conditions in general, the increasing difficulties and risks for starting a business, the Government of Romania adopts an emergency ordinance to stimulate the establishment of new small and medium-sized enterprises called the Start-up Nation Program. It aims to encourage and help the start-up entrepreneurs by offering a maximum amount of 200,000 lei/beneficiary, representing 100% of the eligible expenditure, up to a maximum of 10,000 small and medium-sized enterprises fulfilling the eligibility conditions. At the end of 2017, there were 8,444 signed financing agreements (out of over 19,000 sent files). (See more on <https://start-up.ro>) The interest shown in these program shows that Romanians are interested in becoming entrepreneurs and have business ideas, and the support received from the state motivates and encourages them.

An attempt to boost and revitalize the business environment in our country is therefore noticed. But we can not fail to notice the fluctuation within the Romanian entrepreneurial environment, which may indicate instability, inconsistency or lack of vision. Designing a detailed business plan and strategy is now mandatory.

Douglas Bernhardt, economic and CI analyst, said in his paper *"How to Acquire and Use Corporate Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence"* (2003, pp. 87-90): *"the strategy that is not based on intelligence is not a strategy but a guess"*.

### **Managing vulnerabilities and threats through Competitive Intelligence**

Robert K. Merton, a renowned American sociologist, speaks in his work *"The Matthew Effect in Science"* (1968, pp. 56-63) about the crucial importance of having an initial advantage and how it can be a determining factor in a person's career. The distinguished professor uses an example from the academia, namely, an eminent scientist will get more credit for his work than a lesser known one, even if the work done is the same, and this spiral tends to perpetuate and is difficult, if not impossible, the roles to be reversed (the succes attracts succes and defeat brings defeat).

By extrapolating, we can see the impact of Matthew's<sup>1</sup> effect on the economy as well. It is easier for a powerful multinational company to cope with market fluctuations and find ways to adapt than a small local business. A company operating in several countries at the same time will be able to understand faster the dynamics of capital markets find new financial markets and take priority over acquisitions and mergers.

Nevertheless, national firms may come out of the spiral of the above-mentioned effect, take advantage of multinationals and progress. We can see an example in this respect even on the Romanian market: the entry of foreign firms on the domestic market after 1989 brought about the creation of a competitive framework, new technology, and know-how and capital infusion through foreign direct investments.

At the same time, companies operating on the territory of several countries (even continents) may have problems maintaining their profits continuously. It is possible that the same product may not be marketed in the same form on all markets due to cultural, religious differences, etc.

Neither survival on a market in a certain area is easy and does not come from itself, nor the penetration of new markets and the identification of new competition. Under these conditions, how do companies manage the vulnerabilities they face, meet challenges and resist threats? In this sense, the best performing method of work belongs to the field of Competitive Intelligence.

Company managers do not lack statistical or economic data, etc.; the difficulty consists in analyzing and linking a large number of data, indicators, news, open sources, and based on these, formulating relevant analyzes, forecasts and solutions.

Christopher Murphy in "Competitive Intelligence. Gathering, Analyzing and Putting it to Work" (2005) states that "(...) *any factor that imposes a risk to opportunities or profitability is entrusted to the CI department*". By extrapolating, an analysis of CI experts is useful in avoiding any sensitive / problematic situations that may arise and the

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<sup>1</sup> The name originates from the Gospel after Matthew, in the Bible: "*For to everyone who has, more shall be given, and he will have an abundance; but from the one who does not have, even what he does have shall be taken away*".

scope of this activity goes beyond the strictly economic sphere. The activity of CI should not be confused with espionage. The latter belongs rather to the state and not to the private environment. Competitiveness through information is one within the limits of legality and ethical principles.<sup>2</sup>

Chris West, in the "Competitive Intelligence" (2001, pp. 222-228), proposes a way of working for the CI activity by targeting a division into four broad categories of information gathering and analysis:

- A. Who are the competitors? (Current or future),**
- B. Competitors' Profiles (Current or Future, Potential),**
- C. Interpretation of data, D. Counter-intelligence.**

A. Studying competition is no longer an exclusive domain of the marketing department. By reducing to essence, all firms compete with each other in the sense that they want a bigger share of consumer revenue. Otherwise, competitors can be at the product level (all companies selling the same products), at industry level (the same product class), or at a wider level, all products or services that meet the same needs. (Kotler, 2000)

B. Compiling detailed profiles of competitors involves collecting a large number of data. A record shall be made out for each of them containing data on:

- "Organization: company structure, headquarters, divisions, production locations, shareholders etc.;
- Financial performance: consolidated key financial performance data;
- Products: product types, raw materials, supplies, new products in testing etc.;
- Production: production capacity, production level, technologies and licenses;

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<sup>2</sup> In the US, "The Economic Espionage and Protection of Proprietary Information Act" has taken out the offense of violating the business secret and the one of stealing private information from under the jurisdiction of the local and state authorities and passed them under the jurisdiction of the federal authorities. There is no equivalent of this law in Romania's legislation nor in the European Union's law. However, there are more laws that incriminate the economic espionage.

- Suppliers: who are suppliers of raw materials or equipment?
- Sales and customer base: characteristics and qualifications of the sales force, role of the sales staff, volume and value of sales, sales by applications, sales fluctuation;
- After-sales follow-up: technical support, qualification and number of employees on technical support, response time to requests etc.;
- Distribution: main distributors and distribution channels, fleet, endowments;
- Marketing: direct marketing, advertising, used media, sales promotion, target market segments etc.;
- Website: e-business, hyperlinks to other sites, number of visitors;
- Prices and discounts: price positioning and discount structure;
- Partnerships: joint ventures, licenses, affiliations;
- Export / Overseas subsidiaries: export sales-exports value, overseas locations and activities" (West, 2001, pp. 222-228).

C. All of the above-mentioned information gathering is in vain if the third stage, namely the data interpretation is not performed properly. The data above, put together, must tell us things that we can not tell otherwise, any weaknesses or strengths. We can infer plans or even competitors' strategy, new products or technologies, new market entry etc.

D. *"If the CI field entails obtaining information about the business field in the beneficiary's domain of interest, the CCI is supposed to ensure its own security against external attempts to obtain information that would be further transformed into intelligence. The CCI wants to ensure the physical security, the security of documents, of informatics and communications systems."* (Medar, 2012)

Data protection is achieved by limiting their transmission; for example, although very important to the company, an annual activity report should not be readable by suppliers or collaborators, not even by seasonal employees.

The method outlined above is a simplistic one, a starting point for the work of a CI specialist; at the same time, it can also be done



inside the company without asking for outside help. Moreover, given the rapid and constant evolution of the business environment, these data are mandatory to be known no matter how big or small a company is, how new or how innovative it is.

## Conclusions

The lack of certainty faced by business actors and its fluctuation make the need for an adapted, stable and well-established strategy indispensable. Every department in the company offers the manager data and statistical situations, performance indicators, but for an overall view more needs to be done. Experts in Competitive Intelligence come with something extra: capitalizing on raw data, and an objective understanding of these.

CI specialists work with a wide range of data, with different representations and considerations, from collecting them to turning them into intelligence, this last stage being the most difficult but most important. Generic data is filtered out by sifting relevant information, moving from quantitative to qualitative.

Developing the business environment implies, for economic actors, an intrinsic development, an update to the economic realities of the era of digitization. In order to achieve their goals and make profit, companies feel the need for forecasts and opinions about the future instead of mere information about current or past situations.

Companies must constantly adapt to what customers want and, of course, to new competitors' strategies. Whatever the objectives of an economic agent are (profit growth, higher market share, technological benefits etc.), the essence is survival and development on a competitive market, getting a bigger market share and bringing added value on the niche where it is being operated.

Particularly important to consider, is the socio-cultural element, which can be defined as *"the totality of attitudes, values, norms of conduct, behaviors and demographic trends characteristic of a given geographical area"* (Dima, 2000, p. 74). Companies with high goals, coherent and harmoniously developed principles and strategies help to create an efficient competitive business environment and the latter to develop the socio-cultural environment in which they operate.

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## COLLECTING INFORMATION FROM HUMAN SOURCES FOR COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE

Răzvan GRIGORESCU\*

### Abstract

*The collection of information has evolved continuously throughout history, undergoing a series of transformations closely related to the development of the information sources. Over the last decades, these evolutions have been observed not only at the level of the intelligence community, but also at the level of the business environment, with the development and implementation of the competitive intelligence functions within the companies, on a larger scale.*

*It is a known fact that many competitive intelligence professionals claim that they use HUMINT in their daily activity, often without clearly explaining what they are referring to. With regard to this topic, we believe that more transparency is needed, due to the fact that HUMINT is being also used by the government intelligence agencies to designate the secret human sources.*

*This paper briefly analyses how business information should be collected by the competitive intelligence professionals, the types of sources with which they operate, as well as the way in which HUMINT must be approached in competitive intelligence, in order to align with the applicable Romanian legislation and the SCIP Code of Ethics.*

**Keywords:** *competitive intelligence, collection, elicitation, HUMINT, SCIP, ethics.*

### Introduction

Collecting information is at the very basis of any actionable intelligence product. In competitive intelligence, the quality of the collected information directly influences the quality of the intelligence product.

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The temptation to quickly obtain information that will differentiate between companies can sometimes be absolutely tremendous. Under these conditions, in some cases, there may be different business people willing to do almost anything to achieve their goals, even by ignoring the core principles of professional ethics or certain legal provisions, risking their credibility and their freedom.

The motivation for writing this article is of an intrinsic nature and seeks to correctly identify the legal way in which human sources can be used in Romanian competitive intelligence practice, independent of any other international existing practices.

The premise of the research is that all activities carried out by the public or private companies must be in accordance with the principles of professional ethics and the Romanian legislation in force. Thus, the research question was: "How can information for competitive intelligence be collected from human sources in Romania, in a legal and ethical manner?"

Several other questions arise from the research question, this paper answering them as well: What legal provisions influence the competitive intelligence activity in Romania? Is the competitive intelligence activity regulated, from a legal point of view, in Romania? What key elements must be taken into account by any person engaged in competitive intelligence activities, on the Romanian territory, from a legal point of view? What are the main ethical benchmarks of competitive intelligence? Can certain practices carried out in competitive intelligence operations be considered illegal in Romania? What collection methods and techniques are unethical and / or illegal? Is competitive intelligence synonymous with espionage? What categories of sources are used in government intelligence? What categories of sources are used in competitive intelligence? What kind of primary and secondary sources are used in competitive intelligence? How is HUMINT defined? Is it right to use HUMINT in competitive intelligence? What is the difference between secret human sources and non-secret human sources? How is the competitive intelligence function organized, in private companies? Is it possible to use elicitation techniques in competitive intelligence? What kind of proposals could be

made, in order to accelerate the development of competitive intelligence in our country?

In order to answer the research question, we mainly used the social research method of document analysis, accessing a wide range of validated open sources from which we collected information. This was then filtered and processed, accordingly, in order to conduct the later analysis and synthesis. The sources are mentioned at the end of the research paper.

The title we have chosen, even if it may seem too general, reflects our concerns about clarifying some important aspects regarding how information is collected from human sources, in competitive intelligence. We would like to mention that we did not start our research from the premise that collecting information from human sources in competitive intelligence is illegal. We were only interested in analysing how the activities of collecting information from human sources should be carried out, so that they do not contravene the codes of ethics and the Romanian legislation in force (by its specificity, competitive intelligence must meet both the ethics and legal criteria).

We consider that this research paper will have a positive impact with regard to the understanding of competitive intelligence, its results being able to represent a starting point in various debates and future research, having as central element the collection of information from human sources, in the private companies.

This paper is structured into three main chapters, which are complemented by the conclusions and the bibliography. The first part of the paper highlights the main ethical landmarks and the legislative framework, characteristic of competitive intelligence. In the second part, we approach the sources used by the competitive intelligence professionals to obtain the necessary information, as well as the sources used by the state intelligence services. In the third part, reference is made to the main aspects related to the use of human sources in competitive intelligence, proceeding to a more detailed analysis of the HUMINT concept and its usefulness in the field of competitive intelligence, highlighting different approaches proposed by experts. The results of the research, in relation to the stated research question, are reflected in the conclusions, these being the basis for

formulating several recommendations to the competitive intelligence professionals.

### **Competitive Intelligence: legal aspects**

In Romania, the competitive intelligence activity is not delimited by laws or regulations, this being considered unnecessary, until recently. No less important, however, given that competitive intelligence also involves the collection of various information, aimed at obtaining actionable intelligence products, special attention should be paid to the way in which the collection activities are carried out. Like other business practices, competitive intelligence must be conducted in compliance with applicable Romanian legislation and professional ethics.

Next, we would like to mention the main ethical benchmark of competitive intelligence, as well as to make a brief analysis of the national legislation in force, relevant to both public and private companies, in order to identify the key elements to be considered by any person carrying out competitive intelligence activities in Romania.

With regard to the professional ethics, in competitive intelligence, The SCIP Code of Ethics<sup>1</sup> is an important benchmark and mentions the following guidelines: “to continually strive to increase the recognition and respect of the profession; to comply with all applicable laws, domestic and international; to accurately disclose all relevant information, including one's identity and organization, prior to all interviews; to avoid conflicts of interest in fulfilling one's duties; to provide honest and realistic recommendations and conclusions in the execution of one's duties; to promote this Code of Ethics within one's company, with third-party contractors and within the entire profession; to faithfully adhere to and abide by one's company policies, objectives and guidelines”. (SCIP, n.d.)

Referring to our national legislation, we note that not much effort has been made, so far, to analyse the main elements of legislation to be considered in the practice of competitive intelligence, especially

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<sup>1</sup> Strategic & Competitive Intelligence Professionals – a global society of strategic and competitive intelligence professionals.

when we refer to the collection of information from human sources. Therefore, we would like to try to identify these elements.

For a start, we should emphasize that from a competitor's point of view, the information of interest, planned to be collected, could be a publicly available one or a confidential one, such as a trade secret (whose obtaining is unlawful, without the consent of its rightful owner, as it is not meant to be publicly available).

A trade secret could be defined as know-how or business information that is not widely known, being undisclosed and intended to remain confidential. (Directive (EU) 2016/943, 2016)

In order for any piece of information to be protected as a trade secret, it must meet the following conditions: it must be a secret, meaning that it is not known or accessible to many people; it must have a commercial value; it must be the subject to protection measures, in order to maintain its secrecy. (European IPR Helpdesk, n.d.)

It is a well-known fact that crime presupposes the existence of intent. According to the article 16 of the new Criminal Code, the following are provided regarding guilt:

“(1) The action is an offense if committed under the form of guilt required by the criminal law.

(2) Guilt exists when an offense is committed with direct intent, with basic intent or with oblique intent.

(3) An action is committed with direct intent when the perpetrator:

- a) can foresee the outcome of their actions, in the expectation of causing such outcome by perpetrating the act;
- b) can foresee the outcome of their actions and, while not intending to produce it, nevertheless accepts the likelihood that will occur.

(4) An act is committed with basic intent when the perpetrator:

- a) can foresee the outcome of their actions but does not accept it, believing without reason that such outcome will not occur;
- b) does not foresee the outcome of their actions, although they should and could have foreseen it.

(5) Oblique intent exists when an act, consisting of a deliberate action or inaction, produces unintended more serious consequences and is attributable to the perpetrator.

(6) The act consisting of an action or inaction shall constitute an offense when committed intentionally. The act committed with basic intent constitutes an offense only when the law expressly establishes it as such.” (Criminal Code, 2009)

From the Criminal Code perspective, the intention can be substantiated if different entities, such as the competitors of a company, plan and carry out activities of collecting information of interest, with secret or confidential character, regarding a target company.

Trying to identify the most important legislative provisions, related to the field of competitive intelligence, following a brief analysis of the relevant Romanian legislation, we chose to focus on the following: *Constitution of Romania* (1991), as amended and supplemented; Law no. 31/1990 on companies, as amended and supplemented; Law no. 11/1991 on combating the unfair competition, as amended and supplemented; Law no. 51/1991 on the national security of Romania, amended by Law no. 187/2012, republished, under art. 107 (3) From the Law no. 255/2013; Law no. 14/1992 on the organization and operation of the Romanian Intelligence Service, as amended and supplemented; Law no. 8/1996 on copyright and neighbouring rights, as amended and supplemented; Law no. 21/1996 of competition, amended and supplemented by Law no. 149/2011 and Law no. 347/2015 on approving Government Emergency Ordinance no. 31/2015; Law no. 84/1998 on marks and geographical indications, republished; Law no. 298/2001 on the amendment and supplementation of Law no. 11/1991 on combating the unfair competition; Law no. 324/2003 on approving Government Emergency Ordinance no. 57/2002 on scientific research and technological development, amended and supplemented by Government Emergency Ordinance no. 6/2011; Law no. 506/2004 on the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communication sector, that transposes Directive 2002/58/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic



communications sector (Directive of privacy and electronic communications), amended and supplemented; Law no. 535/2004 on prevention and combating terrorism, as amended and supplemented by Law no. 187/2012, Law no. 255/2013, Government Emergency Ordinance no. 78/2016 and Law no. 58/2019; Order no. 1.832/856/2011 on the amendment to the classification of occupations in Romania – Level of Occupation (six characters); Law no. 190/2018 on implementing measures to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation); Government Emergency Ordinance no. 25/2019 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure, as well as on the amendment and supplementation of legislation, that transposes Directive 2016/943/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure.

Analysing the content of the above mentioned laws and regulations, several key elements have emerged, considering that they must be taken into account, by any person who carries out competitive intelligence activities, in Romania. The key elements we found have been summarized, among which we would like to mention the following: “the right to information shall not be prejudicial to the measures of protection of young people or national security”, as mentioned in Art. 31 (3) of the Constitution of Romania (Constitution of Romania, 1991); all the carried out activities must comply with the General Data Protection Regulation; the disclosure, collection or use of trade secrets by third parties, as a result of a commercial or industrial espionage action, which infringes a legal person, is illegal and is punishable (Law no. 298, 2001); the attainment of a trade secret, as well as its use or disclosure, without the consent of its rightful owner is illegal (Government Emergency Ordinance no. 25, 2019); the attainment, use or disclosure of a trade secret is unlawful if the person

acquiring the trade secret knew or should have been aware that the trade secret was obtained from a person who was not allowed to disclose that trade secret. (Government Emergency Ordinance no. 25, 2019)

### **Sources of information in competitive intelligence**

Most business people use competitive intelligence responsibly, in compliance with applicable laws and codes of ethics. It is well known that competitive intelligence is incompatible with the following ways of collecting information, deeply illegal, which must be strictly avoided by everyone, the list being not limited to: violation of individuals' privacy and the infringement of their fundamentals rights; blackmail and various types of threats; corruption of civil servants or competition employees; illegal entry into the spaces where the competitors carry out their daily activity or into their employees homes, in order to gather information; phishing; wiretapping etc.

Unfortunately, there is still an ongoing confusion regarding the term competitive intelligence, which is sometimes considered synonymous with espionage. In order to clarify things, it should be noted that competitive intelligence activities take place in full legality and in accordance with the ethical principles, having nothing in common with espionage, which is unethical, being a crime, according to the Criminal Code.

Without going into too much detail, we will continue by briefly referring to the competitive intelligence sources, comparing them with the ones used by the governmental intelligence agencies. According to the Explanatory Dictionary of the Romanian Language, the term source is defined as "the place where information or a novelty emanates" (Romanian Academy, 2016, p. 1191).

Regarding government intelligence, the sources of information can be divided into the following main categories: secret sources (HUMINT and TECHINT) and open sources (OSINT), non-secret. Although the use of HUMINT is being often invoked, mostly by foreign experts, competitive intelligence is not using secret sources, but open sources (to obtain secondary or primary information).

Presently, there are different approaches in regard with secondary and primary sources of information. Generally speaking, the secondary sources used in competitive intelligence can be represented by traditional media, new media, grey literature, books, official reports, brochures, conferences, academic papers, images from commercial satellites etc., while the primary sources being used are generally represented by non-secret human sources, original documents publicly available etc.

We would like to point out that some categories of sources can be both primary and secondary sources (UNSW Library, n. d.). Primary sources are those that have not been altered and have not been edited (e.g. speeches, telephone interviews, press releases etc.), while secondary sources have been edited, in various ways (e.g. newspaper articles, magazines etc.). (Cook, Cook, 2000, p. 39)

Reviewing the different categories of open sources, the Open Source Centre also mentions the press conferences or the conferences and symposia in professional or academic settings (Open Source Centre, n.d.), that can represent both secondary sources and primary sources. The information obtained from these categories of open sources could be also primary information (for example, the public information obtained by an investigative journalist to the question he asked a person that is holding a press conference).

Jay Liebowitz shows us that the primary sources used in competitive intelligence can be individuals, data sets or various documents, noting that interviewing people at fairs and exhibitions or conferences can prove useful. As for secondary sources, they are described either as the person who knows the individual who holds the information of interest, or as an article in a newspaper, a report on a particular industry, or someone quoting someone else. (Liebowitz, 2006, p. 60)

The primary sources used in competitive intelligence are the sources from which first-hand information is collected. Larry Kahaner gives examples the CEO of a company, the president, a governmental agency, or another person who has access to the right information. (Kahaner, 1996, p. 53) "Human intelligence is derived from human sources". (Interagency OPSEC Support Staff, 1991)

Ionel Nițu describes HUMINT as “the use of secret human sources” (Nițu, 2012, p. 37). Secret human sources are people who provide information that is generally not intended for the general public. Among the possible secret human sources are intelligence officers, agents (spies), military attachés, soldiers, emigrants, tourists, war deserters, prisoners, dissidents etc. (Petrescu, 2011, p. 168)

Peter Gill and Mark Phythian emphasize that intelligence operates with both secret and open sources, HUMINT being part of the secret sources category. (Gill, Phythian, 2011, p. 64) Various competitive intelligence practitioners invoke the use of HUMINT, without making certain clarifications, which would eliminate the uncertainties regarding the legality of these approaches, which can end up by creating the false impression that competitive intelligence is synonymous with espionage, when, in fact, competitive intelligence is a legal activity, useful to the business environment. Next we will show why this can happen.

Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt put the equal mark on gathering information from human sources, espionage and HUMINT. (Shulsky, 2006, p. 35) Mark Lowenthal highlights that HUMINT means espionage (Lowenthal, 2003, pp. 74-77), involving the manipulation of other human beings as potential sources of information (Lowenthal, 2003, p. 211).

Sergiu Medar and Cristi Lățea point out that, from a theoretical point of view, HUMINT represents “the information obtained by specially prepared and trained personnel by exploiting human sources, officially, semi-officially or unofficially (clandestinely), through informants, collaborators or agents (spies)” (Medar, Lățea, 2007, p. 46).

As for the intelligence officers, who work for the intelligence services, they often act under the cover of employees of embassies, consulates, consular offices, business missions or official diplomatic activities. (Petrescu, 2011, p. 168) Stan Petrescu claims that there is an unwritten law “according to which intelligence officers and military attachés may carry out clandestine activities, on their own, to collect information.” (Petrescu, 2011, p. 169)

Although for the general public HUMINT collection remains synonymous with espionage and clandestine actions, most of it is

actually being conducted “by overt collectors, such as diplomats and military attachés”. (Operations Security, n.d.)

In turn, TECHINT (Shulsky, Schmitt, 2008, p. 35), technical sources (secret) could provide information in addition to or as a substitute for information from human sources and/or open sources, the collection of information from these sources being done “without the knowledge, agreement or cooperation of the targets.” (Petrescu, 2011, p. 65)

Regarding OSINT, Ionel Nițu defines it as “the collection of information from open, public sources, with unregulated access, official or unofficial” (Nițu, 2012, p. 37). Edward Waltz describes the main categories of intelligence sources, dividing them in terms of access and means of collection, OSINT being openly accessible sources, the collection of information from these sources being done by human and technical means. (Waltz, 2003, p. 36) According with NATO, there are four main categories of open sources: open source data (OSD), open source information (OSIF), open source intelligence (OSINT), and open source intelligence validated (OSINT-V). (NATO, 2001, pp. 2-3)

In general, the use of human sources is characteristic to the field of social research, characterized by transparency, in which the application of questionnaires, conducting qualitative interviews, using focus groups, etc., manages to provide answers, scientifically valid, to various research questions. Under these conditions, it is natural for human sources to be also considered in the field of intelligence, even if the methods and techniques that are used to obtain information are more comprehensive.

There is still certain confusion about HUMINT and OSINT, with some people mistakenly believing that the use of human sources is only characteristic to HUMINT. Next, we will show that, to a certain extent, human sources are also characteristic for OSINT (as opposed to HUMINT, in OSINT we are only referring ourselves to non-secret human sources).

Among the open sources mentioned by the NATO Open Source Intelligence Handbook are the open human sources, more precisely, various experts and observers. “The ultimate open source is a human expert or human observer with direct experience. (...) The human

expert is often the most efficient and the most inexpensive means of creating new open source intelligence that is responsive to a specific requirement from the commander or his staff". (NATO, 2001, p. 9)

Stephen Mercado noted that the sharp development of OSINT is transforming the world of intelligence, with the advent of open versions of the covert arts of human intelligence (HUMINT), aerial imagery (IMINT) and signal intelligence (SIGINT). (Mercado, 2004, p. 47)

Practically, OSINT extends to areas of HUMINT, IMINT and SIGINT (Mercado, 2004, p. 48), pervading "all of the collection disciplines", as evidenced by Mark M. Lowenthal, which also stated that today information can be collected including by elicitation, by ordering images from commercial satellites and by "using software to conduct traffic analysis". (Lowenthal, 2001, p. 62) Regarding competitive intelligence, David Jimenez specifies that it is based on open sources, also mentioning the employee interviews, as an example (Jimenez, 2005, p. 171).

With reference to open source data, Robert David Steele also mentions oral debriefing or another form of information, from a primary source. (Steele, 2007, p. 131)

Considering the open sources of information, the same expert mentions the following general categories: traditional mass-media, different commercial online sources, gray literature, overt human experts, commercial imagery and geospatial information, and the Internet. (Steele, 2007, p. 138)

In turn, Ion Călin also includes the human sources (observers, researchers etc.) in OSINT. Basically, the main categories of open sources mentioned by Ion Călin are represented by the traditional media, the Internet, the "grey" literature, the human sources (n. a. non-secret), and the commercial satellites. (Călin, 2015, p. 193)

Ion Călin mentions that the human sources he is referring to should not be confused with the human sources specific to the intelligence activity (HUMINT). (Călin, 2015, p. 196)

Regarding their value and credibility, Ion Călin appreciates the fact that the information collected from open sources have at least the same value as that derived from classified ones. (Călin, 2015, p. 193)

Non-secret human sources are those human sources from which information is obtained for the general public. Non-secret human sources include observers, researchers, “government officials, librarians, archivists, investigative journalists, accredited reporters from governmental institutions, employees of non-governmental organizations.” (Călin, 2015, p. 193) At the same time, we consider that public relations experts, academic experts, business people, including specially trained staff to represent companies, at trade fairs and exhibitions, sales staff, customers and their competitors etc., can be also added to the list.

Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt (2006, p. 35) include the collection through diplomatic contacts in open sources. Taking into account all these elements, noting the diversity of the available open sources, we can deduct that, in competitive intelligence, the use of the term “HUMINT” cannot be accepted unconditionally, being necessary more clarifications, at least from the legal perspective of our country.

Given the controversies related to the use of primary sources, in competitive intelligence, we will further refer to some aspects related to the use of human sources.

### **Human sources in competitive intelligence**

In competitive intelligence, the use of secondary sources is predominant. No less important, there are opinions that support the idea of using the primary sources, on a larger scale, also by making reference to HUMINT.

One of the people who support this approach is Nir Kaminer, Head of Competitive Intelligence T-Systems International GmbH, and Germany. He considers that although secondary information, used in competitive intelligence activity, already proved its effectiveness, its exclusive use can lead to the loss of the distinctive advantage companies are looking for, believing that it can also be accessed by competitors, as it's not exclusive. (Institute for Competitive Intelligence, 2017)

In this respect, Nir Kaminer is of the opinion that the primary information (obtained from primary sources) makes the difference, not being accessed by everyone. He considers that the information collected and analysed, using HUMINT (through direct contact with human

sources, previously identified, with whom is made conversation), is effective in competitive intelligence, helping businesses to win. Regarding the practices to be avoided when using HUMINT, Nir Kaminer only mentions that it should be borne in mind that “the same situation does not happen within your own organization”, emphasizing the importance of communication with employees, in terms of taking all the necessary precautions, in relation to what they communicate to others, in order to avoid the undesirable information leaks. (Institute for Competitive Intelligence, 2017)

Internationally, the private companies choose either to organize their competitive intelligence functions internally, or to outsource them. The competitive intelligence function of a company may be developed in a separate department, included in one or more of the company's existing departments or assigned to one or more trained individuals. In the same time, the competitive intelligence function can be outsourced to various entities, such as freelancers, consulting firms, security companies, private intelligence agencies, private detective agencies and/or various developers of dedicated IT solutions.

Sometimes, the above mentioned entities employ former military people, including former military intelligence personnel, being able to conduct intelligence operations anywhere in the world, being able to access even hidden (n. a. protected) information or personal information, as mentioned by W.E.P.A. Agency, for example. (W.E.P.A. Agency, n.d.)

We consider it to be self-evident that what it is legal in other countries it is not necessarily legal in Romania. Therefore, before starting a new activity, following any other existing foreign model, from elsewhere, all the relevant Romanian legislation should be studied, with a focus on the possible legal implications of the carried out activities, also taking into account the European Union legislation, where applicable.

Taking into account that we gave examples from other countries, referring to the possibility of accessing the competitive intelligence services, offered by different external entities, to various companies on the Romanian market, or to companies that are aiming entering this market in the future, concerning HUMINT, without referring to a



specific case, we consider that we should ask ourselves the following question: "Who guarantees that a foreign entity, such as a private intelligence agency, for example, that is also specialized in competitive intelligence, complies with our national legislation, when collecting information, on Romanian territory"?

In this regard, we would like to highlight a few more conceptual approaches of HUMINT. The CIA defines HUMINT as any information that can be collected from human sources. HUMINT collection is done by clandestinely obtaining photographs or other documents, by collecting overtly by different people overseas, by debriefing of foreign nationals and citizens traveling abroad, as well as by official contacts with foreign governments. (CIA, 2010)

From a certain perspective, HUMINT can be also used in business, but without aiming to obtain secret or confidential information, including trade secrets. A study by Alisa Rubin Peled and Haim Dror, found that corporations could use HUMINT (seen as "counter-terror intelligence techniques based on human sources") to identify patterns of corporate-wide fraud, rather than target individual perpetrators, and educate employees about the information they can share with others. (Peled, Dror, 2010, pp. 320-331)

In turn, trying to define HUMINT, Larry Kahaner briefly refers to it as "what someone tells you", giving examples from the business world such as what salespeople tell their managers about customers, the rumours or notes taken by employees when attending public events, organized by competitors, such as the opening a new factory etc. (Kahaner, 1996, p. 80)

Robert M. Clark is mentioning that HUMINT could be collected clandestinely and overtly. (Clark, 2014, p. 50) Clark emphasizes the fact that in competitive intelligence, HUMINT is mostly done overtly (Clark, 2014, p. 51), noting that he does not state that this collection is totally made in this way, thus understanding that it is also made clandestinely, which is contrary to the Romanian legislation.

It should be noted that, more often than not, HUMINT is brought into discussions by mentioning the elicitation techniques. We should mention that elicitation could lead sometimes to different ethical and legal issues that should not be ignored, but treated responsibly.

In order to understand what we mean by that, we consider necessary to briefly mention the way in which elicitation is being defined, internationally.

One of the approaches belongs to Cliff Lansley, which defines elicitation as “a process used to draw out information from people, during a communication with a purpose, often without them realizing the elicitor’s purpose for doing so”. (Lansley, 2017) Lansley emphasizes that you should not abuse of elicitation, if it might harm others. (Lansley, 2017)

At the same time, Wayne N. Taylor defines HUMINT concept as “the subtle art of extracting information from another individual during an apparently normal and innocent conversation”. (Taylor, 2010, p. 6) What is important to note is that Wayne N. Taylor further explains that the target of elicitation is the individual that “may or may not be willing to share the information and should not know that you’re even interested in the information”. (Taylor, 2010, p. 6)

We also consider it appropriate to present the way in which the FBI defines elicitation, as “the strategic use of conversation to extract information from people, without giving them the feeling they are being interrogated.” (U.S. Department of Justice, n.d.)

Elicitation has very deep roots in the more or less recent history of Romania, being mainly related with the activity of secret services, an example of definition being the one proposed by the **National Council for the Study** of the **Securitate Archives** (NCSSA), more precisely, “the operative method of collecting information under the cover of a false identity”. (N.C.S.S.A., n. d., p. 5)

From these definitions, it can be seen that, in general, elicitation is being used with the intention of extracting information of interest from a person who holds it, including information that the person would not disclose, voluntarily, in other circumstances, not being aware that he/she transmits information, without being shown any transparency, in relation to the aim pursued, being able to go as far as to use a false identity, if necessary, which contradicts not only the professional ethics, but also the national laws (especially, if the information of interest is secret or confidential).

In order to avoid any confusion, we would like to emphasize that we do not consider unethical and/or illegal any use of human sources in competitive intelligence activities, in regard with elicitation, appreciating that there might be certain ways in which it is neither illegal nor unethical to do it.

However, in order to emphasize the importance of clarifying the way in which elicitation is being carried out in competitive intelligence, we mention that Robert M. Clark points out that, in general, an operation is clandestine if the opponent or target does not realize that it took place, at all, being different from the covert one (hidden), in which the adversary or the target realizes that it took place, not being able to identify the source of the operation. (Clark, 2013)

We would like to mention that, according to the Explanatory Dictionary of the Romanian Language, the term clandestine is defined as having “a secret character, which is done in secret (being forbidden by law)”. (Romanian Academy, 2016, p. 211)

Thus, we cannot fail to notice that aiming to extract information of interest from human sources, for a specific purpose, by using different methods and techniques, the target(s) being unaware about that specific purpose, without willing to disclose the information of interest, to others, could be interpreted, at least from a theoretical point of view, to be a clandestine operation, especially if the information intended to be extracted is known to be secret or confidential (referring to trade secrets), possibly falling under the incidence of the Criminal Code, including from the national security perspective, in some cases.

In these conditions, regarding the competitive intelligence activities carried out on the Romanian territory, we consider the use of HUMINT to be inappropriate, due to the multiple concerns of its legality and its compliance with the applicable codes of ethics, recommending the use of non-secret human sources.

## **Conclusions**

Competitive intelligence is being characterized by the use of open sources for collecting information, being incompatible with the use of secret sources; at least from the perspective of the Romanian legislation (competitive intelligence is a business practice, not a military

one, without any regulations to connect it to the intelligence services of the state). Competitive intelligence is using human sources and will continue to do it, provided that the national and international legislation, as well as the ethical codes are complied with.

Answering the research question, there are always legal and ethical ways through which useful information could be collected, from human sources, for competitive intelligence purposes. With regard to the legal provisions in force and the provisions of the codes of professional ethics, they can be respected, for example, by using non-secret human sources and applying those methods and techniques that are more characteristic to the field of social research, such as surveys and questionnaires, qualitative interviews, the use of focus groups etc., that are not violating Romanian laws or the provisions of the codes of ethics, clearly mentioning that we are only referring to the collection of information that is not secret or confidential.

With regard to the use of elicitation techniques, in competitive intelligence, in Romania, the features of our national legislation, as well as the ethical codes, including The SCIP Code of Ethics, should be seriously taken into consideration. We would like to emphasize that, general speaking, elicitation is not being used randomly, but with a prior preparation, based on a collection plan (i.e., with intent). Therefore, if the intended purpose is to obtain secret or confidential information, such as trade secrets, from a theoretical point of view, by using elicitation and extracting such information of interest, a crime would be committed.

Presently, in regard with the concept of competitive intelligence, internationally recognized as a respectable business practice, an unfortunate confusion is still being made, from time to time, by which competitive intelligence is considered synonymous with espionage.

We consider that one of the causes that led to the perpetuation of this confusion might be represented by the use of HUMINT, for collecting information. In order to avoid any future perception errors of competitive intelligence, we would like to propose, to all the competitive intelligence professionals, the use of the non-secret human sources, overtly, as we know that, generally speaking, secret human sources are providing information that is not meant for the general

public. In the same time, we propose to avoid using the term HUMINT in competitive intelligence, the term being much more comprehensive, being used by the state intelligence services, more often, also suggesting the creation of a new concept, as an alternative.

Although it is not absolutely necessary, at this moment, the future regulation of competitive intelligence activity in Romania, could have some positive effects in regard with the perception of this respectable business practice among our private companies, creating the premises for an accelerated development of this field in our country, that could lead to the increase of the competitiveness of our business environment and to the consolidation of the companies with full or majority Romanian capital, as well as to the improvement of some of our macroeconomic indicators.

Last but not least, regulating competitive intelligence could contribute to the increasing of the security culture of the Romanian entrepreneurs, being also useful in preventing and deterring the development of certain illegal practices in our country.

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## **GAMES, EXERCISES AND SIMULATIONS**

**ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS IN SECURITY  
AND INTELLIGENCE STUDIES: METHODS OF IDENTIFICATION  
AND ANALYSIS OF PROJECTION FACTORS.  
PROPOSAL OF A CLASS EXERCISE**

**Ileana-Cinziana SURDU\***

**Abstract<sup>1</sup>**

*Forecasting methods are used in different areas, different contexts, but with the same final purpose: evaluating possible futures. Alternative scenarios are an efficient tool of identifying alternative futures, based on past and present actions and contexts.*

*Since gaining popularity, in the 1950s, the scenario method has been constantly improved and has evolved into different typologies. The qualitative approach of the alternative scenarios method allows for insightful analysis and debate on the topic addressed, based on the projection factors that describe the situation under study. The scenario method can be adapted to different types of situations and to different time-frames. The article discusses various scenario designs and reviews their primary characteristics, sending the reader to further information. Without representing a formal institutional method of analysis, alternative scenarios can successfully be used in processes that target risk assessments and mitigations, tackling vulnerabilities, identifying gaps and needs, anticipating attacks and possible associated tools, but also the elaboration of strategies on a long, medium and short-term.*

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<sup>1</sup> This paper is part of the research activity within the EUSEGOV Jean Monnet Module - *A common understanding of EU Security Governance. Teaching and researching the EU security policies and institutions for a better academic and professional approach in security and intelligence field*, project no. 621227-EPP-1-2020-1-RO-EPPJMO-MODULE. More details on <https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/erasmus-plus/projects/eplu-project-details/#project/621227-EPP-1-2020-1-RO-EPPJMO-MODULE>.

"The European Commission's support for the production of this publication does not constitute an endorsement of the contents, which reflect the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein."

*This paper proposes a class exercise based on the elaboration of alternative scenarios. As support for both the lecturer, who will act as the moderator, and the students, who will be the participants of the exercise, the article discusses the research method proposed through definitions, characteristics and classifications, advantages and disadvantages, methods of identification and analysis of projection factors, and also the utility of the method for the intelligence and security studies.*

**Keywords:** *alternative scenarios, multiple scenarios, projection factors, key-drivers, security and intelligence studies.*

## **Alternative scenarios as a research method**

### **What are alternative scenarios?**

Alternative scenarios are the result of anticipating different possibilities of the future, by taking into consideration a series of variables. Scenarios are “preparation for potential future challenges, not predictions of what will happen (...) and create plausible views of the future that decision-makers can use to determine their best response and how to react to alternative plays” (Jackson, 2011, p. 24).

Philip van Notten (2005) evaluates that “scenarios are consistent and coherent descriptions of alternative hypothetical futures that reflect different perspectives on past, present, and future developments, which can serve as a basis for action”. Scenarios present multiple possible futures, “from the expected to the wildcard, in forms that are analytically coherent and imaginatively engaging”, contributing to the elimination of the unexpected turn of events (Bishop, Hines and Collins, 2007, p. 5).

Discussed also as *multiple scenarios*, the method results with alternative possible explanations of possible futures, in the presence of key-drivers of projection factors (Handbook of Analytic Tools and Techniques, 2016).

The definitions mentioned above illustrate a series of characteristics of the scenario method: scenarios are not predictions, they are consistent and coherent descriptions, are based on the reflection on past, present and future developments, they can be used in preparing for possible future challenges and strategic responses.

Philip van Notten (2006) classifies scenarios after “macro” and “micro” characteristics:

- “The goals of scenario studies: Exploration – Pre-policy research”, which address “evolutionary” and “discontinuity” changes, through “descriptive” and “normative” values. The goals cover, on one hand, creative thinking, raising awareness, and learning through exploration, and, on the other hand, recommendations for policies or “strategic decision-making”. The value of the scenario establishes the type of indicators presented, whether the conditions for a certain aim are presented or if possible outcomes are presented without following a specific goal. Evolutionary changes refer to gradually driven situations, while discontinuity focuses on the “sudden nature of change”.

- “Design of the scenario process: Intuitive – Analytical”, which employs “participatory” and “model-based” methods. The analytical design is primarily based on computer simulations, often associated with model-based quantification techniques. The intuitive design implies qualitative approaches based on creative techniques.

- “Content of the scenarios: Complex – Simple”, which are developed “in chain” or as “snapshots”. The complexity of a scenario results through the intersection of processes that determine it, while the simplicity is associated with particular scopes. “Chains” include the process of development, while “snapshots” focus on the end-state of the developments.

The scenario method gained popularity with Herman Kahn, in the 1950s, while working at RAND Corporation<sup>2</sup>, and, later, with Bright, who promoted scenarios as “tools for contingency planning”, focusing on “the benefits of planning for all reasonable outcomes” (Bright, 1978, apud Gentry, Calantone, and Cui, 2006, p. 58).

The method can be successfully used in cases such as: exploring possibilities, identifying risks and opportunities, identifying possible improvements, planning future actions, developing new strategies, implementing diagnoses, analyzing implications of different challenges etc. (Jackson, 2011). Multiple scenarios prove to be very useful in understanding the many possible turns of a situation, but also in

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<sup>2</sup> A research organization, established in 1948 in USA, which now works in USA, Europe and Australia for strengthening public policies.

anticipating different types of outcomes (Handbook of Analytic Tools and Techniques, 2016).

According to Bright (Bright, 1978 apud Gentry, Calantone, and Cui, 2006, p. 51-52), scenarios are used to analyze “several possible futures with the idea of being prepared for any uncertainty”. The scenario method is placed by Gentry, Calantone, and Cui (2006) under the general umbrella of *scripts*, at the intersection of casualty and opinion.

Scenarios are efficient methods in different fields, from foresight analysis, to the development of public policies and decision making in governments, enterprises and organizations (van Notten, 2005). Foresight methodologies represent “frameworks for making sense of data generated by structures processes to think about the future” (Conway, s. a., p. 1), and scenario development is one aspect of this “comprehensive activity” (Bishop, Hines and Collins, 2007, p. 6). Alternative scenarios have proven to be useful in different domains, either as a single analysis method or as part of a more complex methodology that comprises complementary methods. Therefore, alternative scenarios can contribute to fields such as political, economic, social, foresight, futures studies, strategy work, military intelligence etc. (Kuosa, 2014).

A good scenario “inspires, engages and enables others to take action, breaks people's acceptance of current paradigms and produces plausible outcomes that can be turned into strategic responses” (Jackson, 2011, p. 27). Successful scenarios are associated with a couple of principles: exploring plausible futures, being consistent and based on rigorous data, and being compelling (Foresight Horizon Scanning Centre, 2009). As such, efficient and useful scenarios use valid data, can determine entities and people to act upon the new information and free themselves from previous certainties, in order to adopt a strategic behavior.

### **Advantages of using alternative scenarios**

Alternative scenarios can contribute to a better and common understanding of possible futures, making better and justified strategic decisions, preventing risks, enabling shared action, and even enforcing

team spirit and collaboration (Jackson, 2011). Also, discussing the scenario planning method in relation to foresight studies, M. Conway highlights the benefit of gathering information external to the subject organization (Conway, s. a.).

The method can lead to understand different possible turn of events, how certain elements can modify certain aspects, which aspects are more prone to change than others, how alternative futures may look like, what can be done to prevent certain types of change, what are the unknown important elements etc. (Jackson, 2011).

By generating alternative scenarios, decision makers can eliminate the element of surprise in possible turn of events (Handbook of Analytic Tools and Techniques, 2016). Although, this can be achieved within certain limits, as different factors can determine different results.

“The true value of the technique is to provide a palette of ideas from which attention-deserving themes can be developed” (Handbook of Analytic Tools and Techniques, 2016, p. 35). Thus, the method<sup>3</sup> implies a process of identifying possible relevant themes to be addressed and further analyzed.

### **Disadvantages of using alternative scenarios**

The method can be subject to lack of credibility, subjectivism, or errors. Also, because alternative scenarios cannot be validated, and can be impacted by cultural variables, their results are placed under suspicion. At the same time, the high amount of resources in terms of time and money implied contributes to the negative evaluation of using such a method. (Jackson, 2011)

The scenario method presents the risk of being labeled as irrelevant (Conway, s. a.) if the process is not clearly stated within a more expansive analysis, as, for example, an organizational diagnosis or a strategic development plan.

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<sup>3</sup> This study differentiates the term “method” (understood as steps to be followed) from “technique” (understood as how the steps will be implemented) (according to the clarifications of Bishop, Hines and Collins, 2007).

## Methods of identification and analysis of projection factors

Alternative scenarios are formally projected in a workshop setting, using both deductive and inductive approaches, tackling with the imagination of the participants, who are experts in the addressed field. The experts have the role of identifying the key-drivers, which are elements with possible impact over the analyzed theme (Handbook of Analytic Tools and Techniques, 2016). The identification of such elements can be assimilated to the process of identifying indicators. "Indicators are observable phenomena that are periodically reviewed to track events, spot emerging trends, validate a hypothesis, and warn of anticipated change" (Pherson, 2018, p. 1). As such, observed phenomena are converted into analysis indicators, which need continuous updating to the reality, by tracking events, trends, changes, which can provide insight into anticipating future events, but also can confirm previous identified scenarios.

Philip van Notten (2006) describes the design process through analytical and intuitive approaches. The first type of approach, the analytical one, includes the model-based technique, which refers to computer simulations, and other quantification procedures. Another analytical technique is desk research, implemented through document analysis. The intuitive approach includes participatory, more creative techniques, as, for example, the elaboration of stories. The intuitive approach is based on four steps: "a) identification of subject or problem area; b) description of relevant factors; c) prioritization and selection of relevant factors; d) the creation of scenarios. A subsequent step might be scenario evaluation as pre-policy research." (van Notten, 2006). Intuitive and analytical approaches can successfully be combined, for a more in-depth analysis.

Bishop, Hines and Collins (2007) discuss different categories of scenarios, each described through scenario techniques. Among the analyzed categories, the authors present *the Royal Dutch Shell technique*, or *Global Business Network (GBN)*, created by Pierre Wack in the 1970s. The technique reflects a two-dimensional matrix, presenting "two dimensions of uncertainty or polarities" (Bishop, Hines and Collins, 2007, p. 14). Börjeson (Börjeson et al., in press apud Bishop, Hines and Collins, 2007, p. 10) identifies three categories of scenarios:

predictive – analyzing “What will happen?”, exploratory – analyzing “What can happen?”, and normative – analyzing “How can a specific target be reached?”. A normative design implies the establishment of visions and norms, followed by the explanation of possible outcomes, without connecting the storyline to data or historical events (Kuosa, 2014). On the other hand, explorative designs analyze what is possible to happen, even if it does not include the desired outcomes, and the scenarios resulted must be based on empirical data and on a logical temporal path, starting from past events (Kuosa, 2014).

The alternative scenarios development can include a Delphi process, which focuses on identifying consensus and disapproval within the working group with reference to the topic addressed. The process allows for individual inputs on scenario dimensions, followed by a process of agreeing on key-drivers resulted. (Wright, G. et al., 2013)

The basic stages for generating scenarios include (Handbook of Analytic Tools and Techniques, 2016):

- identifying the main issue to be addressed by involving experts in the field;
- identifying the factors that may have an impact over the situation and out of them identifying the key-drivers;
- establishing the limits of the key-drivers;
- grouping the drivers in 2x2 pairs;
- developing a story for each quadrant formed by the 2x2 pairs;
- selecting the scenarios to be further analyzed on the premises of “illustrating compelling and challenging futures not now being considered” (Handbook of Analytic Tools and Techniques, 2016, p. 35);
- elaborating indicators suitable for tracking the development of the scenarios(s). (Handbook of Analytic Tools and Techniques, 2016)

Jackson, (2011) recommends certain steps in order to obtain efficient results when developing scenarios:

- clearly specifying the theme that is to be addressed;
- identifying the major elements that may have an impact over the identified theme;
- establishing the way these elements interact with each other and extract the ones with the estimated higher impact;



- imagining possible futures starting from the interaction of the selected elements;
- deciding which interaction needs to be evaluated through alternative scenarios method;
- identifying key-variables that define the certain interactions;
- allocating descriptive short titles for each scenario;
- establishing the period of time that is needed to be evaluated for each scenario;
- organizing the workshop settings with the participants and discuss the key-variables, projected over the required period of time (short/ medium/ long term);
- making sure the scenarios resulted are anchored into the reality and are plausible. (Jackson, 2011)

Foresight Horizon Scanning Centre (2009) proposes a checklist of issues as a previous step to the development of scenarios:

- verifying the clarity of the exercise's purpose, by discussing with the stakeholders;
- anticipating the usefulness of the results;
- defining the time-frame of the scenarios, in accordance to the topic addressed: 3-5 years for situations dependent on short-term available factors, more than 5 years when analyzing long-lasting situations;
- describing the characteristics of the participants in terms of expertise and backgrounds, including characteristics of the beneficiary categories;
- exploring the interests of the possible beneficiaries of the results;
- establishing the methodology of development and how the results will be disseminated: giving names to the resulted scenarios in accordance to their main characteristics, elaborating visual diagrams, developing stories, identifying catchy headlines for the scenarios, presenting video formats of the scenarios etc. (Foresight Horizon Scanning Centre (2009)

In the construction of alternative scenarios, it is recommended to use a quadrant-based model, which will result with four possible potential futures: "one can only be considered a forecast, two would

most likely limit competing uncertainties and three may cause people to assume one is the forecast”, while more than four may imply the use of a morphological analysis method (Jackson, 2011, p. 26). The “two-dimensional matrix” is based on the selection of two factors that are considered to have the most impact on the topic addressed (van Notten, 2006). The selection can follow “the backbone approach” (when the relationship between the two factors rely on a particular theory), “the foundation approach” (when the factors are selected in relation to their impact over the future of the topic addressed), “the scaffolding approach” (which results with more elaborated scenarios, that don’t fit into the structure any more), and “the shop window approach” (which results with clear different scenarios) (Van’t Klooster and van Asselt, 2006 apud van Notten, 2006). These approaches of elaborating scenarios are also called “deductive”, referring to the framework on which scenarios are based on (Van der Heijden, 1996 apud van Notten, 2006). “Inductive” approaches are methods of elaborating scenarios in contrast with the deductive ones. These methods don’t rely on a structure for the scenarios. Instead, they imply associations, storylines etc. (Van der Heijden, 1996 apud van Notten, 2006).

Foresight Horizon Scanning Centre (2009) presents three possibilities of developing scenarios that were used by the UK government. The “two-axes method” results are considered rather illustrative, being more suited for medium and long-term situations (10-20 years). The “branch analysis” is recommended for short-term events (maximum 5 years); it starts from a main question and it defines sequenced possible events and their potential outcomes. The “cone of plausibility” presents the possible impact of drivers on final outcomes, being suited for very short-term events (2-3 months) with a limited number of drivers, but also for long-term situations; it relies on the identification of key-drivers and on the adjustment of assumptions afferent to each driver (Foresight Horizon Scanning Centre, 2009). Habegger (2009) distinguishes between four types of futures, as part of the “futures cone” technique: “possible futures” (futures resulted from imagination), “plausible futures” (futures in line with current knowledge), “probable futures” (futures connected to the present and

the past), and “preferable futures” (representing the desired futures) (Habegger, 2009, p. 11).

Timing is an important aspect to consider when organizing scenario projects. There are certain types of situations when the method might not have a positive impact, for example: during chaotic times, during times of internal competitions or noise-producing actions, or after decisions have already been made. (Jackson, 2011).

### **Using alternative scenarios in security and intelligence studies**

Alternative scenarios can be used as a research method in instances such as identifying (new) vulnerabilities, possible attacks, and possible attack methods (Handbook of Analytic Tools and Techniques, 2016, p. 35). In intelligence and security studies, indicators are useful in analyzing possible futures, and “often described as estimative, predictive, or foresight indicators” (Pherson, 2018, p. 1). These types of indicators that are often used together with alternative scenarios are called *estimative*. Estimative indicators can measure change, can be used to “monitor, detect, or evaluate change over time” (Pherson, 2018, p. 7). Estimative indicators refer to future events, may be sustained by historical similar outcomes, can make extrapolations, and are usually qualitative (Pherson, 2018). A subset of the estimative indicators consists of *warning indicators*, which “provide advanced early warning of undesirable events” and are “often used to determine an alert or threat level” (Pherson, 2018, p. 8).

The method can successfully be used in analyzing security threats and in preventing the associated risks. Kim and Cha (2011) describe scenarios as a qualitative security risk analysis (SRA) useful in analyzing “possible future events (...) providing future strategies and appropriate countermeasures” (Kim and Cha, 2011, p. 293). SRA is defined as “a proactive approach that can identify and assess accident risks before they cause major losses”, which includes three stages: 1) defining the scope, boundaries and methodology, 2) developing the risk analysis and 3) implementing a risk mitigation and evaluation process (Kim and Cha, 2011, p. 293, 2094). Kim and Cha (2011) propose the updating of the scenario method to the Unified Modeling Language

(UML) use cases, which focuses on identifying security issues before implementing a risk analysis and proposing countermeasures.

**Class exercise: identifying projection factors and elaborating alternative scenarios using “the two-axis method”**


The following exercise proposes the practice of the elaboration of alternative scenarios in relation to a pre-selected topic. The exercise starts from the hypothesis that the participants were previously presented the method of generating alternative scenarios, including their advantages, disadvantages, and utility.

The exercise implies the presence of a moderator and the participation of minimum 4 students; the students/ participants will have had access to information regarding the topic of the exercise.

Resources needed:

- paper and pens for each group of participants;
- flipchart and colored markers;
- projector and laptop (if possible), for presenting the information used in the exercise: topic, scheme, steps to follow.

Proposal of topic (*the topic will be changed in accordance to the aim of the exercise*): Elaborate alternative scenarios in order to address the following topic: *What elements can determine the development of violent extremism manifestations with tendencies of terrorism, in Romania? Please, refer to the following 10 years.*



**Figure 1.** Schematic structure for elaborating alternative scenarios<sup>4</sup>

## Methodology

### Instructions for the moderator:

1. group the participants into groups of 3-4;
2. hand the groups pens and paper;
3. present the topic/write it down on the flipchart, so the participants can read it whenever they need to;

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<sup>4</sup> Source: Author's elaboration, adapted after Handbook of Analytic Tools and Techniques. (2016); Watts, J., Jensen, B., Work J.D., Whyte, Ch. and Kollars, N. (September, 2019); van Notten, Ph. (2006); Foresight Horizon Scanning Centre (October, 2009).

4. draw/present the schematic structure for elaborating alternative scenarios, so the participants can look at it whenever they need to (see Figure 1);

5. present/ write down the steps for elaborating alternative scenarios (described below), so the participants can read it whenever they need to;

- i. present each step one by one and ask each group to delegate representatives who will present the results orally;
- ii. present the time allotted for each step and monitor the time;

6. move around the classroom, so you make sure that all the students participate, and encourage all the students to participate;

7. ask the students to discuss the results after each step.

*If the format of the gathering with the participants allows the implementation of the exercise over a longer period of time:*

8. establish the period of time for monitoring the scenarios;

9. organize a new workshop with the same participants, after the established period of time, and discuss the development of each selected scenario.

### **Steps to be followed by the participants:**

1. identify the main elements that define violent extremism manifestations with tendencies of terrorism, by using the information gathered during your theoretical study and by referring to expressed views of practitioners and experts in the field (e.g. expressed in articles, interviews, presentations etc.); write them down;

2. each group's representative presents the results and all the participants discuss it with the purpose of agreeing on including it in the exercise; the results will be presented on flipchart pages;

3. out of the identified elements select projection factors/ key-drivers that may have an impact over the violent extremism manifestations with tendencies of terrorism in Romania, during the next 3 years;

- i. select the projection factors with the estimated higher impact over the situation addressed;

4. each group's representative presents the results and all the participants discuss it with the purpose of agreeing on including the projection factors in the exercise; the results will be presented on flipchart pages;

5. all the participants will group the selected projection factors that also interact with each-other, so they can form 2x2 pairs; the results will be presented on flipchart pages;

6. all the participants will establish the limits of the projection factors and a representative will place them on a scheme (see Figure 1);

7. in groups, develop and describe possible futures resulted from the interaction of each pair of projection factors, by referring to each quadrant in the scheme (see Figure 1);

- each group will be analyzing the intersection of one pair of projection factors (if more pairs than groups resulted, the groups will select the factors by preference, without overlapping with other group; if less pairs than groups resulted, the groups will select the factors by preference, even though they overlap with other group);
- name each of the four scenarios resulted;
- describe the implications of each scenario from different perspective: social, cultural, economic, political etc.;
- select the scenarios to be further analyzed, in accordance to their plausibility and to the relevance for the situation studied;
- elaborate indicators relevant for monitoring the selected scenarios;

8. each group's representative presents the results and all the participants discuss it.

## Conclusions

The identification of possible alternative scenarios can overcome the uncertainty of the future, through the advantage given by the possibility of monitoring the development of a certain situation with the identified projection factors or key-drivers. As such, the alternative scenarios method may contribute to the elimination of the element of surprise and unexpected turn of events. Among the most efficient uses

of the method are strategic planning and early warning on possible outcomes. However, projection factors or key-drivers can contribute to the identification of trajectories, but the development of the monitored situation is dependent on the trend of different events. Therefore, alternative scenarios can explore possible futures in relation to certain impact factors, resulting with examples of outcomes. The qualitative approach of the alternative scenarios method allows for insightful analysis and debate on the topic addressed, based on the projection factors that describe the situation under study. The scenario method can be adapted to different types of situations and to different time-frames. Without representing a formal institutional method of analysis, alternative scenarios can successfully be used in processes that target risk assessments and mitigations, tackling vulnerabilities, identifying gaps and needs, anticipating attacks and possible associated tools, but also the elaboration of strategies on a long, medium and short-term.

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## **REVIEWS AND NOTES**

**Cosmin Dragoş DUGAN, *Neuroaugmentarea în epoca cognitivizării. Între competiție sinergie. Optimizarea performanțelor umane pentru personalul de securitate națională și profesii de elită*<sup>1</sup>, Bucharest, Military Publishing House, 2020**

**Review by Alexandra POPESCU\***

The central element of the book “Neuro-augmentation in the age of cognition” is represented by the study of the role of the techniques and instruments specific to the practice of neuro-augmentation in optimizing human performance, focusing on the military field, without limiting exclusively its focus on it. From this perspective, the author’s approach can be considered a structured and documented approach conducted in Romania on the cognitive optimization and neuro-augmentation, the final goal of the research process described in the process being to develop an autochthonous vision regarding the development and implementation of programs to increase/optimize the performance of the personnel employed in the field of national security.

In an increasingly competitive society, where intelligence, creativity and originality are central factors in the process of evaluating human performance, the pressure to reach maximum potential led to the creation of a culture of improving cognitive, emotional and behavioural performances. Cognitive performance optimization and neuro-augmentation have crystallized especially in recent decades as distinct and specialized branches within the concept of human performance optimization (HPO), focusing on achieving maximum performance, in ethical and medical safety conditions. In this context, the book represents a first step in the development and identification of

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<sup>1</sup> *Neuroaugmentation in the age of cognition. Between competition and synergy. Optimizing human performance for national security personnel and elite professions.*

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neuro-augmentation as one of the study branches of neuroscience, trying to stimulate university research in this field throughout the presented results, highlighting the need to develop the operational neuroscience domain in Romania, as an integrative and interdisciplinary approach.

The book begins with an introductory chapter that presents the main theories which deal with the studied subject (dataism, transhumanism and singularity), which is complemented by a chapter dedicated to the definition, by making a brief literature review, of the three concepts operated within the research process: (a) the optimization of human performance – captures the Romanian perspective on defining this concept; (b) operational neuroscience – defined from the perspective of optimizing human performances in order to identify the role they play in the development of recruitment and motivation strategies for the personnel; (c) cognitive optimization and augmentation (neuro-augmentation) – defined from the perspective of military personnel.

Furthermore, the third chapter deals with the ethics of neuro-augmentation, which is addressed in terms of the widespread implementation of the techniques and methods for human performance optimization, fact that would attract controversy about the reasons, used methods and possible consequences of this particular practice, as well as about how public opinion would receive it. The fourth chapter focuses on identifying the role that neuro-augmentation, as a science and procedure, can play as a component of the process of evaluation and measurement of human performance specific to the personnel hired in institutions of national security, by analysing and describing evaluation models derived on the civil area from precision and personalized medicine initiatives, in order to be able to establish which are the parameters currently used to evaluate neurocognitive and emotional states and performances.

The fifth chapter presents in detail the methods and techniques used for optimization and neuro-augmentation that can be applied to military personnel, highlighting the practical applications which have been developed within several institutions of national security, the interest these institutions shown into developing such applications

(proven by the investments and funds allocated to research in this particular field), the inclusion of provisions on neuro-augmentation within official doctrinal documents and the experimental use within current military practice.

In order to achieve a unitary perspective on the basis of the theoretical information presented in the first five chapters, useful for the reader to construct an overview on the studied topic, the sixth chapter presents a detailed description of the applicability of the neuro-augmentation in the field of national security throughout (a) a presentation of the applicability of this practice for the optimization of certain higher mental processes or cognitive functions (memory, attention, concentration etc.) for military professions, (b) a presentation of applicability for civilian professions, (c) a discussion of unconventional aspects of human performance, with applicability in the field of national security and (d) a presentation of the applicability of neuro-augmentation for various weapons and military specialties.

One of the most interesting and original sections of this book is represented by the seventh chapter, which aims to demonstrate the utility and the positive impact of real-time performance measurement, as well as the application of neuro-augmentation methods and techniques in the activities conducted by security officers at airport checkpoints. Starting from the hypothesis that the implementation of a cognitive optimization program within the activity conducted by airport security officers will led to a measurable improvement of neurovisual performances, the author conducts an experiment on three stages in order to identify the most relevant performance indicators that can be measured in real-time and a proposal for a cognitive optimization and augmentation able to improve the performances of the process of visual targets identification. Therefore, the experiment consisted of a series of small-scale experiments, as follows: (1) exploratory study aimed at conducting a probabilistic identification of brain areas that are critical for the neurovisual performance of airport security officers; (2) evaluation of the means used to obtain the performance parameters in conditions as similar as possible to the operational ones – for this study the author used a sample made up of inexperienced subjects (civilian employees who had not

previously carried out activities specific to airport officers and who were not trained in this particular domain); (3) the main experiment aimed at demonstrating the positive impact determined by the optimization program on visual target identification performance throughout the identification of brain activation patterns and the calculation of the individual visual performance of airport security officers.

In this context, the chapter dedicated to conclusions highlighted the fact that the cognitive optimization and neuro-augmentation methods and techniques differ in terms of operating principles, action and administration conditions, specificity, recommendations etc. A simple classification considers the degree of accessibility, complexity and intrusiveness – from “classic” and well-known methods such as nutritional interventions, physical training techniques, sleep optimization, neuroergonomics, advanced techniques of psychotherapy and personal development, cognitive training, etc. to more sophisticated methods such as pharmacological stimulation (nootropic), neuromodular or transcranial stimulation techniques.

The orchestration of these methods and techniques in customized optimization and augmentation programs is being performed by groups of experts (doctors, psychologists, coaches) under de umbrella of multi-layered neuroprotective strategies that include prevention, optimization, augmentation and recovery measures adapted to individual phenotypic and genotypic particularities. Another form of capitalization is represented by the precise countermeasures designed to counteract the biological and psychological effects resulted from occupational/professional exposure to aggressive factors and high-risk situations.

The ability to directly connect the finite human mind to an artificial partner with unlimited virtual development potential is a revolutionary technological breakthrough, if it can ever be safely operationalized. The ethical, legal, practical issues, presented in detail in the book, are commensurate with the potential benefits, especially since many aspects of human-artificial intelligence collaboration are unprecedented in human history.

The development and integration of neurotechnologies and artificial intelligence in the military field aims to achieve advanced man-

machine collaborative solutions. This hybrid approach, metaphorically called the “centaur” type, tries to virtualize the hardware elements, while they will be “cognized” by advanced artificial intelligence solutions. Assisted human operations are based on the use of systems that expand human physical capabilities (mainly exoskeletons), but the robotic offer is very creative.

Developing efficient and secure neuro-augmentation programs for intelligence personnel allows a possible re-approach to the issue of classical HUMINT, understood in the form of exploiting individual skills and access to relevant information. The book, basing on the literature review process and discussions with experts, analyses the concept of “neuro-HUMINT”, limited to the concerns of a state or non-state entity to optimize the individual and collective physical, psychological and behavioural abilities of human sources.

The book is a plea for the ethical and constructive use of the concept of human performance and artificial intelligence optimization and calls for the establishment of a lexicon dedicated to cognitive optimization and neuro-augmentation in the Romanian research community, as well as for an interdisciplinary approach to doctoral research topics in the field of neurosciences for the development of original and pragmatic local visions, based on research that responds to intrinsic needs.

**Florentina HĂHĂIANU, *Explorarea competenței socio-emoționale în domeniul intelligence (Exploring socio-emotional competence in intelligence)*, Top Form Publishing House, 2016**

**Review by Silviu PETRE\***

Emotional intelligence has become one of the most employed notion in public speech as well as in punditry. Often associated with the American psychologist Daniel Goleman, the notion itself found its way in a tortuous manner, its coming of age reflecting the very maturation of psychology from art to a well established science. Present people like to believe they can predict and measure someone's behavior from his or hers socio-emotional abilities.

Florentina Hăhăianu's inserts her contribution into this ungoing debate with a special focus on the profile of the future intelligence officer.

At first, the author reviews the preceding literature so as to make order through the jungle of semantics. The existing definitions and their subsequent criteria given are legion, often fuzzy as each author writing about the matter craves to trailbalze the discipline.

As such, one of the most pertinent definition for the social intelligence is considered to be: "the ability to get along with others and convince them to cooperate with you" (Karl Albrecht, page 26)

In a similar veneer, emotional intelligence (EI) is held to be "the ability to understand and order ones emotions" (according to Saloney and Mayer, page 27). Expanding on that, Reuven Bar-On, PhD at the University of tel Aviv sees emotional intelligence a "string of capabilities, competence and noncognitive skills which influence one's ability to succeed and adapt to the presure of the environment." (page 27)

Aformentioned Daniel Goleman draws attention to their difference and that they should not be held to be synonymous. Pushing

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
through such a rich literature, Hăhăianu suggests that the two should be lumped together in a synthetic concept – one able to describe “the ability for reconnaissance and control of your own’s emotion as well as well of the others along with the adapting the behavior while relating to the others.” (p. 29)

The definitions themselves remain only half of the story unless we think further to instruments to evaluate those abilities or even more, to exort them in the educational process. Here enter competencies.

In this regard, “social and professional competencies stand for efficiency in transactions which require affective skills, both with respect to one’s person, as well as in intercourse with the others, both within familiar as well as unfamiliar environments.” (p. 64)

Going from the periphery to the nutshell of the study, the author charts the whole array of emotional competencies required by an intelligence officer in his/her tasks, as one can notive just bellow (p. 81):

### **The Pentagonal Model of the Socio-Emotional Competencies**



**Author's graphic, (p. 81)**

- **Self Consciousness** stands for: the capability towards self knowledge and also of the consequences of one's actions towards the others; self confidence and rightful selfevaluation.
- **Self Control** stands for: "handling emotional reactions accordingly to different situations and people." It bodes well with notions like: resilience, dutifulness, and adaptability.
- **Self Motivation** stands for the ability to "identify your own inner resources that might be tapped in and channeled towards success."
- **Social Consciousness** describes empathy.
- **Social skills** express: the ability to communicate efficiently along with other notions like assertiveness and team spirit. (pages 82-89)


Written from an individual-centric perspective, Florentina Hăhăianu's study strives to be a synthesis of previous literature about the profile of the nowadays intelligence officer. The publication of the book bodes well with present times considering that the rampant evolution of terrorist threat highlighted once again the importance of HUMINT as supplement to technical approaches – preferred for their more economic results. Last but not least, the effort to visualising the 'ideal silhouette' of an intelligence officer can be extremely useful for the whole array of security organisations (armies, police, intelligence agencies) in an age where all of them struggle with recruiting predicaments of various sorts and the best and the brightest among the graduates choose private sector as future career (Knight, 2016, Morrison, 2017, Weiss and Castro: 2019, Moore and Martinez, 2020).

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***Lumea de mâine: Ce urmează după  
pandemie? Reflecții și proiecții***  
***(The World of Tomorrow. What Next after  
the Pandemic?)***, eds. Olivia Todorean,  
Sergiu Celac, George Scutaru,  
Curtea Veche Publishing, 2020

**presented by Mihaela TEODOR\***



The volume *Lumea de mâine: Ce urmează după pandemie? Reflecții și proiecții* (*The World of Tomorrow. What Next after the Pandemic?*), an intellectual output by New Strategy Center was produced and published, in a record time and in lock down conditions, in July 2020 and in collaboration with Curtea Veche Publishing.

The volume was coordinated by Olivia Todorean, a career diplomat with academic interests on theories of international relations and current global developments, Ambassador Sergiu Celac, a career diplomat and Honorary Chairman of New Strategy Center, and George Scutaru, the CEO of New Strategy Center and former presidential adviser for national security. The foreword was written by Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, President of the Munich Security Conference, and the afterword by Prof. Ioan Aurel Pop, President of the Romanian Academy.

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As the official presentation of the volume stress, in July 2020, the editorial work was finalized and ready for publishing for all of „37 essays signed by 43 Romanian and foreign authors representing various professions and fields of expertise: political scientists, economists, sociologists, psychologists, communication experts, and engineers, all with a solid reputation in their specific domains” (See more on <https://www.curteaveche.ro/p/lumea-de-maine-ce-urmeaza-dupa-pandemie>).

The authors are representatives of the academic and think-tank community from the USA, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Norway, Ukraine, Turkey, and Republic of Moldova. Some of the Romanians contributors are Sergiu Celac, Lazăr Comănescu, Cristian Diaconescu, Mihnea Motoc, Sorin Ducaru, Daniel Dăianu, Alina Bârgăoanu, and Vasile Dâncu.

Romanians and foreigners, from essential fields such as geopolitics, economics, diplomacy, security and defense were invited to contribute to the volume, proposing different approaches „on the most acute questions about the present and the biggest issues of the future after COVID-19”. As Wolfgang Ischinger notes in the preface “the initiative is all the more valuable as it offers decision-makers different angles of approach, early warning and recommendations for political actions” (See more on <https://www.newstrategycenter.ro/new-strategy-center-book-the-world-of-tomorrow-what-next-after-the-pandemic/>).

## **ACADEMIC FOCUS**

**CRESCent**

Strategic partnership project within  
ERASMUS+ Program  
AGREEMENT No. –  
2018-1-RO01-KA202-049449

**MIND THE GAP IN MEDIA  
COVERAGE AND STRATEGIC  
COMMUNICATION IN CASE  
OF SECURITY THREATS –  
THE DEVELOPMENT  
OF CRITICAL THINKING  
AND RESPONSIBLE REACTION**  
(October 1<sup>st</sup>, 2018 –  
September 30<sup>th</sup>, 2021)

CRESCent project addresses the challenge of social polarization created by the propagation of disinformation and fake news. It is a proven fact that fake news have created in Europe, and in the three countries participating in the project, an acute miscommunication and lack of trust between the two targeted professional categories. As the media has been pressed into reaching large audiences, institutional spokespersons were forced into communicating what is necessary and not divulging aspects which could jeopardise security investigations and public safety. A gap of trust and efficient communication was, thus, created and later on widened by the phenomenon of fake news. While it is indeed the media professionals that shape the way information is delivered to the public, they themselves might get trapped in particular “narratives” and share common mental frames. Recognizing that the media professionals are themselves the locus of potential influence by external actors is crucial to developing strategies to combat misinformation and hostile influence. CRESCent aims to address this divide through innovative solutions and multiplication of best practices of both spokespersons and journalists.

CRESCent project creates a training platform and a set of communication and cross-sectorial strategic communication instruments, which aim to capacitate institutional spokespersons and journalists from security and LEA fields, in order to use media reporting to the public in a conscious and ethical manner. CRESCent’s main target group consists of spokespersons in the field of national security and

LEAs. The secondary group is represented by (young) journalists who are active in the field of security.


Participating organizations are: “Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy (MVNIA) – Romania; University “Rey Juan Carlos” (URJC) – Spain; Kentro Meleton Asfaleias (KEMEA), Centre for Security Studies – Greece; Ministry of Internal Affairs, Directorate for Information and Public Relations (MAI-DIRP) – Romania.

Objective of the project are:

- to develop a toolkit of techniques, methods and instruments for institutional spokespersons and journalists who communicate on issues related to security and law enforcement, as support in their professional activity;
- to enhance key-competences and skills of the spokespersons and journalists so that they become resilient to fake news, build an ethics of reporting, perform double fact checking, provide and obey ethical grounds in handling sources, report security threats and handle truth for the preservation of democracy and the rule of law.

The CRESCent project is part of the ERASMUS+ program and it is funded by the European Commission. See more about the project on the official website: <https://crescentproject.eu>.





**A RADICAL MODEL OF RESILIENCE  
FOR YOUNG MINDS – ARMOUR**  
Grant Agreement No. 823683  
(January 1<sup>st</sup>, 2019 – December 31<sup>st</sup>, 2021)

The Euro-Arab Foundation leads ARMOUR (*A Radical Model of Resilience for Young Minds*) consortium and the project aiming to address the social polarization caused by the adoption and spread of extremists ideologies by creating an interdisciplinary learning model that helps individuals and communities develop resilience to the specific ideologies and behaviours of violent extremism. The ARMOUR's consortium, led by the Euro-Arab Foundation, is also made up of the Centre for Security Studies – KEMEA (Greece), the “Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy (Romania), SYNYO GmbH (Austria), the Italian Ministry of Justice, Agenfor (Italy), LIBRe Foundation (Bulgaria), the University of Malta (Malta) and the University of Groningen (Netherlands).

ARMOUR Project aims to address societal polarization via strengthening resilience of individuals, communities and vulnerable groups (such as children, youth etc.) to polarisation, and to promote interaction and cooperation between different local actors from public sectors, i.e. law enforcement, social services etc., that specialise in working with vulnerable groups in preventing extremism through development of cooperation models. The project will design and create a Toolkit for first-line practitioners to employ in reducing polarization among children and youth.

The Toolkit, capitalizing on previous work carried out by project partners, takes the form of experimental laboratories (experimental labs) which together work towards: strengthening individual capacity

to resist push and pull factors of radicalization; creating community empowerment and resilience to social polarization and violent extremism and assisting states deploy proportional responses against provocations and latent conflicts. The model will then be promoted through a social media campaign.

The expected impact of the project covers the following aspects:

- Increasing awareness and capacity of first-line practitioners: ARMOUR achieves this through the experimental labs and the related training programme. The first tool will help practitioners better understand and identify instances of radicalization and polarization among children and youth while the second one will help them improve their ability to use the project toolkit;
- Promoting interaction and cooperation among different stakeholders: ARMOUR achieves this by organizing the experimental labs in which practitioners and members of vulnerable communities have trusted interactions;
- Promoting the views of moderate voices by engaging with the silent majority and integrating them into the experimental lab;
- Developing and promoting concrete tools targeting vulnerable groups: the experimental lab combined with the best practices identified in the project and the online campaign are concrete tools which key actors can use when working with vulnerable youth.

The project is financed by the Internal Security Fund, a funding package of the Directorate-General for Home Affairs (European Commission) to promote the implementation of the Internal Security Strategy, law enforcement cooperation and the management of the Union's external borders. See more about the project on the official website: <https://armourproject.eu/a/privacy-policy>.



**Education, Scholarships, Apprenticeships  
and Youth Entrepreneurship  
Programme in Romania, funded by the EEA Grants –  
Financial Mechanism 2014-2021**

*Agreement no.: 18-COP-0017*

(October 1<sup>st</sup>, 2019 – September 30<sup>th</sup>, 2021)

**THESEUS Project aims at Connecting the Disconnections between Disparate Data, in order to provide knowledge for building Insightful Analysis.** The broad availability of data has led to increasing interest in methods for extracting useful information and knowledge from data, determining the emergence of new fields of science (e.g. data science). At the same time, big data algorithms have been signaled as a potential leverage that can lead to digital dictatorship if insufficiently understood, poorly handled and unethically regulated. Companies in every industry focused on ways to structure, process and analyze the growing volume and diversity of data so as to streamline decisions and gain a competitive edge. State institutions, regular citizens, social and political science practitioners on the other hand, are not yet properly equipped to properly mitigate the economic, social and political impact of the information technology revolution that awaits us in the decades to come. Therefore, in the process of understanding and mitigating risks and opportunities of Big Data, complex workloads, new skills and competences have to be acquired.

Following these emerging needs, the **objective of the project** is to enhance human capital and knowledge base by tackling directly skills and competences required and providing an understanding of the

processes guiding big data analytics. This objective will be met by **building and delivering a course**, consisting of four modules, capitalizing on big data methodologies: introductory module, data collection module, data processing module and data analysis module.

The course will not be designed as a technologically focused course, but rather knowledge, awareness and understanding focused course. The course avoids an algorithm-centered approach. It focuses on how options are understood and choices and tradeoffs are designed. Thus, it enhances, through learning by doing, key-competences and skills required in collecting, understanding, correlating and processing big data, helping them streamline problem-solving processes in a data-driven ecosystem.

The project addresses **two professional categories**: *governance and social scientists* and *national security practitioners*, whose complementary work is of paramount importance in insuring the sustainable development of democracy. Both categories carry out great responsibility at social level. Ill-informed decisional processes in national security and policy-making, based on incomplete, inaccurate or incorrectly correlated data generate negative impact, affecting society at large. Although practitioners targeted by the project work with large amounts of data, their background is mostly in social science or security studies, lacking a very specific technical training. Such (future) professionals need to better understand what and how big data can be capitalized so as to ethically and lawfully improve the overall efficiency of their organization.

**Participating organisations** are: “Mihai Viteazul” National Information Academy (ANIMV) – Romania; University of Malta (UoM) – Malta; Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) – Norway; National University of Political Studies and Public Administration (SNSPA) – Romania. THESEUS Project is part of the Education, Scholarships, Apprenticeships and Youth Entrepreneurship Programme in Romania, being funded by the EEA Grants – Financial Mechanism 2014-2021.



**Empowering a Pan-European  
Network to Counter Hybrid  
Threats (EU-HYBNET)  
H2020 Grant agreement  
no: 883054  
(May 2020 – April 2025)**

EU-HYBNET is a 60 month project (2020-2025), financed through the Horizon 2020, which will start in May 2020. The project is being developed and implemented by a consortium of 25 partners, coordinated by LAUREA University of Applied Sciences from Finland. The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats and the Joint Research Centre are leading partners of the EU-HYBNET project.

EU-HYBNET will bring together practitioners and stakeholders to identify and define their most urgent requirements for countering hybrid threats, by undertaking an in-depth analysis of gaps and needs and prioritizing those that are crucial to address through effective research and innovation initiatives, including arranging training and exercise events to test the most promising innovations (technical and social) which will lead to the creation of a roadmap for success and solid recommendations for uptake, industrialization and standardization across the European Union.

The project aims to build an empowered, sustainable network, which will:

- define common requirements that can fill knowledge gaps, deal with performance needs, and enhance capabilities of innovation endeavors;
- monitor significant developments in research and innovation;
- deliver recommendations for uptake and industrialization of the most promising innovations that address the needs of

practitioners, and determine associated priorities for standardization;

- establish conditions for enhanced interaction among its members;
- persistently strive to increase its membership and continually build network capacity through knowledge exchange.

EU-HYBNET will address four core themes to ensure coherence in the project's results: 1) Future Trends of Hybrid Threats, 2) Cyber and Future Technologies, 3) Resilient Civilians, Local Level and National Administration and 4) Information and Strategic Communication.

Romania represents the consortium through "Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy (MVNIA). MVNIA will incorporate the project's research findings and information into its MA & PhD research programs. As students come from diverse areas (security practitioners, legal, media, private business), the impact of exploitation of the information will reach a wide audience, and the EU-HYBNET training documents will also be employed to enhance capabilities of experts and practitioners in the fight against hybrid threats.

**EU-HYBNET is a Pan-European network of security practitioners, stakeholders, academia, industry players, and SME actors across EU, collaborating with each other to counter hybrid threats.**



With the support of the  
Erasmus+ Programme  
of the European Union

EUSEGOV  
Jean Monnet Module  
621227-EPP-1-2020-1-RO-EPPJMO-MODULE



### Jean Monnet Module EUSEGOV

*A common understanding of EU Security Governance. Teaching and researching the EU security policies and institutions for a better academic and professional approach in the security and intelligence field*  
(October 21<sup>st</sup>, 2020 – October 20<sup>th</sup>, 2023)\*

“Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy (MVNIA) implements a three year Jean Monnet Module grant: **EUSEGOV** – *A common understanding of EU Security Governance. Teaching and researching the EU security policies and institutions for a better academic and professional approach in the security and intelligence field.* The EUSEGOV module focuses on EU Governance, a subfield of EU studies that has received less attention comparatively with the study of other EU related issues. The module aims at educating students and at equipping them with the knowledge and necessary skills to become EU citizens and better security providers. The academic value of the EUSEGOV module is to deliver courses on EU Security Governance for security and intelligence studies students. The courses tackle specific aspects of EU integration studies: *Introduction to EU Security Governance and Strategic communication in EU Security Governance.*

The **specific objectives** of the Module are:

- Providing a coordinated series of MA compulsory and PhD summer courses aiming to familiarize students with the main

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\* This Project has been carried out with the support of the Erasmus+ programme of the European Union. The content of this Project does not necessarily reflect the position of the European Union, nor does it involve any responsibility on the part of the European Union.

trends and approaches in the field of communication and security governance in the European Union.

- Updating the teaching contents on the topic by research activities.
- Making aware students who do not automatically come into contact with EU studies of the importance of security governance by training them in using both the specialized language and methodology specific to subjects that pertain to the area of international relations, political sciences, as well as security studies.

The module's objectives will be achieved through the **teaching, researching and promoting** activities. To this respect, the EUSEGOV module includes a **two completely new courses**, one compulsory for MA students and one optional for PhD students, covering a major gap in the curricula i.e. the developments in the idea of European Security Governance. By bringing together academics and experts from various fields of knowledge, from civil society organizations and institutions, the interdisciplinary teaching and research approach of this Module provides the students with an in-depth and systematic understanding of key EU Security Governance topic. The EUSEGOV includes also research activities on the **Strategic communication in EU Security Governance thematic**. The research report will contain an extensive analysis of three aspects: *Strategic communication in EU – practices and official documents; EU Security strategic communication institutions; EU Security Governance future: alternative scenarios*.

A general dissemination campaign will be implemented to create a broad understanding of the importance and the particularities of EU Security Governance: two conferences, opening and closing conferences; a MA and a PhD round-table debates. The main output is represented by the training of a target group formed by master students and PhD candidates in security and intelligence studies that must better understand the direct and indirect implications of EU's security governance impact on the member states.



## CALL FOR PAPERS ROMANIAN INTELLIGENCE STUDIES REVIEW

“Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy, via its National Institute for Intelligence Studies, publishes the *Romanian Intelligence Studies Review* (RISR), a high quality peer reviewed and indexed research journal, edited in English and Romanian twice a year.

The aim of the journal is to create a framework for debate and to provide a platform accessible to researchers, academicians, professional, practitioners and PhD students to share knowledge in the form of high quality empirical and theoretical original research papers, case studies, conceptual framework, analytical and simulation models, literature reviews and book review within security and intelligence studies and convergent scientific areas.

Topics of interest include but are not limited to:

- Intelligence in the 21<sup>st</sup> century
- Intelligence Analysis
- Cyber Intelligence
- Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)
- History and memory in Intelligence
- Security paradigms in the 21<sup>st</sup> century
- International security environment
- Security strategies and policies
- Security Culture and public diplomacy

**Review Process:** RISR shall not accept or publish manuscripts without prior peer review. Material which has been previously copyrighted, published, or accepted for publication will not be considered for publication in the journal. There shall be a review process of manuscripts by one or more independent referees who are conversant in the pertinent subject area. Articles will be selected based on their relevance to the journal's theme, originality and scientific correctness, as well as observance of the publication's norms. The editor evaluates the recommendation and notifies the author of the manuscript status.

The review process takes maximum three weeks, the acceptance or rejects notification being transmitted via email within 5 weeks from the date of manuscript submission.

**Date of Publishing:** RISR is inviting papers for No. 25 and 26 and which is scheduled to be published on June and December, 2021.

**Submission deadlines: February 1<sup>st</sup> and July 1<sup>st</sup>**

**Author Guidelines:** Author(s) should follow the latest edition of APA style in referencing. Please visit [www.apastyle.org](http://www.apastyle.org) to learn more about APA style, and <http://www.animv.ro> for author guidelines and details.

**Contact:** Authors interested in publishing their paper in RISR are kindly invited to submit their **proposals electronically in .doc/.docx format at our e-mail address [rrsi@sri.ro](mailto:rrsi@sri.ro), with the subject title: RRSI article proposal.**

*Appearing twice a year, the review aims to place debates in intelligence in an institutional framework and thus facilitating a common understanding and approach of the intelligence field at national level.*

*The target audience ranges from students to professionals, from the general public to those directly involved in intelligence research and practice.*

**ISSN - 2393-1450**  
**ISSN-L - 2393-1450**  
**e-ISSN 2783-9826**

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