



THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

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ABSTRACT

At the end of 1991, the former Directorate I of the KGB, which dealt with collecting foreign intelligence, became the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR - Служба внешней разведки Российской Федерации), an organization led by Yevgeny Primakov. Subsequently, in August 1992, the objectives that the SVR needed to achieve were outlined, with gathering economic and technological information from the West being a priority. Although initially disorganized, the SVR quickly evolved from a poorly organized service to a proficient one. The current leadership, headed by director Sergei Naryshkin, reflects the service's closeness to the Kremlin leader, becoming an essential component in Vladimir Putin's strategic vision. The purpose of the SVR is to recruit secret human sources to ensure the security of the Russian Federation, training its officers so that they can build a productive and loyal agency.

Keywords: SVR, Russian Federation, Herman Simm, intelligence

Introduction

States are looking for as much information as possible to guarantee superiority and security in front of their enemies. One of these states is the Russian Federation, which, following the dismemberment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), has found itself in a situation of inferiority to the United States. Thus, the Russian Federation is trying by all means, including the improvement and modernization of intelligence services such as the Federal Security Service (FSB- Федеральная служба безопасности Российской Федерации), the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU- Главное разведывательное управление) and the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR- Служба внешней разведки Российской Федерации) to regain what it had lost with the collapse of the Soviet state, namely spheres of influence, economic zones, strategic partners, and recognition as a global, not just regional, Great Power.

This paper aims to identify the role played by the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation in guaranteeing the security of the Russian state. At present, it is one of the most successful intelligence services and, given that this is the objective for which the secret services were created, the following questions can be asked: Why did this service emerge? What is the organizational structure? Who runs the SVR? What are the objectives of the SVR? Which intelligence services does the SVR cooperate with? How are external intelligence officers trained?

The paper also analyzes the motivations that can lead to the decision to betray one's own country in favor of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation. It can therefore be appreciated that the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation is particularly important in realizing Russia's security goals.

The Collapse of the KGB and the Rise of the SVR

Before 1989, there were two intelligence services in the Soviet Union: the Committee of State Security (KGB - Комитет государственной безопасности) and the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR (GRU - Главное разведывательное

управление). After the breakup of the Soviet state, the Russian intelligence services were reformed. The former Directorate I of the KGB, which was in charge of gathering information from outside the country, became the SVR, an organization headed by Yevgeny Primakov, at the end of 1991. Subsequently, in August 1992, the Law on Foreign Intelligence was adopted, which clearly set out the objectives to be achieved by the SVR, with Western economic and technological intelligence being a priority in intelligence gathering. Under Article 5, the SVR "shall support the economic development and scientific and technical progress of the country by collecting economic and technical information and provide this information to government bodies". The same law stipulated that "career personnel could occupy positions in ministries, departments, institutions, enterprises and organizations without their presence there, compromising those institutions and making them liable to the charge of association with foreign intelligence institutions". Article 15 also mentioned cooperation between the SVR and other governmental bodies, stating that "Ministries and departments of the Russian Federation shall assist the foreign intelligence institutions of the Russian Federation in their intelligence work" (Knight, 1996, p. 135).

Despite the reforms, the SVR was a weak service when it was established in comparison with former KGB Directorate I. This was due to the fact that the scope of the SVR's activities was reduced as a result of the transfer of the intelligence agents of some 40 Third World countries into a state of conservation. Also, the number of intelligence officers with diplomatic cover¹ embassies based in Western Europe and the United States were reduced by about 20% (Troncotă & Blidaru, 2020). In addition to this, the SVR had to establish cooperative relations with other intelligence services in the West on issues that seriously affected the security of the Russian Federation, such as terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, and nuclear weapons proliferation (Zaitseva, 2007). At present, the SVR has moved from the stage of a deficient service to a real intelligence service, which strives to reach the highest standards.

Management and Organization of the SVR

The head of the SVR is Sergei Naryshkin. He was appointed as director of the Foreign Intelligence Service by President Vladimir Putin in 2016, replacing Mikhail Fradkov. Naryshkin

has worked in St. Petersburg city hall with Vladimir Putin since the 1990s (UNANSEA, n.d.). Prior to his appointment as head of foreign intelligence, he served as head of the Presidential Administration, and in 2011 he became chairman of the State Duma of the Russian Federation (Lenta.ru, n.d.). In terms of the SVR chief's youthful activities between 1978-1982, his biography has a gap, which has led many critics to claim that this is the period when he trained to become an intelligence officer. From 1988-1992 he was at the Soviet Union Embassy in Brussels as an expert for the State Committee for Science and Technology. This position is ideally suited as a cover for an officer in the KGB's Directorate I, which was in charge of intelligence gathering from the external environment (Troncotă & Blidaru, 2020).

Next to Sergei Naryshkin, the SVR is headed by deputy directors, including Aleksandr Nikolaevich Balakin, Andrey Mikhaylovich Moryakov, Aleksandr Nikolaevich Smolkov, Sergey Aleksandrovich Gerasimov and the first deputy director of the SVR, Viktor Fedorovich Lavrentsov (RuPEP.org, n.d.).

The Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) is organized into five departments as follows: the Analytical and Intelligence Department, the IT Department, the Operational Technique Department, the Economic Intelligence Department, and the Foreign Counterintelligence Department (Agentura.ru, n.d.). Within the Analytical and Intelligence Department, the most notable is the U.M.39949, commanded from February 1, 2024 by Pavel Ivanov, which has under its subordination several directorates, among which we can mention the Political Intelligence Directorate (P), the Legal Intelligence Directorate (L), the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Directorate (N) and the S Directorate, the department that supervises the work of illegal officers. It should be noted that Pavel Ivanov, prior to his current position, headed the Department of Economic Intelligence, focusing his attention on Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and the Baltic States (The Insider, 2024).

More information about Directorate S has come to light in recent years, especially after the discovery of the 10 illegals operating in the United States. They were betrayed by the former deputy of Directorate S, Colonel Aleksandr Poteev. Anna Chapman, the most notorious illegal uncovered in 2010, testified that she was caught after an FBI agent contacted her with the code that only Poteev and her liaison officer would have known. After the SVR colonel defected, he was sentenced in absentia to 25 years in prison for high treason and desertion (ABC-News, 2011).

The SVR also includes the Zaslou structure,

which carries out autonomous actions in support of Foreign Intelligence Service operations outside the Russian Federation. This structure was created in 1997 by a secret order issued by the President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, and was to be subordinated to the Director of the SVR (Brocard, 2023). The Foreign Counterintelligence Directorate is also in charge of collecting information about traitors within the SVR and about the activities of Russian institutions abroad. Counterintelligence officers are tasked with recruiting human covert sources from opposing intelligence services. The most eloquent case is that of CIA officer Aldrich Ames, who was recruited by counterintelligence officer Victor Cherkashin (Latunsky, 2019).

The Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation operates globally and is responsible for gathering intelligence from most geographical areas. Its wide area of coverage has led to the establishment of several departments with regional competence within the service. In this way, the SVR divided the world into several departments along linguistic, ethnic, and cultural lines. Using the model of the former Directorate I of the KGB (Andrew & Gordievski, 1994), we can identify the following areas of interest of the SVR: Department 1 (North America), Department 2 (Latin America), Department 3 (Scandinavia and the Commonwealth), Department 4 (Germany and Austria), Department 5 (France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Benelux, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and the countries of the former Yugoslavia), Department 6 (China, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, and North Korea), Department 7 (Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Papua New Guinea, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines), Department 8 (Türkiye, Iran, Afghanistan, Israel, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan), Departments 9 and 10 (English and French-speaking African countries, except Egypt), Department 17 (Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Bangladesh), Department 18 (Arab countries and Egypt) and the former Soviet Department, covering countries such as Ukraine, Belarus, Republic of Moldova, Baltic States, etc.

Objectives of the SVR

According to the new version of the Federal Law "On Foreign Intelligence" of January 10, 1996, the objectives of the SVR are set by the President of the Russian Federation. Article 12 states that the President "determines the tasks of intelligence work", "controls and coordinates the activities of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation", makes decisions on the conclusion

¹ Colonel Oleg Penkovsky revealed, as early as 1962, that of the 5,200 Soviet diplomats in Soviet embassies and consulates in 72 Western countries, about 3,000 belonged to the two services KGB and GRU (Ștefănescu, 1992).

of cooperation agreements of the SVR with "intelligence and counterintelligence services of foreign states" and "appoints the heads of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation". The objectives that both the SVR and the GRU are to fulfill, according to Article 5, relate to assisting "the economic development, scientific and technological progress of the country and the military and technical security of the Russian Federation", as well as "ensuring favorable conditions for the successful implementation of the security policy of the Russian Federation" (Federal Law No. 5-FZ, 1996). The Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation is also authorized to carry out disinformation and propaganda missions, to protect employees of Russian institutions abroad and their families, to conduct strategic, economic, military, scientific and technological espionage, and to conduct electronic surveillance abroad (DIA, 2017, 72).

At the same time, the strategic interests of the Russian Federation in the former Soviet area should not be ignored. In these countries, the SVR works closely with the Presidential Administration. Within the latter is the Department for Interregional and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, headed since 2021 by former SVR colonel Igor Maslov (Kremlin.ru, 2021). Before receiving this post, Igor Maslov was in charge of the department's "Moldovan Division", reporting to former SVR general Vladimir Cernov. Those under Igor Maslov's command prepared briefing notes and reports on politicians, monitored compromising information and drafted speeches that referred to ex-Soviet states. The information was forwarded to the SVR headquarters and the Presidential Administration (Thorik, 2020). Through the economical entity Promsvyazbank, run by Petr Fradkov, the son of former SVR director Mikhail Fradkov², the separatist regions of Moldova and Ukraine are financed. Evghenia Guțul, the pro-Kremlin Bashkan of Gagauzia, signed an agreement during her visit to Moscow in 2024, which stipulates that all pensioners and public sector employees in the region can claim a monthly payment equivalent to 100 dollars, which is possible by using MIR cards (payment system in Russia) (Borogan & Soldatov, 2024). According to these circumstances, we can assume that through this operation, the Russian secret services are trying to illegally finance pro-Russian parties in the Republic of Moldova in the context of the presidential elections in the form of support for the population of Gagauzia.

In terms of cyber activity, SVR has a hacking unit known as Cozy Bear (APT-29), which in 2021 affected the American company SolarWinds Corporation. SVR accomplished this by gaining access to the internal

network of software maker SolarWinds, inserting malware into a version of the Orion IT monitoring application. Subsequently, users of the program downloaded and installed the update along with the Russian malware, thus creating the opportunity to steal sensitive information. According to a statement released by the White House, "the SVR's compromise of the SolarWinds software supply chain gave the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service the ability to spy on or disrupt more than 16,000 computer systems around the world" (Cimpanu, 2021). Following the start of the war in Ukraine, the SVR, along with the FSB and GRU, began cyber- attacking major Romanian government institutions. According to Gen. SRI Anton Rog, head of the National Cyberint Center, "before the war in Ukraine started, there were two services that were buzzing us in one - GRU with APT-28 and FSB, with much more complex malware. GRU is noisier, it's from the military. FSB is more stylish and more complex malware. Since the war started, the SVR, with APT-29, came along" (ELR, 2023).

The SVR is also responsible for counter-terrorism, although the FSB has most of the counter-terrorism duties. The latter heads the National Anti-Terrorist Committee (NAC), headed by FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov. The director of the SVR is also a member of this committee, along with other dignitaries of the Russian Federation (FIDH.org, 2009). However, the importance that the SVR attaches to the fight against terrorism, as well as to other issues of interest to the Russian Federation, is reflected in the cooperation relations that the service has with foreign partners.

Collaboration with Counterpart Services

As a rule, cooperation with partner foreign services is carried out on counter-terrorism issues. Article 4(1) of the Federal Law "On Countering Terrorism" (Federal Law No. 35-FZ, 2006) states that cooperation with other services is mandatory. The article states that "the Russian Federation, in accordance with its international treaties, will cooperate in the fight against terrorism with other foreign states, their law enforcement agencies and special services, as well as international organizations". As for the SVR's cooperation with other intelligence services, Director Sergei Naryshkin said, "At present, I know of only a few special services that have openly declared their refusal to communicate with us. We constantly cooperate with all significant intelligence agencies in the world. Among our

partners is the CIA in the United States, with which we continue to interact on issues of countering international terrorism and exchange views on topical issues of our time" (EADaily, 2021). As for cooperation with the US service, the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine has caused the cooperation between the two agencies to decrease in intensity, with the SVR director stating that there are no substantial contacts at the moment between the two intelligence services (TASS, 2022). The situation became so tense that the SVR leadership announced that the US military base Tanf, located on the border between Syria, Jordan and Iraq, is being used to train Daesh militants to carry out acts of sabotage and terrorism not only on the territory of Syria, but also on the territory of Russia (TRT.net, 2023).

There is a close cooperation between the SVR and the services of the countries that are part of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), apart from Ukrainian and Moldovan secret services. In addition to these countries, the Russian services have good relations with the intelligence services of the states that are part of the BRICS³ and the SCO⁴, the main collaborator being the People's Republic of China (TASS, 2023).

Training of SVR Officers

Compared to the FSB Academy, the SVR Academy does not accept young people who have not completed higher education. To be eligible to enroll in the SVR Academy, candidates must be citizens of the Russian Federation "who are ready to serve their Motherland, have a higher education, are under 30 years of age, are physically healthy, have the ability to study foreign languages, and have a sufficient level of political, scientific and technical education and general culture". Candidates have to pass a series of psychological tests, which assess the level of intellectual development, quick thinking, sociability and neuropsychic stability (SVR-msotr, n.d.). According to Victor Suvorov, a former GRU officer, an important criterion in the selection of Soviet spies was that psychologists established the presence of a sense of humor in candidates. In their conception, "the man without a sense of humor, even if at first glance he seems very intelligent, is in reality a fool" (Suvorov, 2016, p. 93).

Admitted students have to learn how the operational work is carried out. They learn several foreign

languages, counterintelligence techniques, philosophy, sociology, economics, psychology, informational, operational and technical analysis, Russian and foreign literature and art, military history, self-defense techniques, driving different types of vehicles and basic use of firearms (Bennett, 2000; Braun, 2020). Colonel Mikhail Frolov, a professor at the SVR Academy, stated that he was teaching students the "art of intelligence". This is "the ability to get in touch with people, the ability to choose the people we need, the ability to ask questions in which our country and our leadership are interested, the ability, if you will, to be a psychologist" (Kremlin.ru, 2021).

In addition to officers who are trained by the SVR Academy, there are also illegal officers. The training of Directorate S staff is known to a limited number of people. According to Horațiu Blidaru, before being sent on foreign missions, "the illegals undergo intensive training, which includes the assimilation of foreign languages, the use of encrypted communication systems, codes and ciphers, steganography, the learning of techniques of counter- surveillance and concealment of equipment and materials used in secret activity, and the use of impersonal mailboxes" (Blidaru, 2021, p. 88).

Recruitment Methods Inherited from the KGB

In order to recruit agents to work with the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, officers of the SVR have to go through a certain process, which in Western literature is called the Agent Recruitment Cycle (Burkett, 2013). This process consists of identifying people who can meet the need for information; assessing the persons sighted, in terms of placement capacity and access to the desired information, and starting the process of determining the motivations and vulnerabilities of the agents; developing a relationship with the individual to assess their actions and whether they will be responsive to the demands of the officers; actual recruitment, which can be direct, with the officer disclosing his or her SVR membership, or by the new officer gradually coming to understand this; training and coordination (handling) meetings⁵ with the agent, including outlining the tasks to be performed; and handing the officer over to another case officer or ending the relationship.

³BRICS is an international organization, and the name comes from its main member countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.

⁴The abbreviation SCO stands for Shanghai Cooperation Organization. It is an organization that includes Russia, China, and four former Soviet republics in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan).

⁵The publication Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (2023, p. 5) documented that agents recruited from Ukraine began in the fall of 2021 to go on short vacations to resorts in Türkiye, Cyprus, and Egypt, where they met with their Russian handlers, from whom they received their future assignments.

²Currently, Mikhail Fradkov is the Director of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISI), which until 2009 was part of the SVR under the designation of U.M.613.

These steps have been rigorously followed since KGB times. In a recently declassified 1989 report entitled "Some Aspects of Training the Operative for Psychological Influence of Foreigners During Cultivation", it is noted that the emphasis was predominantly on the power of persuasion, on psychological influence, which was generally directed towards a person's consciousness, reason, logical thinking, sphere of ideas and worldview and a person's subconscious emotions, feelings, and attitudes (KGB Report, 1989).

At the same time, to assess the agent's personality, intelligence officers have to identify "the degree of his dissatisfaction with his own life, the successes he has achieved and his inner conflict", especially since "a dissatisfied person, who is in a state of conflict with society, with his close persons or with himself, is receptive to the highest degree to new ideas, because he sees in them the possibility to change his existing situation for the better". Also, the age of the agent is an important factor. An agent can be young and inexperienced, so that he or she can fall prey to Russian intelligence officers, who can take advantage of his or her naivety. But, according to the KGB Report, Russian foreign intelligence officers have to keep in mind that "the most vulnerable employees are those between 36 and 45 years of age, who occupy lower-ranking positions. Their enthusiasm for work is low, there may be problems in their family, financial difficulties arise, funds are needed for their children's education, to cover mortgage debts etc.". Moreover, it is added that "these employees lose self-confidence. Their feelings of worry, dissatisfaction and resentment towards their bosses increase. They start actively looking for a way out of the impasse" (KGB Report, 1989).

In order to recruit a person of interest, the Russian secret services will help to deepen the deplorable situation in which they find themselves (Suvorov, 2016). For example, if a potential source has financial problems, the SVR will try to aggravate them, so that the individual becomes more receptive to the ideas propagated by Russian intelligence officers.

After the moment of recruitment, most individuals realize that their situation has worsened considerably. According to psychologist David L. Charney (2019), after this phase, the agent faces two failures: "the first failure was not being able to manage his life during the crisis, before he became a traitor. And the second is that of being trapped in an existential black hole" (Charney, 2019, p. 9). This emerges from the statements of former traitors who worked for the Russian services. The Russian agent David Boone stated that the actions he took "overshadowed everything good I did in my life before and after. I'm glad it's over." Likewise, Robert

Lipka, a National Security Agency (NSA) employee who had spied for the Russian services for 30 years, said that when "I started, I didn't realize what it all meant. As I was doing it, I tried to withdraw several times. For 30 years I lived a life of terror thinking that the whole thing would be uncovered" (Charney, 2019, p. 14).

The aim of the SVR officers is to strengthen the relationship with the covert source so that the source can be certain that he will not betray. Officers must induce a sense of security by recognizing to the agents the importance of the actions and services provided. In short, the more people feel validated, involved and rewarded, the more the quality of the bond will increase. It is this ability of Russian officers to influence individuals necessary for intelligence work that led Edward Lucas (2018), a specialist in Russian intelligence, to assert that many of the greatest traitors, from Kim Philby to Herman Simm, have admitted that they were not simply defectors, but employees of the other side.

The Reasons of Treason: the Herman Simm Case

The reasons for betrayal are multiple, and the purpose of SVR officers is to observe the vulnerabilities of future agents in order to recruit and coordinate them. Without secret human sources, intelligence services cannot function properly. Despite technological developments, HUMINT has remained the only way in which a high-performing intelligence service can satisfy, at least partially, its intelligence needs. For this reason, intelligence officers' identification of agents' motivations must take precedence in their work. Thus, for an individual, idealism, ideology, patriotism and religion are among the main motives when it comes to making a complicated decision such as betraying one's own country. Likewise, professional or social failures, states of frustration, as well as the desire for social recognition and appreciation constitute, as presented above, a complex of motivations, which can affect the capacity for critical thinking (Albu, 2022). After recognizing motivations, the officers of the former Directorate I of the KGB, later SVR, had to have the ability to find the right words. To realize the desires of the agent, the officer "must talk to him about things that can be understood, using simple and concrete expressions" (KGB Report, 1989).

According to a CIA psychologist, Dr. Ursula M. Wilder (2017), individuals who have been recruited by an adversary intelligence service live double lives. Among the elements she lists when it comes to the possibility

of a person betraying their own country, she emphasizes personality disorders, which refer to the traits, attitudes and values that characterize a person, and a state of crisis, manifested by a period of intense stress in a person's life.

Case Study

In what follows, in order to reveal both the persuasive skills of SVR officers and the dysfunctions and motivations of an agent, the case of Estonian Herman Simm we consider to be relevant. In order to understand not only the *modus operandi*, but also the psychological processes behind the actions, we will present the development of the relationship between Herman Simm and the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation in stages. The action went through several stages: crisis stage, recruitment stage, active stage, pre-arrest stage, and arrest and post-arrest stage (Charney, 2019).

I. CRISIS PHASE

Following a corruption scandal, which Herman Simm vehemently denied, he was dismissed as Director General of the Estonian Police. According to the Estonian Intelligence Service (Security Police Annual Review, 2008), one of Simm's desires was to obtain the rank of general, and his dismissal dashed his hopes of achieving this goal. When asked by journalists why he allowed himself to be recruited by the SVR, Simm stated that he felt "frustrated" because he had "lost his job as police chief because of false accusations" (Spiegel, 2010). Thus, it can be seen that before being approached by the Russian service, Simm went through a period of crisis, in which the state of frustration and the desire for recognition were stronger than the oath he swore to his own country.

II. RECRUITMENT STAGE

Herman Simm was recruited in 1995 by the SVR officer Valeri Mihhailovich Zentsov, a former KGB officer in Estonia. After the dissolution of the State Security Committee of the Estonian Socialist Soviet Republic on January 1, 1992, Valeri Zentsov became an official military pensioner of the Russian Federation. In reality, he continued to work in the SVR, used the cover of a businessman and, with temporary residence permits, lived in Estonia. Subsequently, Herman Simm's activity was coordinated by the SVR's Directorate S officer Sergei Yakovlev, who was alias Antonio Amurett de Jesus Graf, with Portuguese citizenship. In addition to

offering cash⁶ to Herman Simm, the Russian officers lied to Herman Simm that he would receive the rank of major general and multiple decorations (Security Police Annual Review, 2008). To motivate his collaboration with the SVR, Herman Simm stated that he feared for his daughter's life (Spiegel, 2010).

III. ACTIVE STAGE

After it began to be coordinated by Sergei Yakovlev, training meetings and receiving assignments took place outside the borders of Estonia (Security Police Annual Review, 2008). According to Simm, "in the beginning, it was very difficult to get information out illegally. But the higher I climbed, the easier it became". He likened his work to "constantly walking on the edge of a knife", stating that he used to get nervous when he met "the same person twice in one day" (Spiegel, 2010). In short, in the active phase of providing the most important information, the agent experienced an intense state of anxiety and fear of not being caught by the Estonian intelligence service.

IV. PRE-ARREST STAGE

Herman Simm stated that he realized that his arrest was imminent when his liaison officer, Sergei Yakovlev, called him from his cell phone stating that he could not come to the meeting, thus, this action went against "all the rules of conspiracy", making him understand that his liaison officer had been uncovered (Spiegel, 2010).

V. ARREST AND POST-ARREST STAGE

This is the stage when stress levels increased the most, followed by the feeling of anxiety decreasing after the officer got used to the thought of being caught (Charney, 2019). Traitors tried to justify their actions and minimize their seriousness. This was also done by Herman Simm, who said he did not give the Russians the information they "really wanted" (Spiegel, 2010).

Thus, from the statements of the Estonian Intelligence Service, as well as from the statements of Herman Simm, we can observe that the act of betraying his own country was taken at a time when he felt wronged. Because of frustration and professional failures, he became vulnerable to the ideas propagated by SVR intelligence officers, who offered the Estonian agent money, the so-called 'general rank' and protection. Herman Simm experienced the same sensations that are typical for traitors: he felt anxiety, fear of not being caught and the feeling of being trapped in this vicious circle from which it was impossible to escape.

³Herman Simm is said to have received 1.3 million Estonian kroons, or about 83,000 Euro, for the work.

Conclusion

Following the analysis of open-source information, we were able to observe some of the activities of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation. It was created and organized by its first director, Yevgeny Primakov, and has developed into a high-performance intelligence service

with a wide range of activities carried out on a global scale. The service has well-trained officers who seek to ensure the security of the Russian Federation while harming other states. The institution, according to the 1996 Federal Law "On Foreign Intelligence", reports to the Kremlin leader, who outlines its tasks. The closeness between SVR director Sergei Naryshkin and President Vladimir Putin also makes the Foreign Intelligence Service more politicized than the GRU.

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